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THE LIFE

OF

JOHN LOCKE,

WITH EXTRACTS FROM

HIS CORRESPONDENCE, JOURNALS,

AND

COMMON-PLACE BOOKS.

BY LORD KING.

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THE LIFE

OF

JOHN LOCKE.

THE state of the coin had for a long time very much engaged Locke's attention; the first of his treatises upon that subject was published in 1691, and the farther consideration in 1695, for the purpose of correcting the false ideas then universally prevalent.

Whenever there is considerable distress in the public affairs,—if trade is embarrassed, if the currency is disordered, if the finances are deranged,—there are always to be found men, who from ignorance or interest, are ready to recommend what they are pleased to call the easy, practical, and natural remedies, which in the end generally aggravate the evils they were supposed to cure. Under a despotic Govern-

ment, if the debts are embarrassing, or the finances in disorder, a base coin is issued, and the defrauded creditor is compelled to submit in silence to the royal ordinance. Such was the common ordinary practice of the old French Government, and of most of the other states of Europe, whose coins have been successively deteriorated from their original standard.

In our own country, and in our own times, we have seen a Bank-Restriction Act imposed, to avoid a temporary difficulty, which deranged our affairs during a quarter of a century.

In 1695, one or perhaps all these causes of national distress were severely felt; the war had diminished the national resources, and the frauds practised for some time by the clipping the money, had considerably impaired its intrinsic value. Mr. Lowndes and the practical men of that day recommended the usual panacea, an alteration of the standard; but those honest ministers Lord Somers and Sir William Trumbull, the Secretary of State, knowing from the treatise on Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money, published in 1691, that Locke had turned his attention very much to those subjects, now called him to their assistance, and were guided by his advice.

Lord Keeper Somers writes to him:

" SIR, November, 95.

" You will easily see by the book which was put in my hand last night, and by the title of a Report which it bears, as well as by the advertisement at the end of it, that you were in the right when you said that the alteration of the standard was the thing aimed at. The challenge at the end, if you will allow me to say so, is in some sort directed to you. The proposition which you and I discoursed upon yesterday is endeavoured to be represented impracticable. The passing of money by weight is said to be ridiculous, at least in little payments; the sudden fall of guineas will be an utter ruin to very great numbers; there is no encouragement proposed to invite people to bring the clipped money into the Mint, so that will be melted down to be transported, which will be a certain profit at least, till by a law money can be exported. And whilst this is doing nothing will be left to carry on commerce, for no one will bring out his guineas to part with them for twenty shillings when he paid thirty shillings for them so lately. These, as I remember, were the objections made use of; and I doubt not but you will, without great difficulty, help us with some expedients for them. I believe it an easier task than to

remove what I see is so fixed, the project of alteration of the standard.

" I am,
Your most humble servant,
J. SOMERS."

In the " Farther Consideration on raising the value of Money," published 1695, addressed to Sir John Somers, he endeavoured to strip the question of hard, obscure, and " doubtful words wherewith men are often misled and mislead others." He condemns the nefarious project of raising the denomination and altering the standard as a fraud upon all creditors, and justly considers it as " THE MEANS OF CONFOUNDING THE PROPERTY OF THE SUBJECT, AND DISTURBING AFFAIRS TO NO PURPOSE."

The advice of Locke was followed, and the great recoinage of 1695 restored the current money of the country to the full legal standard.

The difference between the embarrassments which affected the currency in the reign of King William, and those which have occurred in our own time, may be thus stated: the coin at the period first mentioned, had been deteriorated by the frauds of individuals and the

neglect of the public; but when the evil was felt, and the remedy pointed out, the Parliament, notwithstanding the pressure of the war and the false theories of the practical men of those days, applied the proper remedy at the proper time before any great permanent debt had been incurred. In our own time the depreciation of the currency was entirely to be attributed to the Bank and the Government. The paper-money of a banking company without the one indispensable condition of security against excesses, *payment in specie on demand*, was in an evil hour substituted in place of the King's lawful coin; and in order that the Minister might avoid the imputation of being an unskilful financier, who borrowed money on unfavourable terms, a debt of unexampled magnitude was accumulated in a debased currency, to be ultimately discharged by payment in specie at the full and lawful standard. It must be confessed, that by the tardy act of retributive justice which was passed in 1819, the punishment inflicted upon the nation was in the exact proportion to the former deviations from good faith and sound principle, and we may at least hope that the severity of the penalty will prevent for the future a repetition of the same folly.

Respecting the other subject of the treatise, viz. "Consideration on lowering the rate of Interest," the author asks this question: "Whether the price of the hire of money can be regulated by law?" The same question, after the lapse of 130 years, we may still continue to repeat with the same success. He then shows that the attempt "to regulate the rate of interest will increase the difficulty of borrowing, and prejudice none but those who need assistance."

In the same year he was appointed to a seat at the Council of Trade. Sir John Somers writes to inform him of the King's nomination, and to make excuse for using his name without his "express consent."

Sir Wm. Trumbull communicates the same appointment by the following letter.

"SIR, Whitehall, May 19, 1696.

"BESIDES my particular obligations to thank you for your kind letter to me, I am now to call upon you in behalf of the public, whose service requires your help, and consequently your attendance in town. The Council of Trade (whereof you are most worthily appointed a member,) must go on with effect, or the greatest inconveniences and mischief will fol-

low. I hope your health will permit you to come and make some stay here; and what reluctancy soever you may have to appear among us, I know your love to your country, and your great zeal for our common interests will overcome it, so that I will trouble you no farther till I can have the happiness of seeing you here, and assuring you by word of mouth that I am unalterably

Your most faithful humble servant,

WILLIAM TRUMBULL.

"My wife will have me send her humble service to you."

After holding the appointment at the Board of Trade for a short time, his increasing infirmities made him wish to resign it, and he communicated his intention to Lord Keeper Somers, by letter, dated 7th Jan. 1696-7.

"MY LORD,

"SOME of my brethren, I understand, think my stay in the country long, and desire me to return to bear my part, and to help to dispatch the multitude of business that the present circumstances of trade and the plantations fill their hands with. I cannot but say they are in the right; and I cannot but think, at the

same time, that I also am in the right to stay in the country, where all my care is little enough to preserve those small remains of health, which a settled and incurable indisposition would quickly make an end of anywhere else.

"There remains, therefore, nothing else to be done but that I should cease to fill up any longer a place that requires a more constant attendance than my strength will allow; and to that purpose, I prevail with your Lordship to move his Majesty, that he would be pleased to ease me of the employment he has been so graciously pleased to honour me with, since the crazyness of my body so ill seconds the inclination I have to serve him in it, and I find myself every way incapable of answering the ends of that commission. I am not insensible of the honour of that employment, nor how much I am obliged to your Lordship's favourable opinion in putting me into a post, which I look upon as one of the most considerable in England. I can say that nobody has more warm wishes for the prosperity of his country than I have; but the opportunity of showing those good wishes, in being any way serviceable to it, I find comes too late to a man whose health is inconsistent with

the business, and in whom it would be folly to hope for a return to that vigour and strength which such an employment I see requires. It is not without due consideration that I represent this to your Lordship, and that I find myself obliged humbly and earnestly to request your Lordship to obtain for me a dismission out of it. I wish your Lordship many happy new years, and am, with the utmost acknowledgment and respect."

LORD KEEPER SOMERS TO MR. LOCKE.

"SIR, 26th Jan. 1696-7.

"My great fatigue, joined with a very great indisposition, must make my excuse for being so slow in returning an answer to your very obliging letter. I am very sorry for your ill health, which confines you to the country for the present; but now you will have so much regard to yourself, your friends, and your country, as not to think of returning to business till you are recovered to such a competent degree, as not to run the hazard of a relapse. As to the other part of your letter, which relates to the quitting the commission, I must say you are much in the wrong, in my opinion, to entertain a thought of it; and I flatter my-

self so far as to believe I could bring you over to my sentiments, if I had the happiness of half an hour's conversation with you. These being my thoughts, you cannot wonder if I am not willing to enter upon the commission you give me, of saying something to the King of your purpose. But when the new commission is made, and the establishment fixed, and the Parliament up, and you have had the opinion of your friends here, I will submit to act as you shall command me. In the mean time give me leave to say, that no man alive has a greater value for you, nor is with more sincerity than myself, Sir,

Your most faithful servant,

J. SOMERS."

DRAFT OF LOCKE'S ANSWER TO LORD KEEPER SOMERS.

"MY LORD, Feb. 1, 1696-7.

"I KNOW nobody that can with so much right promise himself to bring me over to his sentiments as your Lordship, for I know not any one that has such a master-reason to prevail as your Lordship, nor any one to whom, without attending the convictions of that reason, that I am so much disposed to submit to

with implicit faith. Your Lordship, I perceive, from several positions takes a different view of the same thing; and since your Lordship, who always speaks reason, is always also ready to hear it, I promise myself that the propositions I made would not appear to your Lordship altogether unfit, had I an opportunity to offer to your Lordship all the considerations that moved and hold me to it. The obliging promise your Lordship has been pleased to make me in the honour of yours of the 25th of January, that when I have had your Lordship's opinion, you will not refuse me the favour I have asked, if I shall then continue my request, sets me at rest for the present; and a word from your Lordship that you will have the goodness to let me have notice time enough to lay before your Lordship what weighs with me in the case, before any thing can be done either in making a new commission, or fixing the establishment, will ease your Lordship of any farther importunity from me; and then I who am so much in your favour, shall not alone of all the subjects of England, apprehend that, upon a fair hearing, your Lordship will not allow the equity of my case. Untoward health, which complies no more with good manners than with other obligations, must be my ex-

cuse to your Lordship for this last, as well as it was a great cause of my first request to you in this affair. If my ill lungs would permit me now presently, (as becomes me) to come to town and wait there the opportunity of discoursing your Lordship, I should not have reason as I have to desire to quit this employment. The great indulgence your Lordship expresses to my infirm constitution, makes me hope it will extend itself farther; it cannot, I think, do less than make your Lordship bethink yourself of a man to substitute in the place of a shadow. I cannot make an equal return to your Lordship's concerns for my health, since my country's welfare is so much interested in your Lordship's preservation, mixing with my concern for your late indisposition, will not suffer my good wishes for the confirmation of your strength to be purely personal to your Lordship, though nobody can be more than I am,

&c. &c."

In the following year King William ordered Locke to attend him at Kensington, desirous to employ him again in the public service. However flattering the King's intention towards him must have been, the state of his

health prevented him from accepting the honour that was designed him: he writes to the Lord Chancellor Somers, probably from Oates.

"Jan. 28, 1697-8.

"MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP.

"SUNDAY, in the evening, after I had waited on the King, I went to wait upon your Lordship, it being, I understood, his Majesty's pleasure I should do so before I returned hither. My misfortune in missing your Lordship I hoped to repair by an early diligence the next morning; but the night that came between destroyed that purpose and me almost with it. For, when I was laid in my bed, my breath failed me; I was fain to sit up in my bed, where I continued a good part of the night, with hopes that my shortness of breath would abate, and my lungs grow so good-natured as to let me lie down to get a little sleep, whereof I had great need; but my breath constantly failing me as often as I laid my head upon my pillow, at three I got up, and sat by the fire till morning. My case being brought to this extremity, there was no room for any other thought but to get out of town immediately; for, after the two precedent nights without any rest, I concluded the agonies I laboured under

so long in the second of those, would hardly fail to be my death the third, if I stayed in town. As bad weather, therefore, as it was, I was forced early on Monday morning to set out and return hither.

"His Majesty was so favourable as to propose the employment your Lordship mentioned; but the true knowledge of my own weak state of health made me beg his Majesty to think of some fitter person, and more able, to serve him in that important post; to which I added my want of experience for such business. That your Lordship may not think this an expression barely of modesty, I crave leave to explain it to your Lordship, (though there I discover my weakness,) that my temper, always shy of a crowd of strangers, has made my acquaintances few, and my conversation too narrow and particular, to get the skill of dealing with men in their various humours, and drawing out their secrets. Whether this was a fault or no to a man that designed no bustle in the world, I know not. I am sure it will let your Lordship see that I am too much a novice in the world for the employment proposed.

"Though we are so oddly placed here, that we have no ordinary conveyance for our letters from Monday till Friday, yet this

delay has not fallen out much amiss. The King was graciously pleased to order me to go into the country to take care of my health: these four or five days here have given me a proof to what a low state my lungs are now brought, and how little they can bear the least shock. I can lie down again, indeed, in my bed, and take my rest; but, bating that, I find the impression of these two days in London so heavy upon me still, which extends farther than the painfulness of breathing, and makes me listless to every thing, so that methinks the writing this letter has been a great performance.

"My Lord, I should not trouble you with an account of the prevailing decays of an old pair of lungs, were it not my duty to take care his Majesty should not be disappointed, and, therefore, that he lay not any expectation on that, which, to my great misfortune, every way, I find would certainly fail him; and I must beg your Lordship, for the interest of the public, to prevail with his Majesty to think on somebody else, since I do not only fear, but am sure, my broken health will never permit me to accept the great honour his Majesty meant me. As it would be unpardonable to betray the King's business, by undertaking

what I should be unable to go through; so it would be the greatest madness to put myself out of the reach of my friends during the small time I am to linger in this world, only to die a little more rich, or a little more advanced. He must have a heart strongly touched with wealth, or honours, who at my age, and labouring for breath, can find any great relish for either of them."

King William, who was subject to the same asthmatic complaint, is said to have conversed with Locke respecting his treatment of his own disorders. The King, when he was told that a very strict abstinence afforded the only relief, acknowledged that the advice was very good, but, like other patients, did not resort to that disagreeable remedy. Having refused the employment which the King had designed for him, he now determined to resign that which he for some years held, and for the same reason.

The asthmatic complaint, to which he had been long subject, making a continued residence in London, particularly during the winter season, very distressing to him, he had for some years taken up his abode with Sir F. and Lady Masham, at Oates, near Ongar, in Essex,

where he was perfectly at home, and enjoyed the society most agreeable to him; as Lady Masham, the daughter of Cudworth, is said to have been a woman of great sense and of most agreeable manners. Their intimacy seems to have been of long standing by the following letter of Locke to her brother, Mr. Cudworth, dated 1683, which is interesting, as it affords a proof of the great activity of his mind in the search for every sort of knowledge.

"SIR, London, 27th April, 1683.

"THOUGH you are got quite to the other side of the world, yet you cease not to make new acquisitions here; and the character you have left behind you, makes your acquaintance be sought after to the remotest parts of the earth. There is a commerce of friendship as well as merchandise; and though nobody, almost, lets his thoughts go so far as the East Indies, without a design of getting money and growing rich, yet, if you allow my intentions, I hope to make a greater advantage by another sort of correspondence with you there. In the conversation I have had the happiness to have sometimes with your sister here, I have observed her often to speak of you with more

tenderness and concern than all the rest of the world, which has made me conclude it must be something extraordinary in you which has raised in her (who is so good a judge) so particular an esteem and affection, beyond what is due to the bare ties of nature and blood. And I cannot but think that your souls are akin, as well as your bodies, and that yours, as well as hers, is not of the ordinary alloy. I account it none of the least favours she has done me, that she has promised me your friendship; and you must not think it strange, if I presume upon her word, and trouble you with some inquiries concerning the country you are in, since she encourages me in it, and assures me I shall not fail of an answer.

"Some of those who have travelled, and writ of those parts, give us strange stories of the tricks done by some of their jugglers there, which must needs be beyond legerdemain, and seems not within the power of art or nature. I would very gladly know whether they are really done as strange as they are reported; and whether those that practise them are any of them Mahometans, or all (which I rather suppose) heathens, and how they are looked on by the Bramins, and the other people of the

country; whether they have any apparitions amongst them, and what thoughts of spirits; and as much of the opinions, religion, and ceremonies of the Hindoos and other heathens of those countries, as comes in your way to learn and inquire. It would be too great kindness, if you could learn any news of any copies of the Old or New Testament, or any parts of them, which they had amongst them, in any language, in those Eastern countries, before the Europeans traded thither by the Cape of Good Hope. I should trouble you also with inquiries concerning their languages, learning, government, manners, and particularly Aureng Zebe, the Emperor of Hindostan, since I could promise myself a more exact account from you than what we have in printed travels; but I fear I have been more troublesome than what you will imagine will become a man that does but now begin to beg your acquaintance. If I have trespassed herein, you must excuse it to the little distinction I make between you and your sister; you must conclude I forgot myself, and thought I was talking to, and (as I used to do) learning something of her; and 'tis to the same account I must beg you to place the obligation you will lay on me, by procur-

ing and sending hither an answer to the inclosed letter, directed to Mrs. Richards. Her husband died going to the East Indies, in a ship that set out hence about Christmas was twelvemonths, where he was to have been factor, somewhere in the Bay of Bengal, for the Company. His wife and two daughters, who were with him, went on their voyage; where she settled herself, and remains now, you will easily know. I beg the favour of you to get the inclosed conveyed to her, and an answer from her, which be pleased to direct to be left for me either with Mr. P. Percevall, at the Black Boy, in Lombard-street, or Mr. S. Cox, at the Iron Key, in Thames-street, London.

"And now, having been thus free with you, 'tis in vain to make apologies for it; if you allow your sister to dispose of your friendship, you will not take it amiss that I have looked upon myself as in possession of what she has bestowed on me; or that I begin my conversation with you with a freedom and familiarity suitable to an established amity and acquaintance; besides, if, at this distance, we should set out according to the forms of ceremony, our correspondence would proceed with

a more grave and solemn pace than the treaties of princes, and we must spend some years in the very preliminaries. He that, in his first address, should only put off his hat and make a leg, and say your servant, to a man at the other end of the world, may, (if the winds set right,) and the ships come home safe, and bring back the return of his compliment, may, I say, in two or three years, perhaps, attain to something that looks like the beginning of an acquaintance, and by the next Jubilee there may be hopes of some conversation between them. Sir, you see what a blunt fellow your sister has recommended to you; as far removed from the ceremonies of the Eastern people you are amongst, as from their country; but one that, with great truth and sincerity, says to you,

I am, &c.

J. L.

"One thing, which I had forgot, give me leave to add, which is a great desire to know how the several people of the East keep their account of time, as months and years; and whether they generally agree in using periods answering to our weeks; and whether their arithmetic turns at ten as ours doth."

The following letters are selected from a very great number written by Locke to his relation Mr. King, afterwards Lord Chancellor, and found amongst his papers.

TO P. KING, ESQ. M. P. MIDDLE TEMPLE, LONDON.

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, July 3d, 98.

"I AM glad that you are so well entered at the bar; it is my advice to you to go on so gently by degrees, and to speak only in things that you are perfectly master of, till you have got a confidence and habit of talking at the bar. I have many reasons for it which I shall discover to you when I see you. This warm day, (which has been the third that I have been able this year yet to pass without a fire,) gives me hopes that the comfortable weather which I have long wished for is setting in, that I may venture to town in a few days, for I would not take a journey thither to be driven out again presently, as I am sure our late cold weather would have done, for my lungs are yet very weak.

"I have writ to my Lord Pembroke, because you desire it, and because I understand by you that Mr. Edwards desires it; you will see what

I have writ, but it is by no means fit that Mr. Edwards should see my letter, for I have in it kept to the measures I always observe in such cases, and which have gained some credit to my recommendation, though it does not always content candidates, if one says no more than what one knows. If you deliver it, pray let it be with my most humble service; if you do not deliver it, pray burn it.

"My lady, &c. give you their service.

I am, dear cousin,

Your most affectionate

J. LOCKE."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, March 1st, 1701.

"IN compliance with yours of yesterday, I write this evening with intention to send my letter to Harlow to-morrow morning, that Mr. Harrison may, if possible, find some way of conveyance of it to you before to-morrow night. The family and other circumstances have no exception, and the person I have heard commended, but yet the objection made is considerable. I think the young gentleman concerned ought to manage it so as to be well satisfied whether that be what he can well bear, and will consist with the comfort and satis-

faction he proposes to himself in that state before he seem to hearken to any such proposal, so that he may avoid what he cannot consent to, without any appearance of a refusal. For to make a visit upon such proposal, though it be designed without any consequence, and offered to be contrived as of chance, is yet a sort of address; and then going no farther, whatever is said will be ill taken of her friends, and consequently the whole family be disobliged, which will have ill consequences, and therefore should be avoided: for whatever reason a man may have to refuse a woman that is offered him, it must never be known that it was any thing in her person; such a discovery makes a mortal quarrel. If he that proposed it be the confidant of the young gentleman, and can be relied on by him, and has said nothing of it to her friends, he possibly may contrive an unsuspected interview, and is the fittest person to do it; if not, the young man must find some other way to satisfy himself that may not be discovered. A friend of mine in Jermyn-street, who missed you narrowly when you came last from Exeter, knows her well; but an inquiry there must be managed with great dexterity to avoid suspicion of the

matter, and consequently talking of it. You shall be sure to hear from me in the matter before you go out of town, if you persist in the mind of going.

"I am your most affectionate cousin,
and humble servant,
JOHN LOCKE."

"DEAR COUSIN, Jan 27, 1700.

"I am as positive as I can be in any thing that you should not think of going the next circuit. I do not in the mean time forget your calling; but what this one omission may be of loss to you, may be made up otherwise. I am sure there never was so critical a time when every honest Member of Parliament ought to watch his trust, and that you will see before the end of the next vacation. I therefore expect in your next a positive promise to stay in town. I tell you, you will not, you shall not repent it. I cannot answer the other parts of your letter, lest I say nothing to you at all this post, and I must not omit by it to put an end to the remainder of your wavering about your going the circuit. I shall enlarge in my next.

And am yours,
J. L."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, Jan. 31, 1700.

"HAVING no time but for a few words the last post, it is fit I now answer the other particulars of your letter, which I then was forced to omit. Your staying in town the next vacation I look upon as resolved, and the reasons I find for it in your own letters, now that I have time to read them a little more deliberately, I think sufficient to determine you should, though I say nothing at all. Every time I think of it I am more and more confirmed in the opinion that it is absolutely necessary in all respects, whether I consider the public or your own private concerns, neither of which are indifferent to me. It is my private thought that the Parliament will scarce sit even so much as to choose a Speaker before the end of the term; but whenever he is chosen, it is of no small consequence which side carries it, if there be two nominated, or at least in view, as it is ten to one there will be, especially in a Parliament chosen with so much struggle. Having given all the help possibly you can in this, which is usually a leading point, showing the strength of the parties, my next advice to you is not to speak at all in the House for some time, whatever fair opportunity you may seem to have:

but though you keep your mouth shut, I doubt not but you will have your eyes open to see the temper and observe the motions of the House, and diligently to remark the skill of management, and carefully watch the first and secret beginnings of things, and their tendencies, and endeavour, if there be danger in them, to crush them in the egg. You will say, what can you do who are not to speak? It is true I would not have you speak to the House, but you may communicate your light or apprehensions to some honest speaker who may make use of it; for there have always been very able members who never speak, who yet by their penetration and foresight have this way done as much service as any within those walls. And hereby you will more recommend yourself when people shall observe so much modesty joined with your parts and judgment, than if you should seem forward though you spoke well. But let the man you communicate with be not only well-intentioned, but a man of judgment. Methinks I take too much upon me in these directions; I have only then to say in my excuse, that you desired it more than once, and I advise you nothing I would not do myself were I in your place. I should have much more to say to you were you here, but it being fitter for

discourse than for letter, I hope I may see you here ere long, Sir Francis having already proposed to me your stealing down sometimes with him on Saturday, and returning Monday. The Votes you offer me will be very acceptable, and for some time at least during the busy season I would be glad you would send me, every post, the three newspapers, viz. Postman, Postboy, and Flying Post; but when you begin to send them you will do me a kindness to stop Mr. Churchill from sending me any more, for he sends them now; but it is by the butcher they come, and very uncertainly. But when you send me these papers, do not think you are bound always to write to me; though I am always glad to hear from you, yet I must not put that penance upon you. Things of moment I doubt not but you will let me know.

"I am your affectionate cousin,

J. L."

"DEAR COUSIN, Feb. 7th, 1700.

"I AM glad to find by yours of the 30th Jan. that you are resolved to stay; your own resolution in case of unforeseen accidents will always be in your power, or if you will make me your compliment that you will not go without my

leave, you may be sure that in any unforeseen and pressing occasion that may happen that may make it necessary for you, you will not only have my leave, but my persuasion to go: but as things are, I think it for your interest to stay. If you have read the two parts of the Duke of Anjou's Succession Considered, pray tell me your opinion of it.

"Just now, I received yours of the 4th; whether you should frequent the meeting of the Rose I know not, till I know who they are that meet there.

"I think your cousin's advice about Bank bills and East India bonds is right. I wish the cash you have of mine were turned into guineas; in that specie it will be fitter to lodge any where, as there shall be occasion. I hope with you it is very secure where it is, and I cannot desire you should do better for me than for yourself; so that I shall rest satisfied whatever may happen, being confident you do for me as for yourself. Pray put in the Gazette with the other newspapers you send me.

"Your affectionate cousin,

And humble servant,

J. LOCKE."

" DEAR COUSIN, Oates, Feb. 29th, 1701.

" YOU need not make apologies for not precisely answering my letters: I can easily conceive your hands full of late. When you see my Lord Shaftesbury again, pray, with my most humble service, let him know that, though the honour of a visit from him be what I could not in good manners ask, yet there is nothing I have for this good while more earnestly longed for, than an opportunity of kissing his hands; and since he owns so favourable an intention, that of coming hither, my Lady Masham and I, are in impatient expectation of it.

" I believe Sir H. Furne's case might afford you fit occasion to speak in a matter which, being law, you might be fully master of. I am very glad the ice is broke, and that it has succeeded so well; but now you have showed the House that you can speak, I advise you to let them see you can hold your peace, and let nothing but some point of law, which you are perfectly clear in, or the utmost necessity, call you up again.

" When you go to the meeting of those gentlemen you mention, I think you should say as little as possible as to public affairs, but behave yourself rather as one unversed, and a

learner in such matters. And your other business in the law will be an excuse, if you are not there every night, and you may always learn the next day what was debated there the night before.

"You will do me a kindness to send me word what is done in the House of Lords, and which way at any time they move with regard to public things on foot.

"I am glad to hear it said that the House seems in a good disposition, and resolved to support England against France; but wonder at myself for saying I am glad, it being prodigious for any one to think it could ever be otherwise. And yet I find some here wonder, that whilst the King of France makes such a mighty collection of forces in Flanders just over against us, we hear not of raising any land-forces on this side the water, especially since the printed papers mention transport ships drawn together about Calais and that way. If his fleet should be ready before ours, (which God forbid!) what will your thirty thousand seamen signify?

"I am, dear cousin, your's,

J. LOCKE.

"The transactions also of the Convocation are worth observing: pray tell me, is Dr.

Kennet's answer to Mr. Atterbury worth the reading? if it be, pray speak to Mr. Churchill, when he comes in your way, to send it me."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, March 3rd.

"I IMAGINE by what you say of the circuit, that you have not duly considered the state in which we are now placed. Pray reflect upon it well, and then tell me whether you can think of being a week together absent from your trust in Parliament, till you see the main point settled, and the kingdom in a posture of defence against the ruin that threatens it. The reason why I pressed you to stay in town was, to give the world a testimony how much you preferred the public to your private interest, and how true you were to any trust you undertook; this is no small character, nor of small advantage to a man coming into the world. Besides, I thought it no good husbandry for a man to get a few fees on circuit, and lose Westminster Hall. For I assure you, Westminster Hall is at stake, and I wonder how any one of the House can sleep till he sees England in a better state of defence, and how he can talk of any thing else till that is done, Pray read the pamphlet I sent you by M. Coste; of the rest,

you and I shall talk when I see you here: the sooner the better.

"I am your affectionate

J. L."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, 3rd Jan. 1701-2.

"I HAVE received the prints you sent me; I have read the King's speech, which is so gracious, and expresses so high concern for the religion, freedom, and interest of his people, that methinks that besides what the two Houses will do or have already done, the city of London and counties of England, and all those who have so lately addressed him, cannot do less than with joined hearts and hands return him addresses of thanks for his taking such care of them. Think of this with yourself, and think of it with others who can and ought to think how to save us out of the hands of France, into which we must fall, unless the whole nation exert its utmost vigour, and that speedily. Pray send me the King's speech printed by itself, and without paring off the edges; a list also of the members, if there be yet any one printed complete and perfect.

"I am, dear cousin,

Affectionately, &c.

J. L."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, 27th Feb. 1701-2.

"I AM more pleased with what you did for the public the day of your last letter, than for any thing you have done for me in my private affairs, though I am very much beholden to you for that too. You will guess by all my letters to you of late, how acceptable to me is the news of your not going out of town the beginning of the next week. You see what need there is of every one's presence, and how near things come. Do not at this time lose a week by going to Winchester or Salisbury. You think the crisis is over; but you know the men indefatigable and always intent on opportunity, and that will make new crises, be but absent and afford occasion. I conclude, therefore, that you will stay at least a week longer; and let me tell you it can, it will, it shall be no loss to you. Your affectionate cousin,

JOHN LOCKE."

* * * Oates, 5th April, 1701.

"I CONFESS I do not see, if we stick to our proposals, which the Dutch and we have given in, how a war can be avoided; and if we do not obtain that security, the Dutch and we must be lost. The House of Lords in their

address are clear in that point, and I think every body sees it. The good King of France desires only that you would take his word, and let him be quiet till he has got the West Indies into his hands, and his grandson well established in Spain; and then you may be sure you shall be as safe as he will let you be, in your religion, property, and trade. To all which, who can be such an infidel as not to believe him a great friend?

"I am glad Lord Shaftesbury and you talk of coming at Easter, there will then be some kind of vacancy."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, 4th Nov. 1702.

"HAD not my health with strong hand held me back from such a journey at this time of the year, especially to London, I had certainly, upon reading my Lord Peterborough's message to me in your letter, obeyed my inclination and come to kiss his hands before he went; nor could the considerations of my health have hindered me, nor the remonstrances of my friends here against it, if I could have seen any thing wherein I could by waiting upon him have done any service to his Lordship. As it is, there is nothing I have borne so uneasily from the decays of age, my troublesome

ear, my breathless lungs, and my being unable to stir, as the being stopped paying my respects in person, upon his going upon such an expedition. And yet I know not what I could do were I now in London, but intrude myself unseasonably amidst a crowd of business, and rob him uselessly of some of his time, at a season when he cannot, I know, have a minute to spare. But when I have said and resolved all this, I find myself dissatisfied in not seeing of him; and 'tis a displeasure will rest upon my mind, and add weight to that of those infirmities that caused it. If I could hope that in this my state of confinement and impotency, there was any thing remained that might be useful to his Lordship, that would be some comfort and relief to me. And if he would let me know wherein I might be any way serviceable to him in his absence, it would make me put some value upon the little remainder of my life. And dear cousin, if you could, before my Lord goes, find an opportunity to wait upon him, and say something to him from me to the purport above written, you would do me a singular kindness.

"Let me hear from you by the first opportunity. Your affectionate cousin,

J. LOCKE."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, 23rd Nov. 1702.

"IF you had come (as it seems you talked) with my Lord Peterborough, you had saved him the going several miles out of the way, and I had seen you; but you had business, and I wonder not at it. I must trouble you once more to wait upon my Lord or Lady Peterborough in my name, with the return of my humble service and thanks for the honour they have done me, and my inquiries how they do after their journey. I hope you will have an opportunity of going so far as Bow-street tomorrow, that I may hear from you how they do. I was much in pain about their getting to town now the days are so short; your letter saying nothing of them, makes me presume they got safe; it would else have made a noise. Pray in your letter write whether my Lord Marlborough be yet come or no. I beg your pardon for this trouble, and excuse it this once more,

And believe that I am your affectionate

J. L."

"All here greet you."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, April 30, 1703.

"I AM puzzled in a little affair, and must beg your assistance for the clearing of it. Mr.

Newton, in Autumn last, made me a visit here; I showed him my essay upon the Corinthians, with which he seemed very well pleased, but had not time to look it all over, but promised me if I would send it him, he would carefully peruse it, and send me his observations and opinion. I sent it him before Christmas, but hearing nothing from him, I, about a month or six weeks since, writ to him, as the inclosed tells you, with the remaining part of the story. When you have read it, and sealed it, I desire you to deliver it at your convenience. He lives in German St.: you must not go on a Wednesday, for that is his day for being at the Tower. The reason why I desire you to deliver it to him yourself is, that I would fain discover the reason of his so long silence. I have several reasons to think him truly my friend, but he is a nice man to deal with, and a little too apt to raise in himself suspicions where there is no ground; therefore, when you talk to him of my papers, and of his opinion of them, pray do it with all the tenderness in the world, and discover, if you can, why he kept them so long, and was so silent. But this you must do without asking why he did so, or discovering in the least that you are desirous to know. You will do well to acquaint

him, that you intend to see me at Whitsuntide, and shall be glad to bring a letter to me from him, or any thing else he will please to send; this perhaps may quicken him, and make him despatch these papers if he has not done it already. It may a little let you into the freer discourse with him, if you let him know that when you have been here with me, you have seen me busy on them (and the Romans too, if he mentions them, for I told him I was upon them when he was here,) and have had a sight of some part of what I was doing.

"Mr. Newton is really a very valuable man, not only for his wonderful skill in mathematics, but in divinity too, and his great knowledge in the Scriptures, wherein I know few his equals. And therefore pray manage the whole matter so as not only to preserve me in his good opinion, but to increase me in it; and be sure to press him to nothing, but what he is forward in himself to do. In your last, you seemed desirous of my coming to town; I have many reasons to desire to be there, but I doubt whether ever I shall see it again. Take not this for a splenetic thought; I thank God I have no melancholy on that account, but I cannot but feel what I feel; my shortness of breath is so far from being relieved by the renewing season

of the year as it used to be, that it sensibly increases upon me. 'Twas not therefore in a fit of dispiritedness, or to prevail with you to let me see you, that in my former I mentioned the shortness of the time I thought I had in this world. I spoke it then, and repeat it now upon sober and sedate consideration. I have several things to talk to you of, and some of present concernment to yourself, and I know not whether this may not be my last time of seeing you. I shall not die the sooner for having cast up my reckoning, and judging as impartially of my state as I can. I hope I shall not live one jot the less cheerfully the time that I am here, nor neglect any of the offices of life whilst I have it; for whether it be a month or a year, or seven years longer, the longest any one out of kindness or compliment can propose to me, is so near nothing when considered, and in respect of eternity, that if the sight of death can put an end to the comforts of life, it is always near enough, especially to one of my age, to have no satisfaction in living.

"I am your affectionate cousin
And humble servant,
J. L."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, April 23, 1703.

"I TOLD you that the Term had got you, nor am I dissatisfied that you mind your business; but I do not well bear it that you speak so doubtfully of making yourself and me a holiday at Whitsuntide. I do not count upon much time in this world, and therefore you will not blame me (if you think right of me) for desiring to see and enjoy you as much as I can, and having your company as much as your business will permit: besides that, I think some intervals of ease and air are necessary for you."

"DEAR COUSIN, Oates, Nov. 15, 1703.

"I TAKE very kindly your offer of coming hither: your kindness makes me very willing to see and enjoy you, but at the same time it makes me the more cautious to disturb your business; however, since you allow me the liberty, you may be assured, if there be occasion, I shall send for you.

"I am troubled at the news from Turkey, for though I think I shall be gone before any storm from thence can reach hither, yet you and my friends and my country, whilst I have

any thought, will be dear to me. As to my lungs, they go on their course, and though they have brought me now to be good for nothing, I am not surprised at it; they have lasted longer already than the world or I expected; how much longer they will be able to blow at the hard rate they do, I cannot precisely say. But in the race of human life, when breath is wanting for the least motion, one cannot be far from one's journey's end.

"Your affectionate cousin,
And humble servant,
J. L."

"Dec. 4, 1703.

"If Sir Cloudesly Shovel and the men-of-war that went out of the Downs with him are lost, and the storm has that effect upon us and the Dutch, that the King of Spain cannot go between this and Christmas to Portugal, as was concerted, what other thing can be reasonable to be done, but to keep ready money by you for any exigence that may happen? there you have in short my measures. I would not, I confess, part with a penny for parchment or paper securities of any kind, till I could see what is like to come of the terrible shock."

" Oates, June 1, 1704.

" I have received no letters from you since the 20th. I remember it is the end of a Term, a busy time with you, and you intend to be here speedily, which is better than writing at a distance. Pray be sure to order your matters so as to spend all the next week with me: as far as I can impartially guess, it will be the last week I am ever like to have with you; for if I mistake not very much, I have very little time left in the world. This comfortable, and to me usually restorative season of the year, has no effect upon me for the better: on the contrary, my shortness of breath, and uneasiness, every day increases; my stomach, without any visible cause, sensibly decays, so that all appearances concur to warn me, that the dissolution of this cottage is not far off. Refuse not, therefore, to help me to pass some of the last hours of my life as easily as may be in the conversation of one who is not only the nearest, but the dearest to me, of any man in the world. I have a great many things to talk to you, which I can talk to nobody else about. I therefore desire you again, deny not this to my affection. I know nothing at such a time so desirable, and so useful, as the conversation of a friend one loves and relies on. It is a week

free from business, or if it were not, perhaps you would have no reason to repent the bestowing a day or two upon me. Make haste, therefore, on Saturday, and be here early: I long till I see you. I writ to you in my last, to bring some cherries with you, but fear they will be troublesome to you; and these things that entertain the senses, have lost with me a great part of their relish; therefore, give not yourself any trouble about them; such desires are usually but the fancy seeking pleasure in one thing, when it has missed it in another, and seeks in vain for the delight which the indisposition of the body has put an end to. When I have your company, I shall forget these kind of things.

"I am, dear cousin,

Your most affectionate,

J. LOCKE."

It was probably in this calm and philosophic temper of mind that he wrote the epitaph, which was afterwards placed upon his tomb, at High Laver.

"Siste, viator; juxta situs est * * * *. Si qualis fuerit rogas, mediocritate suâ contentum se vixisse respondet. Literis innutritus, eousque tantum profecit ut veritati unicè studeret.

Hoc ex scriptis illius disce; quæ, quod de eo reliquum est, majori fide tibi exhibebunt, quàm epitaphii suspecta elogia. Virtutes si quas habuit, minores sane quàm quas sibi laudi, tibi in exemplum proponeret. Vitia una sepeliantur. Morum exemplum si quæras, in Evangelio habes, (vitiorum utinam nusquam,) mortalitatis certè quod prosit hic et ubique.

" Natum * * *

" Mortuum * * *

" Memorat hac tabula brevi et ipsa interitura."

During the last four years of his life, increasing infirmities confined him to the retirement he had chosen at Oates, near High Laver, in Essex; and although labouring under an incurable disorder, he was cheerful to the last, constantly interested in the welfare of his friends, and at the same time perfectly resigned to his own fate. His literary occupation at that time was the study of and Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles, published amongst his posthumous works.

In October 1704, his disorder greatly increased: on the 27th of that month, Lady Masham not finding him in his study as usual, went to his bedside, when he told her that the

fatigue of getting up the day before had been too much for his strength, and that he never expected to rise again from his bed. He said that he had now finished his career in this world, and that in all probability he should not outlive the night, certainly not to be able to survive beyond the next day or two. After taking some refreshment, he said to those present that he wished them all happiness after he was gone. To Lady Masham, who remained with him, he said that he thanked God he had passed a happy life, but that now he found that all was vanity, and exhorted her to consider this world only as a preparation for a better state hereafter. He would not suffer her to sit up with him, saying, that perhaps he might be able to sleep, but if any change should happen, he would send for her. Having no sleep in the night, he was taken out of bed and carried into his study, where he slept for some time in his chair: after waking, he desired to be dressed, and then heard Lady Masham read the Psalms apparently with great attention, until perceiving his end to draw near, he stopped her, and expired a very few minutes afterwards, about three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th October, in his 73d year.

When we consider the number of his publications as well as the subjects which he discusses, it is evident that his application must have been very great, and to enumerate his works will prove his surprising industry. His great work, the Essay on Human Understanding, was first published in 1690, nearly at the same time as Newton's Principia, both contributing to render illustrious the era of the Revolution. The Treatise on Civil Government, a Letter for Toleration, first published in Latin, in Holland, and afterwards in English, with the second Letter in defence of Toleration, were all published in 1690, and a third Letter in 1692. The Treatise on Education,* 1690; that concerning raising the value

* Bayle, Op. Mix. tom. 4, p. 695. Lettre à Minutol, September 21, 1693. "M. Locke a publié en Anglais diverses Pensées sur l'Education des Enfans. C'est un profond philosophe, et qui a des vues fort finies sur tout ce qu'il entrepend."—And in page 696, "Quelqu'un travaille à mettre en Français les Pensées que Monsieur Locke, l'un des plus profonds metaphysiciens de ce siècle, a publiés en Anglais sur l'Education. C'est un homme de beaucoup d'esprit. Je l'ai vû ici (Roterdam) pendant le regne du Roi Jaques; la Revolution le ramena en Angleterre, où il est fort content. Il a publié un systême de l'entendement, et un traité de l'origine du Gouvernement, le dernier a été traduit en Français. Il prouve que la souveraineté appartient aux peuples, et qu'ils

of Money and lowering the Interest, 1691; and further considerations on the same subject, 1695, when he was very much consulted on the measures then in operation for restoring the coin. The Reasonableness of Christianity, *

ne font que la déposer entre les mains de ceux qu'on appelle souverains; sauf à eux à retirer leur dépôt pour le mieux placer, lorsque le bien public le demande. Vous savez que c'est l'evangile du jour à present parmi les Protestans," &c.

* Locke on the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion criticised in Vol. II. Bibliothèque choisie of Le Clerc, and Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, Feb. 1703. Bayle, Op. tom. 4, p. 834. Letter to Coste, Dec. 27, 1703. "Autant que je l'ai compris [the work on the Reasonableness, &c.] cet ouvrage tend à montrer, que pourvu que l'on croie que Jesus Christ est le Messie, et que l'on ait une intention sincère d'obéir à ses preceptes, et de découvrir les autres vérités contenues dans le Nouveau Testament, on a toute l'essence du Chrêtien: de sorte qu'en vivant selon l'Evangile, autant que la fragilité humaine le peut souffrir, et en suppléant par la foi et par la répentance ce qui manque aux bonnes œuvres, on est sauvé aussi surement, que si l'on étoit éclairé sur tous les mystères que l'Eglise Anglicane, par exemple, trouve dans les écrits des Apôtres.

"L'auteur nous apprend dans la seconde partie, qu'il a surtout eu dessein de convertir les Déistes: on a donc lieu de croire qu'il a prétendu faire voir, que l'esprit de la Religion Chrêtienne n'est pas d'exiger de l'homme, comme une condition necessaire à être sauvé, que l'on croie ce grand nombre de dogmes incomprehensibles et qui choquent la lumière naturelle, dont la confession des Protestans est

1695, and a first and second vindication of the same, 1696, and also the three elaborate Letters

chargée: le Péché originel, la Trinité, l'union hypostatique du Verbe, &c. Il n'a point travaillé à concilier avec la raison, ou à imposer à la raison le joug de ces dogmes, comme il a travaillé fortement à refuter les objections fondées sur les faits de la conduite du Messie; je veux dire, sur la manière de cacher ou de deguiser sa Mission, d'emploier des responses ambigues quand il étoit interrogé par les Pharisiens, &c.: choses que certains Juifs ont violemment critiquées, et qui ont je ne scai quoi de choquant. L'auteur a dit, ce me semble, la-dessus de très bonnes choses; mais je ne crois point qu'il y ait des Sociniens qui ne souscrioient à son livre, generalement parlant; et il est certain que cette Secte a toujours suivie cette tablature, pour rendre le Christianisme plus conforme aux lumières de la raison."

Ditto, page 840. Letter to Coste, April 8, 1704.

"Il auroit été, peut-être, à souhaiter que l'auteur se fût fait cette objection. Qu'encore qu'au commencement du Christianisme on fût sauvé sans une croyance distincte de la consubstantialité du Verbe, il ne s'ensuit pas qu'on le puisse être aujourd'hui. Car, les premiers Chrêtiens faisant profession de recevoir le Messie pour le fils de Dieu, ne nioient pas qu'il le fût essentiellement; ils faisoient abstraction entre cette manière d'être fils de Dieu, et les autres manières: mais aujourd'hui cette abstraction est impossible. Il faut, ou admettre formellement, ou rejetter formellement la co-essentialité du Verbe. Cela fait une difference capitale; car vous savez que 'abstrahentium non est mendacium.' Tel étoit l'état des simples aux premiers siècles; ils n'affirmoient ni ne nioient ce dogme là; leur foi étoit la-dessus indéterminée. Mais depuis des disputes et les decisions,

in defence of the principles contained in the Essay against the attacks of the Bishop of Worcester.

The Conduct of the Understanding, one of the most useful and practical of his works, and the Commentaries and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul, close the catalogue of those of his literary labours which have been given to the world.*

il faut opter ou la negative ou l'affirmative. Or il est bien plus criminel de rejetter une vérité proposée, que d'ignorer simplement si les termes, sous lesquels on croit, signifient précisément, déterminément, une telle chose, ou une autre."

* Copyright of Locke's Works.

Mr. Locke received for the first edition of the Essay on Human Understanding 30*l.* in 1689, and by agreement made several years afterwards, the bookseller was to deliver six books well bound for every subsequent edition, and also to pay ten shillings for each additional sheet. For the Reasonableness of Christianity, the price was ten shillings each sheet. For "the copy of several other books," which I believe were, the Consideration of raising the Value, or lowering the Interest of Money, the Reasonableness of Christianity, and Vindication of the same, the sum received was "44*l.* 15*s.*" For the Treatise on Education, 5*l.* for every impression, and twenty-five books bound in calf. Of this book Mr. Cline, the celebrated surgeon, said that it had contributed more to the general health of the higher classes of society, by one rule which the author lays down, than any other book he had ever read.

1698. My

CODICIL OF MR. LOCKE'S WILL RELATING TO HIS WORKS.

"Whereas the Rev. Dr. Hudson, library keeper of the Bodleian Library in the University of Oxford, writ to me some time since, desiring of me, for the said library, the books whereof I was the author, I did, in return to the honour done me therein, present to the said library all the books that were published in my name, which, though accepted with honourable mention of me, yet were not understood fully to answer the request made me; it being supposed that there were other treatises, whereof I was the author, which had been published without my name to them: in compliance, therefore, with what was desired in the utmost extent of it, and in acknowledgment of the honour done me, in thinking my writings worthy to be placed among the works of the learned, in that august repository,—I do hereby give to the public library of the University of Oxford, these following books; that is to say;

1698.	My Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's second answer - - -	14*l.* 10*s.*
	Fourth edition of my Education -	5*l.*
1699.	Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester	14*l.*

Locke's Account-Books.

three letters concerning Toleration, the first whereof I writ in Latin, and was published at Tergon in Holland 1689, under the title "Epistola de Tolerantiâ," and afterwards translated into English, without my privity. 2nd. A second letter concerning Toleration, printed for Awnsham and John Churchill, 1690. 3rd. A third letter for Toleration, to the author of the third letter concerning Toleration, printed for Awnsham and John Churchill, 1692. Two Treatises of government, whereof Mr. Churchill has published several editions, but all very incorrect. The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures. A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity from Mr. Edwards' reflections. A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity. These are all the books whereof I am the author, which have been published without my name to them. Item. I give to the said Bodleian Library the argument of the letter concerning Toleration, briefly considered and answered, printed at Oxford 1691, both which treatises it is my will should be bound up in one volume, with my three letters on the same subject, that therein any one who pleaseth, may have the convenience to examine what my opponent and I have said in the controversy.

"Item. Whereas, there is intended speedily another edition of my Essay concerning Human Understanding, wherein there will be in the thirty-first chapter of the second book some small alterations which I have made with my own hand, that the University which hath been pleased to honour it with a place in its library, may have that essay in the Estate that my last thoughts left it in, it is my will that my executor shall, in my name present to the said Bodleian Library, one copy of the next edition of my said Essay well bound. Item. Whereas I am informed that there is a design of publishing two other volumes as a continuation of the collection of voyages published this year by A. and S. Churchill in four vols. folio, it is my will that my executor shall, in my name, present to the said Bodleian Library the two intended volumes also, when they come out, which I do hereby give to the University of Oxford."

The character of Locke which Le Clerc has added to his éloge, derived, as he tells us, from a person who knew him well, is too excellent to be omitted.

"He was," says she, (and I can confirm her testimony in great measure by what I have myself seen here) "a profound philosopher, and a man fit for the most important affairs. He had much knowledge of belles lettres, and his manners were very polite and particularly engaging. He knew something of almost every thing which can be useful to mankind, and was thoroughly master of all that he had studied, but he showed his superiority by not appearing to value himself in any way on account of his great attainments. Nobody assumed less the airs of a master, or was less dogmatical, and he was never offended when any one did not agree with his opinions. There are, nevertheless, a species of disputants, who, after having been refuted several times, always return to the charge, and only repeat the same argument. These he could not endure, and he sometimes talked of them with impatience, but he was the first to acknowledge that he had been too hasty. In the most trifling circumstances of life, as well as in speculative opinions, he was always ready to be convinced by reason, let the information come from whomever it might. He was the most faithful follower, or indeed the slave of truth, which he

never abandoned on any account, and which he loved for its own sake.

" He accommodated himself to the level of the most moderate understandings; and in disputing with them, he did not diminish the force of their arguments against himself, although they were not well expressed by those who had used them. He felt pleasure in conversing with all sorts of people, and tried to profit by their information, which arose not only from the good education he had received, but from the opinion he entertained, that there was nobody from whom something useful could not be got. And indeed by this means he had learned so many things concerning the arts and trade, that he seemed to have made them his particular study, insomuch that those whose profession they were, often profited by his information, and consulted him with advantage. Bad manners particularly annoyed and disgusted him, when he saw they proceeded not from ignorance of the world, but from pride, from haughtiness, from ill-nature, from brutal stupidity, and other similar vices; otherwise, he was far from despising whomever it might be for having a disagreeable appearance. He considered civility not only as something agreeable

and proper to gain people's hearts, but as a duty of Christianity, which ought to be more insisted on than it commonly is. He recommended with reference to this, a tract of Messrs. de Port Royal, 'sur les moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes;' and he much approved the sermons he had heard from Mr. Wichkot, a Doctor of Divinity, on this subject, and which have since been printed.

"His conversation was very agreeable to all sorts of people, and even to ladies; and nobody was better received than he was among people of the highest rank. He was by no means austere, and as the conversation of well-bred people is usually more easy, and less studied and formal, if Mr. Locke had not naturally these talents, he had acquired them by intercourse with the world, and what made him so much the more agreeable was, that those who were not acquainted with him, did not expect to find such manners in a man so much devoted to study. Those who courted the acquaintance of Mr. Locke to collect what might be learnt from a man of his understanding, and who approached him with respect, were surprised to find in him not only the manners of a well-bred man, but also all the attention which

they could expect. He often spoke against raillery, which is the most hazardous part of conversation if not managed with address, and though he excelled in it himself, he never said any thing which could shock or injure any body. He knew how to soften every thing he said, and to give it an agreeable turn. If he joked his friends, it was about a trifling fault, or about something which it was advantageous for them to know. As he was particularly civil, even when he began to joke, people were satisfied that he would end by saying something obliging. He never ridiculed a misfortune, or any natural defect.

"He was very charitable to the poor, provided they were not the idle, or the profligate, who did not frequent any church, or who spent their Sundays in an alehouse. He felt, above all, compassion for those who, after having worked hard in their youth, sunk into poverty in their old age. He said, that it was not sufficient to keep them from starving, but that they ought to be enabled to live with some comfort. He sought opportunities of doing good to deserving objects; and often in his walks he visited the poor of the neighbourhood, and gave them the wherewithal to relieve their

wants, or to buy the medicines which he prescribed for them if they were sick, and had no medical aid.

"He did not like any thing to be wasted; which was, in his opinion, losing the treasure of which God has made us the economists. He himself was very regular, and kept exact accounts of every thing.

"If he had any defect, it was the being somewhat passionate; but he had got the better of it by reason, and it was very seldom that it did him or any one else any harm. He often described the ridicule of it, and said that it availed nothing in the education of children, nor in keeping servants in order, and that it only lessened the authority which one had over them. He was kind to his servants, and showed them with gentleness how he wished to be served. He not only kept strictly a secret which had been confided to him, but he never mentioned any thing which could prove injurious, although he had not been enjoined secrecy; nor did he ever wrong a friend by any sort of indiscretion or inadvertency. He was an exact observer of his word, and what he promised was sacred. He was scrupulous about recommending people whom he did not know, and he could not bring himself to praise those

whom he did not think worthy. If he was told that his recommendations had not produced the effect which was expected, he said, that 'it arose from his never having deceived any body, by saying more than he knew, that what he answered for might be found as he stated it, and that if he acted otherwise, his recommendations would have no weight.'

"His greatest amusement was to talk with sensible people, and he courted their conversation. He possessed all the requisite qualities for keeping up an agreeable and friendly intercourse. He only played at cards to please others, although from having often found himself among people who did, he played well enough when he set about it; but he never proposed it, and said it was only an amusement for those who have no conversation.

"In his habits he was clean without affectation or singularity; he was naturally very active, and occupied himself as much as his health would admit of. Sometimes he took pleasure in working in a garden, which he understood perfectly. He liked exercise, but the complaint on his chest not allowing him to walk much, he used to ride after dinner; when he could no longer bear the motion of a horse, he used to go out in a wheel chair; and he always

wished for a companion, even if it were only a child, for he felt pleasure in talking with well-bred children. The weak state of his health was an inconvenience to himself alone, and occasioned no unpleasant sensation to any one, beyond that of seeing him suffer. His diet was the same as other people's, except that he usually drank nothing but water; and he thought his abstinence in this respect had preserved his life so long, although his constitution was so weak. He attributed to the same cause the preservation of his sight, which was not much impaired at the end of his life; for he could read by candle-light all sorts of books, unless the print was very small, and he never made use of spectacles. He had no other infirmity but his asthma, except that four years before his death he became very deaf, during a period of about six months. Finding himself thus deprived of the pleasures of conversation, he doubted whether blindness was not preferable to deafness, as he wrote to one of his friends; otherwise, he bore his infirmities very patiently.—This," as Le Clerc says, "is an accurate, and by no means flattered description of this great man."

It has been observed in this character of Locke, that he knew something of almost every

thing, and that he had learned so much of the Arts that he seemed to have made them his peculiar study. The truth and accuracy of this remark is fully confirmed by the numerous receipts, memoranda, and observations, scattered throughout the Journal. All, or very nearly all these have been omitted, because their publication would now be useless, considering the improvements that have been made in arts and manufactures during the last century and a half. As they exist in the original Journal, they afford a striking proof of the activity of his mind, of his industry in obtaining information, and of the accuracy of his descriptions. It is sufficient to say, that if he sees a cannon foundry, or a manufacture of fire-arms, he notes down in great detail the exact process of casting and boring, and of making the best French or German gun-barrels. He does the same of optical glasses, and of microscopes. He is as curious in observing the fermentation of wine, the method of making soap or verdigris, as he is to collect the most accurate information respecting the weights and measures or the true proportion of alloy in the different coins of every country in Europe. In one page he describes the management of vines, olives, and fruit-trees; in another, the preparation of

Spanish perfumes; and in another, he writes on the metaphysical questions of space and extension.

The religious opinions of this great man may best be collected from his own writings: to an ardent piety and a firm belief in the religion he professed, was joined a truly Christian charity for all those who differed in opinion from him. The religion of Locke was that revealed in the Scriptures, which, in his opinion, was the most reasonable religion in the world. Of the particular form of his faith, it is more difficult to speak, because he was always averse to vain and idle disputations: but for the dogmatical and mystical doctors of the Church he certainly had no predilection. Reason was his rule and guide in every thing; toleration was his text; and he abhorred those only who pervert that divine precept, which teaches — to promote peace on earth, and good will towards man. Those who rely upon his authority, and make use of his name, would do well to consider what manner of Christian he was; and, when they bid others believe because he believed, let them also teach as he taught, and practise those virtues which he practised.

He lived in communion with the Church of England; but it will appear most clearly,

from extracts which will be given from an unpublished reply to a work of Dr. Stillingfleet's, that he entertained a strong opinion that the exclusive doctrines of the Church of England were very objectionable; that he thought them much too narrow and confined, and that he wished for a much larger and easier comprehension of Protestants.

The following paper, in Locke's handwriting, was drawn up by him apparently for the rule and guidance of a religious society, whilst he resided in Holland, as it is dated 1688. It may be considered as his idea of a pure Christian community, or church untainted by worldly considerations, or by professional arts.

PACIFIC CHRISTIANS.

1. We think nothing necessary to be known, or believed for salvation, but what God hath revealed.

2. We therefore embrace all those who, in sincerity, receive the Word of Truth revealed in the Scripture, and obey the light which enlightens every man that comes into the world.

3. We judge no man in meats, or drinks, or

habits, or days, or any other outward observances, but leave every one to his freedom in the use of those outward things which he thinks can most contribute to build up the inward man in righteousness, holiness, and the true love of God, and his neighbour, in Christ Jesus.

4. If any one find any doctrinal parts of Scripture difficult to be understood, we recommend him,—1st. The Study of the Scriptures in humility and singleness of heart: 2d. Prayer to the Father of lights to enlighten him: 3d. Obedience to what is already revealed to him, remembering that the practice of what we do know is the surest way to more knowledge; our infallible guide having told us, if any man will do the will of Him that sent me, he shall know of the doctrine, John vii. 17. 4th. We leave him to the advice and assistance of those whom he thinks best able to instruct him. No men, or society of men, having any authority to impose their opinions or interpretations on any other, the meanest Christian. Since, in matters of religion, every man must know, and believe, and give an account for himself.

5. We hold it to be an indispensable duty for all Christians to maintain love and charity

in the diversity of contrary opinions: by which charity we do not mean an empty sound, but an effectual forbearance and good-will, carrying men to a communion, friendship, and mutual assistance one of another, in outward as well as spiritual things; and by debarring all magistrates from making use of their authority, much less their sword, (which was put into their hands only against evil doers,) in matters of faith or worship.

6. Since the Christian religion we profess is not a notional science, to furnish speculation to the brain, or discourse to the tongue, but a rule of righteousness to influence our lives, Christ having given himself to redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a people zealous of good works,* we profess the only business of our public assemblies to be to exhort thereunto, laying aside all controversy and speculative questions, instruct and encourage one another in the duties of a good life, which is acknowledged to be the great business of true religion, and to pray God for the assistance of his Spirit for the enlightening our understanding and subduing our corruptions, that so we may return unto him a reasonable and acceptable service, and show our faith by

* Titus ii 14.

our works, proposing to ourselves and others the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, as the great pattern for our imitation.

7. One alone being our master, even Christ, we acknowledge no masters of our assembly; but if any man in the spirit of love, peace, and meekness, has a word of exhortation, we hear him.

8. Nothing being so oppressive, or having proved so fatal to unity, love, and charity, the first great characteristical duties of Christianity, as men's fondness of their own opinions, and their endeavours to set them up, and have them followed, instead of the Gospel of peace; to prevent those seeds of dissension and division, and maintain unity in the difference of opinions which we know cannot be avoided—if any one appear contentious, abounding in his own sense rather than in love, and desirous to draw followers after himself, with destruction or opposition to others, we judge him not to have learned Christ as he ought, and therefore not fit to be a teacher of others.

9. Decency and order in our assemblies being directed, as they ought, to edification, can need but very few and plain rules. Time and place of meeting being settled, if any thing else need regulation, the assembly itself, or four of the

ancientest, soberest, and discreetest of the brethren, chosen for that occasion, shall regulate it.

10. From every brother that, after admonition, walketh disorderly, we withdraw ourselves.

11. We each of us think it our duty to propagate the doctrine and practice of universal good-will and obedience in all places, and on all occasions, as God shall give us opportunity.

Thus lived this great and upright man, whose private history I have endeavoured to make more known from the memorials he has left, and from the best information that I have been able to collect. From these and from his works, it is evident that his understanding was alike fitted for speculation or practice; and that his mind was capable of comprehending the greatest subjects, and of adapting itself to the smallest details. He regulated his affairs, his time, and his employments with the truest economy, and the most exact attention to method and order. He was ever ready to assist his friends, and he had the satisfaction of retaining their attachment to the end of his

life. He possessed those great requisites of happiness—equanimity, cheerfulness of temper, and the habit of constantly employing his mind in the pursuit of noble or useful objects. He was engaged not only in metaphysical and logical researches, but in most of the great questions which agitated men's minds in religion and politics during the period in which he lived; and greater questions certainly never were decided than those contended for between the time of the Civil Wars of Charles the First and the Revolution of 1688. Whatever may be the inaccuracies or errors in his abstract principles, and many exceptionable passages may no doubt be found in his works, yet it is allowed that, when writing on political questions, he thoroughly weighed and maturely considered the practical results, and arrived at conclusions which are always just, generous, and prudent.

It was within the compass of his life that the great question of Toleration was first agitated, and by his exertions in great part decided. For it must not be supposed that the Reformation conferred a general freedom of conscience, or liberty of enquiry in religious concerns. No greater latitude of examination (except in that one sense as set forth by autho-

rity,) was either intended or permitted after the Reformation, than had been allowed under the Roman Church. One tyranny was replaced by another; and the new Church was no less intolerant than its predecessor. The civil magistrate first assumed the direction of the Reformation in England, then formed a league with the Church (falsely so called), and usurped that dominion over opinion and faith which the Popes had usurped before. The state-Church now made the same imperious demand for the prostration of the understanding, and the will of the people committed to their charge, always so much coveted by every priesthood* which has the power to enforce it. We exchanged at the Reformation a foreign spiritual head, for an equally supreme dictatorship at home. All who presumed to differ from the established rule, were smitten by that double-edged sword which the civil power wielded against the Papists on one side, and the "fanatics" on the other. *Ultra citraque nefas*, it treated with equal severity those who yielded too much to authority, and those who yielded too little.

In one respect, the Reformation conferred

* See Locke, Common-place Book, article Sacerdos.

an unmixed benefit; it dispersed the wealth, and broke the power of the priesthood: as for toleration, or any true notion of religious liberty, or any general freedom of conscience, we owe them not in the least degree to what is called the Church of England. On the contrary, we owe all these to the Independents in the time of the Commonwealth, and to Locke, their most illustrious and enlightened disciple.

If we consider the political changes which it was his fortune to witness, and the important effects produced by his opinions and his writings in promoting the free exercise of reason, which he considered as the highest of all the high interests of mankind, and that on the security of which all others depended; we shall be of opinion that his lot was cast at the time the most fortunate for himself, and for the improvement of mankind. Had he lived a century earlier, he might have been an enquirer indeed, or a reformer, or perhaps a martyr; but the Reformation, which was brought about by passion and interest, more than by reason, was not the occasion for the exercise of his peculiar talents. Had he lived at a later period, the season and the opportunity suited to his genius might have passed by.

It was also within the compass of his life

that the other great contest was decided in England; whether the rights of Kings were to be paramount to all laws, to supersede all laws, and to dispense with all laws; or whether the subjects of England were to possess and enjoy their ancient undoubted rights and liberties, as claimed and asserted at the Revolution, of which Locke was the most successful advocate. His object in the treatise on Civil Government, was, as he says, "to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world, the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with the resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin."

Sir James Mackintosh, after praising the caution for which Locke's Treatise on Government is so remarkable, bearing, as he says everywhere the marks of his own considerate mind, has observed that "the circumstances of his life rendered it a long warfare against the enemies of freedom in philosophizing, freedom in worship, and freedom from every po-

litical restraint which necessity did not justify. In his noble zeal for liberty of thought, he dreaded the tendency of doctrines which might gradually prepare mankind to '*swallow that for an innate principle which may suit his purpose who teacheth them.*' He might well be excused, if in the ardour of his generous conflict, he sometimes carried beyond the bounds of calm and neutral reason, his repugnance to doctrines which, as they were then generally explained, he justly regarded as capable of being employed to shelter absurdity from detection, to stop the progress of free inquiry, and to subject the general reason to the authority of a few individuals." The same accurate judge has observed, that "every error of Mr. Locke in speculation, may be traced to the influence of some virtue; at least every error, except some of the erroneous opinions generally received in his age, which with a sort of passive acquiescence, he suffered to retain their place in his mind." After selecting this favourable apology for Locke's errors, I may be accused of partiality if I omit noticing the opinion of another most acute writer, who speaking of the Essay has declared, "that few books can be named from which it is possible to extract more exceptionable passages." It is, however,

thought by many, that Mr. Stewart scarcely does justice to Locke's principles, and that he too much distrusted their tendency. On the subject of free will, he says, "Locke is more indistinct, undecided, and inconsistent, than might have been expected from his powerful mind when directed to so important a question." He seems to think that he had made various concessions to his adversaries, in which he yielded all that was contended for by Hobbes. He has accordingly been numbered, with some appearance of truth, with those who have substantially adopted the scheme of necessity, while they verbally oppose those doctrines. That some of the principles contained in the Essay may possibly lead to these extreme consequences, that they may be pushed thus far, that these grave objections have been brought forward, cannot be denied. I should, however, have profited little from the example and precepts of that upright man, whose life I have endeavoured to make more generally known, whose sincerity and simplicity, whose constant search for truth, are among the most distinguished features of his character, if I attempted to palliate or disguise those imputed errors and mistakes, which he himself, if convinced, would have been the first to retract.

"Whatever I write," these are his own words, "as soon as I shall discover it not to be truth, my hand shall be forwardest to throw it in the fire."

The delineation of his true character, whatever may be its defects, the most faithful portrait of him, will, I believe, contribute more effectually to his real fame, than any praise, however laboured and brilliant it might be, and I am convinced it is the only panegyric which is worthy of him.

END OF THE LIFE.

EXTRACTS FROM

LOCKE'S COMMON-PLACE BOOK.

(On the first page is written, " Nat. 29 August, 1632, Adversaria, 1661.")

ERROR.

THE great division among Christians is about opinions. Every sect has its set of them, and that is called Orthodoxy; and he who professes his assent to them, though with an implicit faith, and without examining, he is orthodox and in the way to salvation. But if he examines, and thereupon questions any one of them, he is presently suspected of heresy, and if he oppose them or hold the contrary, he is presently condemned as in a damnable error, and in the sure way to perdition. Of this, one may say, that there is, nor can be, nothing more wrong. For he that examines, and upon a fair examination embraces an error for a truth, has

done his duty, more than he who embraces the profession (for the truths themselves he does not embrace) of the truth without having examined whether it be true or no. And he that has done his duty, according to the best of his ability, is certainly more in the way to Heaven than he who has done nothing of it. For if it be our duty to search after truth, he certainly that has searched after it, though he has not found it, in some points has paid a more acceptable obedience to the will of his Maker, than he that has not searched at all, but professes to have found truth, when he has neither searched nor found it. For he that takes up the opinions of any Church in the lump, without examining them, has truly neither searched after, nor found truth, but has only found those that he thinks have found truth, and so receives what they say with an implicit faith, and so pays them the homage that is due only to God, who cannot be deceived, nor deceive. In this way the several Churches (in which, as one may observe, opinions are preferred to life, and orthodoxy is that which they are concerned for, and not morals) put the terms of salvation on that which the Author of our salvation does not put them in. The believing of a collection of certain propositions, which are called and

esteemed fundamental articles, because it has pleased the compilers to put them into their confession of faith, is made the condition of salvation. But this believing is not, in truth, believing, but a profession to believe; for it is enough to join with those who make the same profession; and ignorance or disbelief of some of those articles is well enough borne, and a man is orthodox enough and without any suspicion, till he begins to examine. As soon as it is perceived that he quits the implicit faith, expected though disowned by the Church, his orthodoxy is presently questioned, and he is marked out for a heretic. In this way of an implicit faith, I do not deny but a man who believes in God the Father Almighty, and that Jesus Christ is his only Son our Lord, may be saved, because many of the articles of every sect are such as a man may be saved without the explicit belief of. But how the several Churches who place salvation in no less than a knowledge and belief of their several confessions, can content themselves with such an implicit faith in any of their members, I must own I do not see. The truth is, we cannot be saved without performing something which is the explicit believing of what God in the Gospel has made absolutely necessary to salvation

to be explicitly believed, and sincerely to obey what he has there commanded. To a man who believes in Jesus Christ, that he is sent from God to be the Saviour of the world, the first step to orthodoxy is a sincere obedience to his law. Objection — But 'tis an ignorant day-labourer that cannot so much as read, and how can he study the Gospel, and become orthodox that way? Answer—A ploughman that cannot read, is not so ignorant but he has a conscience, and knows in those few cases which concern his own actions, what is right and what is wrong. Let him sincerely obey this light of nature, it is the transcript of the moral law in the Gospel; and this, even though there be errors in it, will lead him into all the truths in the Gospel that are necessary for him to know. For he that in earnest believes Jesus Christ to be sent from God, to be his Lord and ruler, and does sincerely and unfeignedly set upon a good life as far as he knows his duty; and where he is in doubt in any matter that concerns himself he cannot fail to enquire of those better skilled in Christ's law, to tell him what his Lord and master has commanded in the case, and desires to have his law read to him concerning that duty which he finds himself concerned in, for the regulation of his own

actions; for as for other men's actions, what is right or wrong as to them, that he is not concerned to know; his business is to live well with himself, and do what is his particular duty. This is knowledge and orthodoxy enough for him, which will be sure to bring him to salvation,—an orthodoxy which nobody can miss, who in earnest resolves to lead a good life; and, therefore, I lay it down as a principle of Christianity, that the right and only way to saving orthodoxy, is the sincere and steady purpose of a good life. Ignorant of many things contained in the Holy Scriptures we are all. Errors also concerning doctrines delivered in Scripture, we have all of us not a few: these, therefore, cannot be damnable, if any shall be saved. And if they are dangerous, 'tis certain the ignorant and illiterate are safest, for they have the fewest errors that trouble not themselves with speculations above their capacities, or beside their concern. A good life in obedience to the law of Christ their Lord, is their indispensable business, and if they inform themselves concerning that, as far as their particular duties lead them to enquire, and oblige them to know, they have orthodoxy enough, and will not be condemned for ignorance in those speculations which they had neither parts, opportunity, nor leisure to

know. Here we may see the difference between the orthodoxy required by Christianity, and the orthodoxy required by the several sects, or as they are called, Churches of Christians. The one is explicitly to believe what is indispensably required to be believed as absolutely necessary to salvation, and to know and believe in the other doctrines of faith delivered in the word of God, as a man has opportunity, helps and parts; and to inform himself in the rules and measures of his own duty as far as his actions are concerned, and to pay a sincere obedience to them. But the other, viz. the orthodoxy required by the several sects, is a profession of believing the whole bundle of their respective articles set down in each Church's system, without knowing the rules of every one's particular duty, or requiring a sincere or strict obedience to them. For they are speculative opinions, confessions of faith that are insisted on in the several communions; they must be owned and subscribed to, but the precepts and rules of morality and the observance of them, I do not remember there is much notice taken of, or any great stir made about a collection or observance of them, in any of the terms of church communion. But it is also to be observed, that this is much better fitted to

get and retain church members than the other way, and is much more suited to that end, as much as it is easier to make profession of believing a certain collection of opinions that one never perhaps so much as reads, and several whereof one could not perhaps understand if one did read and study; (for no more is required than a profession to believe them, expressed in an acquiescence that suffers one not to question or contradict any of them;) than it is to practise the duties of a good life in a sincere obedience to those precepts of the Gospel wherein his actions are concerned. Precepts not hard to be known by those who are willing and ready to obey them. J. L.

RELIGIO.—They that change their religion without full conviction, which few men take the way to, (and can never be without great piety,) are not to be trusted, because they have either no God, or have been false to him; for religion admits of no dissembling. J. L.

DISPUTATIO.—One should not dispute with a man who, either through stupidity or shamelessness, denies plain and visible truths. J. L.

LINGUA.—Tell not your business or design to one that you are not sure will help it for-

ward. All that are not for you count against you, for so they generally prove, either through folly, envy, malice, or interest. J. L.

Do not hear yourself say to another what you would not have another hear from him. J. L.

VOLUNTAS.—Let your will lead whither necessity would drive, and you will always preserve your liberty.

SACERDOS.

There were two sorts of teachers amongst the ancients: those who professed to teach them the arts of propitiation and atonement, and these were properly their Priests, who for the most part made themselves the mediators betwixt the Gods and men, wherein they performed all or the principal part, at least nothing was done without them. The laity had but a small part in the performance, unless it were in the charge of it, and that was wholly theirs. The chief, at least the essential, and sanctifying part of the ceremony, was always the priests', and the people could do nothing without them. The ancients had another sort of teachers, who were called philosophers. These led their schools, and professed to instruct those who

would apply to them in the knowledge of things and the rules of virtue. These meddled not with the public religion, worship, or ceremonies, but left them entirely to the priests, as the priests left the instruction of men in natural and moral knowledge wholly to the philosophers. These two parts or provinces of knowledge thus under the government of two distinct sorts of men, seem to be founded upon the supposition of two clearly distinct originals, viz. revelation and reason: for the priests never for any of their ceremonies or forms of worship pleaded reason; but always urged their sacred observances from the pleasure of the Gods, antiquity, and tradition, which at last resolves all their established rites into nothing but revelation. "Cum de religione agitur, T. Coruncanum, P. Scipionem, P. Scævolam, pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthem aut Chrysippum sequor . . . . . A te philosopho rationem accipere debeo religionis, majoribus autem nostris etiam nullâ ratione redditâ credere." Cic. de Nat. Deor. The philosophers, on the other side, pretended to nothing but reason in all that they said, and from thence owned to fetch all their doctrines; though how little their lives answered their

own rules whilst they studied ostentation and vanity, rather than solid virtue, Cicero tells us, Tusc. Quæst. l. 2. c. 4.

Jesus Christ, bringing by revelation from Heaven the true religion to mankind, reunited these two again, religion and morality, as the inseparable parts of the worship of God, which ought never to have been separated, wherein for the obtaining the favour and forgiveness of the Deity, the chief part of what man could do consisted in a holy life, and little or nothing at all was left to outward ceremony, which was therefore almost wholly cashiered out of this true religion, and only two very plain and simple institutions introduced, all pompous rites being wholly abolished, and no more of outward performances commanded but just so much as decency and order required in the actions of public assemblies. This being the state of this true religion coming immediately from God himself, the ministers of it, who also call themselves priests, have assumed to themselves the parts both of the heathen priests and philosophers, and claim a right not only to perform all the outward acts of the Christian religion in public, and to regulate the ceremonies to be used there, but also to teach men their duties of morality towards one another and to-

wards themselves, and to prescribe to them in the conduct of their lives.

Though the magistrate have a power of commanding or forbidding things indifferent which have a relation to religion, yet this can only be within that Church whereof he himself is a member, who being a lawgiver in matters indifferent in the commonwealth under his jurisdiction, as it is purely a civil society, for their peace, is fittest also to be lawgiver in the religious society, (which yet must be understood to be only a voluntary society and during every member's pleasure,) in matters indifferent, for decency and order, for the peace of that too. But I do not see how hereby he hath any power to order and direct even matters indifferent in the circumstances of a worship, or within a Church whereof he is not professor or member. It is true he may forbid such things as may tend to the disturbance of the peace of the commonwealth to be done by any of his people, whether they esteem them civil or religious. This is his proper business; but to command or direct any circumstances of a worship as part of the religious worship which he himself does not profess nor approve, is altogether without his authority, and absurd to suppose. Can any one think it reasonable, yea, or practicable, that

a Christian Prince should direct the form of Mahometan worship, the whole religion being thought by him false and profane? and *vice versa;* and yet it is not impossible that a Christian Prince should have Mahometan subjects who may deserve all civil freedom; and *de facto* the Turk hath Christian subjects. As absurd would it be that a magistrate, either Popish, Protestant, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Quaker, &c. should prescribe a form to any or all of the different Churches in their ways of worship; the reason whereof is because religious worship being that homage which every man pays his God, he cannot do it in any other way, nor use any other rites, ceremonies, nor forms, even of indifferent things, than he himself is persuaded are acceptable and pleasing to the God he worships; which depending upon his opinion of his God, and what will best please him, it is impossible for one man to prescribe or direct any one circumstance of it to another: and this being a thing different and independent wholly from every man's concerns in the civil society, which hath nothing to do with a man's affairs in the other world, the magistrate hath here no more right to intermeddle than any private man, and has less right to direct the form of it, than he has to prescribe to a subject of his in

what manner he shall do his homage to another Prince to whom he is feudatory, for something which he holds immediately from him, which, whether it be standing, kneeling, or prostrate, bareheaded or barefooted, whether in this or that habit, &c. concerns not his allegiance to him at all, nor his well government of his people. For though the things in themselves are perfectly indifferent, and it may be trivial, yet as to the worshipper, when he considers them as required by his God, or forbidden, pleasing or displeasing to the invisible power he addresses, they are by no means so until you have altered his opinion, (which persuasion can only do,)—you can by no means, nor without the greatest tyranny, prescribe him a way of worship; which was so unreasonable to do, that we find scarce any attempt towards it by the magistrates in the several societies of mankind till Christianity was well grown up in the world, and was become a national religion; and since that it hath been the cause of more disorders, tumults, and bloodshed, than all other causes put together.

But far be it from any one to think Christ the author of those disorders, or that such fatal mischiefs are the consequence of his doctrine, though they have grown up with it. Anti-

christ has sown those tares in the field of the Church; the rise whereof hath been only hence, that the clergy, by degrees, as Christianity spread, affecting dominion, laid claim to a priesthood, derived by succession from Christ, and so independent from the civil power, receiving (as they pretend) by the imposition of hands, and some other ceremonies agreed on (but variously) by the priesthoods of the several factions, an indelible character, particular sanctity, and a power immediately from Heaven to do several things which are not lawful to be done by other men. The chief whereof are—1st. To teach opinions concerning God, a future state, and ways of worship. 2nd. To do and perform themselves certain rites exclusive of others. 3rd. To punish dissenters from their doctrines and rules. Whereas it is evident from Scripture, that all priesthood terminated in the Great High Priest, Jesus Christ, who was the last Priest. There are no footsteps in Scriptures of any so set apart, with such powers as they pretend to, after the Apostles' time; nor that had any indelible character. That it is to be made out, that there is nothing which a priest can do, which another man without any such ordination, (if other circumstances of fitness, and an appointment to it, not disturbing

peace and order, concur,) may not lawfully perform and do, and the Church and worship of God be preserved, as the peace of the state may be by justices of the peace, and other officers, who had no ordination, or laying on of hands, to fit them to be justices, and by taking away their commissions may cease to be so; so ministers, as well as justices, are necessary, one for the administration of religious public worship, the other of civil justice; but an indelible character, peculiar sanctity of the function, or a power immediately derived from Heaven, is not necessary, or as much as convenient, for either.

But the clergy (as they call themselves) of the Christian religion, in imitation of the Jewish priesthood, having, almost ever since the first ages of the Church, laid claim to this power, separate from civil government, as received from God himself, have, wherever the civil magistrate hath been Christian and of their opinion, and superior in power to the clergy, and they not able to cope with him, pretended this power only to be spiritual, and to extend no farther; but yet still pressed, as a duty on the magistrate, to punish and persecute those whom they disliked and declared against. And so when they excommunicated, their under officer, the magistrate, was to ex-

ecute; and to reward princes for their doing their drudgery, they have (whenever princes have been serviceable to their ends,) been careful to preach up monarchy *jure divino;* for commonwealths have hitherto been less favourable to their power. But notwithstanding the *jus divinum* of monarchy, when any Prince hath dared to dissent from their doctrines or forms, or been less apt to execute the decrees of the hierarchy, they have been the first and forwardest in giving check to his authority, and disturbance to his government. And Princes, on the other side, being apt to hearken to such as seem to advance their authority, and bring in religion to the assistance of their absolute power, have been generally very ready to worry those sheep who have ever so little straggled out of those shepherds' folds, where they were kept in order to be shorn by them both, and to be howled on both upon subjects and* neighbours at their pleasure: and hence have come most of those calamities which have so long disturbed and wasted Christendom. Whilst the magistrate, being persuaded it is his duty to punish those the clergy please to call heretics, schismatics, or fanatics, or else taught to apprehend danger from dissension in

* It is thus in the original, but, I confess, it is not intelligible.

religion, thinks it his interest to suppress them —persecutes all who observe not the same forms in the religious worship which is set up in his country. The people, on the other side, finding the mischiefs that fall on them for worshipping God according to their own persuasions, enter into confederacies and combinations to secure themselves as well as they can; so that oppression and vexation on one side, self-defence and desire of religious liberty on the other, create dislikes, jealousies, apprehensions, and factions, which seldom fail to break out into downright persecution, or open war.

But notwithstanding the liberality of the clergy to princes, when they have not strength enough to deal with them, be very large; yet when they are once in a condition to strive with them for the mastery, then is it seen how far their spiritual power extends, and how, *in ordine ad spiritualia*, absolute temporal power comes in. So that ordination, that begins in priesthood, if it be let alone, will certainly grow up to absolute empire; and though Christ declares himself to have no kingdom of this world, his successors have (whenever they can but grasp the power) a large commission to execute; and that a rigorously civil dominion. The Popedom hath been a large and

lasting instance of this. And what Presbytery could do, even in its infancy when it had a little humbled the magistrates, let Scotland show.

PATRIÆ AMOR is from the idea of settlement there, and not leaving it again, the mind not being satisfied with any thing that suggests often to it the thoughts of leaving it, which naturally attends a man in a strange country. For though, in general, we think of dying, and so leaving the place where we have set up our rest in this world, yet, in particular, deferring and putting it off from time to time, we make our stay there eternal, because we never set precise bounds to our abode there, and never think of leaving it in good earnest.

AMOR PATRIÆ.—The remembrance of pleasures and conveniences we have had there; the love of our friends, whose conversation and assistance may be pleasant and useful to us; and the thoughts of recommending ourselves to our old acquaintance, by the improvements we shall bring home, either of our fortunes or abilities, or the increase of esteem we expect for having travelled and seen more than others of this world, and the strange things in it; all these preserve in us, in long absence, a constant affection to our country, and a desire to return to it. But yet I think this is not all, nor

the chief cause, that keeps in us a longing after our country. Whilst we are abroad we look on ourselves as strangers there, and are always thinking of departing; we set not up our rest, but often see or think of the end of our being there; and the mind is not easily satisfied with any thing it can reach to the end of. But when we are returned to our country, where we think of a lasting abode, wherein to set up our rest, an everlasting abode, for we seldom think of any thing beyond it, we do not propose to ourselves another country whither we think to remove and establish ourselves afterwards. This is that, I imagine, that sets mankind so constantly upon desires of returning to their country, because they think no more of leaving it again; and, therefore, men married, and settled in any place, are much more cold in these desires. And, I believe, when any one thinks often of this world, as of a place wherein he is not to make any long abode, where he can have no lasting fixed settlement, but that he sees the bounds of his stay here, and often reflects upon his departure, he will presently upon it put on the thoughts of a stranger, be much more indifferent to the particular place of his nativity, and no more fond of it than a traveller is of any foreign country, when he thinks he must leave

them all indifferently to return and settle in his native soil.

The following remarkable passage, containing, as it does, the substance of Paley's argument, must have been written very early, being found in the tenth page of the first Common-Place Book, dated 1661.

"Virtue, as in its obligation it is the will of God, discovered by natural reason, and thus has the force of a law; so in the matter of it, it is nothing else but doing of good, either to oneself or others; and the contrary hereunto, vice, is nothing else but doing of harm. Thus the bounds of temperance are prescribed by the health, estates, and the use of our time: justice, truth, and mercy, by the good or evil they are likely to produce; since every body allows one may with justice deny another the possession of his own sword, when there is reason to believe he would make use of it to his own harm. But since men in society are in a far different estate than when considered single and alone, the instances and measures of virtue and vice are very different under these two considerations; for though, as I said before, the measures of temperance, to a solitary man, be none but those above-mentioned; yet if he be a member

of a society, it may, according to the station he has in it, receive measures from reputation and example; so that what would be no vicious excess in a retired obscurity, may be a very great one amongst people who think ill of such excess, because, by lessening his esteem amongst them, it makes a man incapable of having the authority, and doing the good which otherwise he might. For esteem and reputation being a sort of moral strength, whereby a man is enabled to do, as it were, by an augmented force, that which others, of equal natural parts and natural power, cannot do without it; he that by any intemperance weakens this his moral strength, does himself as much harm as if by intemperance he weakened the natural strength either of his mind or body, and so is equally vicious by doing harm to himself. This, if well considered, will give us better boundaries of virtue and vice, than curious questions stated with the nicest distinctions; that being always the greatest vice whose consequences draw after it the greatest harm; and therefore the injury and mischiefs done to society are much more culpable than those done to private men, though with greater personal aggravations. And so many things naturally become vices amongst men in society, which

without that would be innocent actions: thus for a man to cohabit and have children by one or more women, who are at their own disposal; and when they think fit to part again, I see not how it can be condemned as a vice since nobody is harmed, supposing it done amongst persons considered as separate from the rest of mankind; but yet this hinders not but it is a vice of deep dye when the same thing is done in a society wherein modesty, the great virtue of the weaker sex, has often other rules and bounds set by custom and reputation, than what it has by direct instances of the law of nature in a solitude or an estate separate from the opinion of this or that society. For if a woman, by transgressing those bounds which the received opinion of her country or religion, and not nature or reason, have set to modesty, has drawn any blemish on her reputation, she may run the risk of being exposed to infamy, and other mischiefs, amongst which the least is not the danger of losing the comforts of a conjugal settlement, and therewith the chief end of her being, the propagation of mankind.

SCRIPTURA SACRA.—A Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the

Writings of the Old and New Testament. By William Lowth. 8vo. Ox. 92. p. 288.

'All the books have not an equal inspiration.' 1 Q. What is equal inspiration? if the New be inspired, the Old is, because of the testimony given to the Old by the New. 2 Q. Inspired, because designed by God for the perpetual use and instruction of the Church, and to be a rule of the Christian faith in all ages. 3 Q. Whether by the same reason, they must not be very plain, and their sense infallibly intelligible to those to whom they are to be a rule?

'An inspired writing is what is writ by the incitation, direction, and assistance of God, and designed by him for the perpetual use of the Church.' Q. What is meant by incitation, direction, and assistance in the case? 4 Q. Whether that may not be inspired which is not designed for the perpetual use of the Church? 'God designed to provide a means for preserving the doctrine of Christ to the end of the world.' 5 Q. Will it thence follow that all that St. Luke writ was inspired?

'Writing, the best ordinary means of conveying doctrine to after ages; for God never works more miracles than needs must.' 6 Q. Whether, therefore, all in the New Testament was appointed by God to be written?

'Oral tradition not so good. Particular revelation not pretended to but by enthusiasts.' 7 Q. Whether the name, enthusiasts, answers their arguments for particular revelation?

'By writings, preserved in the ordinary methods of providence, men may as well *know* the *revealed* will of God, as they can know the histories of former ages, and the opinions of philosophers,' &c. 8 Q. Will as well serve the turn, for that is with great uncertainty.

'God made use of writing for the instruction of the Jewish Church. Moses, by God's direction, wrote his law in a book.' 10 Q. Whether then the argument be not, the Old Testament was inspired, therefore the New is?

'It is natural to suppose that the Apostles should take care to provide some certain means of instruction for the Christian church in conformity to the Jewish.' 11 Q. When the author writ this, whether he thought not of it as an human contrivance? 'St. Matthew writ particularly for the use of the Jews he had preached to.' 12 Q. Whether then he had any thoughts that it should be an universal rule?

ELECTIO.

I cannot see of what use the Doctrine of Election and Perseverance is, unless it be to

lead men into presumption and a neglect of their duties, being once persuaded that they are in a state of grace, which is a state they are told they cannot fall from. For, since nobody can know that he is elected but by having true faith, and nobody can know when he has such a faith that he cannot fall from, common and saving faith, as they are distinguished, being so alike that he that has faith cannot distinguish whether it be such as he can fall from or no, (vide Calvin, Inst. l. 3. c. 2. 6. 12.)—who is elected, or has faith from which he cannot fall, can only be known by the event at the last day, and therefore is in vain talked of now till the marks of such a faith be certainly given.

Ecclesia.—Hooker's description of the Church, l. 1. § 15. amounts to this, that it is a supernatural but voluntary society, wherein a man associates himself to God, angels, and holy men. The original of it, he says, is the same as of other societies, viz. an inclination unto sociable life, and a consent to the bond of association, which is the law and order they are associated in. That which makes it supernatural is, that part of the bond of their association is a law revealed concerning what worship God would have done unto him, which

natural reason could not have discovered. So that the worship of God so far forth as it has any thing in it more than the law of reason doth teach, may not be invented of men. From whence I think it will follow: 1st. That the Church being a supernatural society, and a society by consent, the secular power, which is purely natural, nor any other power, can compel one to be of any particular Church society, there being many such to be found. 2nd. That the end of entering into such society being only to obtain the favour of God, by offering him an acceptable worship, nobody can impose any ceremonies unless positively and clearly by revelation injoined, any farther than every one who joins in the use of them is persuaded in his conscience they are acceptable to God; for if his conscience condemns any part of unrevealed worship, he cannot by any sanction of men be obliged to it. 3rd. That since a part of the bond of the association is a revealed law, this part only is unalterable, and the other, which is human, depends wholly on consent, and so is alterable, and a man is held by such laws, or to such a particular society, no longer than he himself doth consent. 4th. I imagine that the original of the society is not from our inclination, as he says, to a sociable

life, for that may be fully satisfied in other societies, but from the obligation man, by the light of reason, finds himself under, to own and worship God publicly in the world. J. L.

SUPERSTITIO.—The true cause and rise of superstition is indeed nothing else but a false opinion of the Deity, that renders him dreadful and terrible as being rigorous and imperious; that which represents him as austere and apt to be angry, but yet impotent and easy to be appeased again by some flattering devotions, especially if performed with sanctimonious shows and a solemn sadness of mind: this root of superstition diversely branched forth itself sometimes into magic and exorcisms, oftentimes into pedantical rites and idle observations of things and times, as Theophrastus has largely set forth. Superstition is made up of apprehension of evil from God, and hopes, by formal and outward addresses to him, to appease him without real amendment of life. J. L.

TRADITIO. The Jews, the Romanists, and the Turks, who all three pretend to guide themselves by a law revealed from Heaven, which shows them the way to happiness, do yet all of them have recourse very frequently

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to tradition, as a rule of no less authority than their own written law, whereby they seem to allow that the divine law (however God be willing to reveal it) is not capable to be conveyed by writings to mankind, distant in place and time, languages and customs; and so, through the defect of language no positive law of righteousness can be that way conveyed sufficiently and with exactness to all the inhabitants of the earth in remote generations; and so must resolve all into natural religion and that light which every man has born with him. Or else they give occasion to enquiring men to suspect the integrity of their priests and teachers, who, unwilling that the people should have a standing known rule of faith and manners, have, for the maintenance of their own authority, foisted in another of tradition, which will always be in their own power, to be varied and suited to their own interests and occasions.

J. L.

Q. Whether the Bramins, besides their book of Handscrit, make use also of tradition, and so of others who pretend to a revealed religion?

UNITARIA.—The fathers before the Council of Nice speak rather like Arians than ortho-

dox. If any one desire to see undeniable proofs of it, I refer him to the Quaternio of Curcillæus, where he will be fully satisfied.

There is scarcely one text alleged to the Trinitarians which is not otherwise expounded by their own writers: you may see a great number of these texts and expositions in a book entitled Scriptura S. Trin. Revelatrix, under the name of St. Gallus. There be a multitude of texts that deny those things of Christ which cannot be denied of God, and that affirm such things of him that cannot agree to him if he were a person of God. In like manner of the Holy Ghost, which of both sorts you may find urged and defended in the two books of Jo. Crellius, touching one God the Father, and abridged in Walzogenius Præpar. ad Util. Lection. N. T. 2, 3, 4, and also in the Brief History, let. 1. 5.

Vita Eterna.—There was no particular promise of eternal life until the coming of Christ; so the Church of Christ have always understood it, as any one may be satisfied who reads J. Vossius's Answer to Ravenspergerus, c. 23. where he shows that the ancient Doctors, especially St. Austin, looked upon the Old Testament as containing properly and di-

rectly the promises only of earthly and temporal things. Patrick, 657. Reade, b. 2.

LIBERUM ARBITRIUM.—Of the ancient philosophers who have written either professedly or incidentally of liberty and necessity, the chief of these Plato de Repub. l. 2 and 3; Gorgia Tim. Phædro, and often elsewhere; Plutarch de Fato; Hierocles in Aurea Carmina and de Fato; Maximus Tyrius an aliquid sit in nostrâ Potestate; Plotinus, l. 1.; Chalcidius Coment. in Timæum; Alexander Aphrodisiensis de Fato ad Imperatores Antoninos; Ammonius Herm. in Arist. de Interpret.; Chrysippus apud A. Gellium, l. vi. c. 11. The Pharisees held freedom of choice, Josephus Ant. l. xviii. c. 11.; and all the Jews, Maimonides Duct. Dubit. part iii. c. 17 and 18. All the fathers before St. Austin held free-will; most Christian writers since deny it. That external objects and natural complexion, custom, &c. &c. are occasions of a great part.

TRINITY.—The Papists deny that the doctrine of the Trinity can be proved by the Scripture; see this plainly taught and urged very earnestly by Card. Hosius de Auth. S. Script. l. iii. p. 53.; Gordonius Hunlæius

Contr. Tom. Cont. de Verbo Dei, c. 19.; Gretserus and Tanerus in Colloquio Rattisbon. Vega. Possevin. Wiekus. These learned men, especially Bellarmin, and Wiekus after him, have urged all the Scriptures they could, with their utmost industry, find out in this cause, and yet, after all, they acknowledge their insufficiency and obscurity.

Curcillæus has proved, as well as any thing can be proved out of ancient writings, that the doctrine of the Trinity, about the time of the Council of Nice, was of a special union of three persons in the Deity, and not of a numerical, as it is now taught, and has been taught since the chimerical schoolmen were hearkened unto.

Concerning the original of the Trinitarian doctrines, from whom they are derived or by whom they were invented, he that is generally and indeed deservedly confessed to have writ the most learnedly, is Dr. Cudworth, in his Intellectual System.

TRINITY.—The divinity of the Holy Spirit was not believed, or, as I think, so much as mentioned by any in the time of Lactantius, i. e. anno 300, vid. Lact. Inst. l. 4. c. 29; Petavius de Trin. 1. c. 14. § 14. 21; Huet. Originian. l. 2. c. 2. 9. 2. §.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.

JUDGING—ELECTION—RESOLUTION.

JUDGING is a bare action of the understanding, whereby a man, several objects being proposed to him, takes one of them to be best for him.

But this is not Election?

Election then is, when a man judging any thing to be best for him, ceases to consider, examine, and inquire any farther concerning that matter; for, till a man comes to this, he has not chosen, the matter still remains with him under deliberation, and not determined. Here, then, comes in the will, and makes Election voluntary, by stopping in the mind any farther inquiry and examination. This Election sometimes proceeds farther to

Firm Resolution, which is not barely a stop to farther inquiry by Election at that time, but the predetermination, as much as in him lies,

of his will not to take the matter into any farther deliberation; *i. e.* not to employ his thoughts any more about the eligibility; *i. e.* the suitableness of that which he has chosen to himself as making a part of his happiness. For example, a man who would be married, has several wives proposed to him. He considers which would be fittest for him, and judges Mary best; afterwards, upon that continued judgment, makes choice of her; this choice ends his deliberation; he stops all farther consideration whether she be best or no, and resolves to fix here, which is not any more to examine whether she be best or fittest for him of all proposed; and consequently pursues the means of obtaining her, sees, frequents, and falls desperately in love with her, and then we may see Resolution at the highest; which is an act of the will, whereby he not only supersedes all farther examination, but will not admit of any information or suggestion, will not hear any thing that can be offered against the pursuit of this match.

Thus we may see how the will mixes itself with these actions, and what share it has in them; viz. that all it does is but exciting or stopping the operative faculties; in all which it is acted on more or less vigorously, as the

uneasiness that presses is greater or less. At first, let us suppose his thoughts of marriage in general to be excited only by some consideration of some moderate convenience offered to his mind; this moves but moderate desires, and thence moderate uneasiness leaves his will almost indifferent; he is slow in his choice amongst the matches offered, pursues coolly till desire grows upon him, and with it uneasiness proportionably, and that quickens his will; he approaches nearer, he is in love — is set on fire — the flame scorches — this makes him uneasy with a witness; then his will, acted by that pressing uneasiness, vigorously and steadily employs all the operative faculties of body and mind for the attainment of the beloved object without which he cannot be happy.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL POWER, INDORSED EXCOMMUNICATION. Dated 1673–4.

There is a twofold society, of which almost all men in the world are members, and that from the twofold concernment they have to attain a twofold happiness; viz. that of this world and that of the other: and hence there arises these two following societies, viz. religious and civil.

CIVIL SOCIETY, OR THE STATE.

1. The end of civil society is civil peace and prosperity, or the preservation of the society and every member thereof in a free and peaceable enjoyment of all the good things of this life that belong to each of them; but beyond the concernments of this life, this society hath nothing to do at all.

2. The terms of communion with, or being a part of this society, is promise of obedience to the laws of it.

3. The proper matter, *circa quam*, of the laws of this society, are all things conducing to the end above-men-

RELIGIOUS SOCIETY, OR THE CHURCH.

1. The end of religious society is the attaining happiness after this life in another world.

2. The terms of communion or conditions of being members of this society, is promise of obedience to the laws of it.

3. The proper matter of the laws of this society are all things tending to the attainment of future bliss,

tioned, *i. e.* civil happiness; and are in effect almost all moral and indifferent things, which yet are not the proper matter of the laws of the society, till the doing or omitting of any of them come to have a tendency to the end above-mentioned.

4. The means to procure obedience to the laws of this society, and thereby preserve it, is force or punishment; *i. e.* the abridgement of any one's share of the good things of the world within the reach of the society, and sometimes a total

which are of three sorts: 1. *Credenda*, or matters of faith and opinion, which terminate in the understanding. 2. *Cultus religiosus*, which contains in it both the ways of expressing our honour and adoration of the Deity, and of address to him for the obtaining any good from him. 3. *Moralia*, or the right management of our actions in respect of ourselves and others.

4. The means to preserve obedience to the laws of this society are the hopes and fears of happiness and misery in another world. But though the laws of this society be in order to happiness in another world, and so the penalties annexed to

deprivation, as in capital punishments. And this, I think, is the whole end, latitude, and extent of civil power and society.

them are also of another world; yet the society being in this world and to be continued here, there are some means necessary for the preservation of the society here, which is the expulsion of such members as obey not the laws of it, or disturb its order. And this, I think, is the whole end, latitude, and extent of ecclesiastical power and religious society.

This being, as I suppose, the distinct bounds of church and state, let us a little compare them together:

THE PARALLEL.

1. The end of civil society is present enjoyment of what this world affords.

1. The end of church communion, future expectation of what is to be had in the other world.

2. Another end of civil society is the preservation of the society or government itself for its own sake.

2. The preservation of the society in religious communion is only in order to the conveying and propagating those laws and truths which concern our well-being in another world.

3. The terms of communion must be the same in all societies.

4. The laws of a commonwealth are mutable, being made within the society by an authority not distinct from it, nor exterior to it.

4. The laws of religious society, bating those which are only subservient to the order necessary to their execution, are immutable, not subject to any authority of the society, but only proposed by and within the society, but made by a lawgiver without the society, and paramount to it.

5. The proper means to procure obedience

5. The proper enforcement of obedi-

to the law of the civil society, and thereby attain the end, civil happiness, is force or punishment. 1st. It is effectual and adequate for the preservation of the society, and civil happiness is the immediate and natural consequence of the execution of the law. 2nd. It is just, for the breach of laws being mostly the prejudice and diminution of another man's right, and always tending to the dissolution of the society, in the continuance whereof every man's particular right is comprehended, it is just that he who has impaired another man's good, should suffer the diminution of his own.

ence to the laws of religion, are the rewards and punishments of the other world; but civil punishment is not so. 1st. Because it is ineffectual to that purpose; for punishment is never sufficient to keep men to the obedience of any law, where the evil it brings is not certainly greater than the good which is obtained or expected from the disobedience; and therefore no temporal worldly punishment can be sufficient to persuade a man to, or from that way which he believes leads to everlasting happiness or misery. 2nd. Because it is unjust in reference both to Credenda and Cultus, that

3rd. It is within the power of the society, which can exert its own strength against offenders, the sword being put into the magistrate's hands to that purpose. But civil society has nothing to do without its own limits, which is civil happiness.

I should be despoiled of my good things of this world, where I disturb not in the least the enjoyment of others; for my faith or religious worship hurts not another man in any concernment of his; and in moral transgressions the third and real part of religion, the religious society cannot punish, because it then invades the civil society, and wrests the magistrate's sword out of his hand. In civil society one man's good is involved and complicated with another's, but in religious societies every man's concerns are separate, and one man's transgressions hurt not another any farther than he imitates him,

and if he err, he errs at his own private cost; therefore I think no external punishment, *i. e.* deprivation or diminution of the goods of this life, belongs to the church. Only because for the propagation of the truth, (which every society believes to be its own religion,) it is equity it should remove those two evils which will hinder its propagation, 1. disturbance within, which is contradiction or disobedience of any of its members to its doctrines and discipline; 2, infamy without, which is the scandalous lives or disallowed profession of any of its members; and the proper way to do this, which is in its

power, is to exclude and disown such vicious members.

6. Church-membership is perfectly voluntary, and may end whenever any one pleases without any prejudice to himself, but in civil society it is not so.

But because religious societies are of two sorts, wherein their circumstances very much differ, the exercise of their power is also much different. It is to be considered that all mankind, (very few or none excepted,) are combined into civil societies in various forms, as force, chance, agreement, or other accidents have happened to constrain them: there are very few also that have not some religion: and hence it comes to pass, that very few men but are members both of some church and of some commonwealth; and hence it comes to pass—

1st. That in some places the civil and religious societies are co-extended, *i. e.* both the magistrate and every subject of the same commonwealth is also member of the same church; and thus it is in Muscovy, whereby they have all

the same civil laws, and the same opinions and religious worship.

2nd. In some places the commonwealth, though all of one religion, is but a part of the church or religious society which acts and is acknowledged to be one entire society; and so it is in Spain and the principalities of Italy.

3rd. In some places the religion of the commonwealth, *i. e.* the public established religion, is not received by all the subjects of the commonwealth; and thus the Protestant religion in England, the Reformed in Brandenburgh, the Lutheran in Sweden.

4th. In some places the religion of part of the people is different from the governing part of the civil society; and thus the Presbyterian, Independent, Anabaptists, Quakers and Jewish in England, the Lutheran and Popish in Cleve, &c.; and in these two last the religious society is part of the civil.

There are also three things to be considered in each religion as the matter of their communion:—

1. Opinions or speculations, Credenda.
2. Cultus religiosus.
3. Mores.

Which are all to be considered in the exercise of church power, which I conceive does

properly extend no farther than excommunication, which is to remove a scandalous or turbulent member.

In the first case there is no need of excommunication for immorality, because the civil law has provided, or may sufficiently, against that by penal laws, enough to suppress it; for the civil magistrate has moral actions under the dominion of his sword, and therefore it is not like he will turn away a subject out of his country for a fault which he can compel him to reform. But if any one differ from the Church in "fide aut cultu," I think first the civil magistrate may punish him for it where he is fully persuaded that it will disturb the civil peace, otherwise not; but the religious society may certainly excommunicate him, the peace whereof may by this means be preserved; but no other evil ought to follow him upon that excommunication as such, but only upon the consideration of the public peace.

In the second case I think the church may excommunicate for faults in faith and worship, but not those faults in manners which the magistrate has annexed penalties to, for the preservation of civil society and happiness. The same also I think ought to be the rule in the third case.

In the fourth case, I think the Church has power to excommunicate for matters of faith, worship, or manners, though the magistrate punish the same immorality with his sword, because the Church cannot otherwise remove the scandal which is necessary for its preservation and the propagation of its doctrines; and this power of being judges who are fit to be of their society, the magistrate cannot deny to any religious society which is permitted within his dominions. This was the state of the Church till Constantine. But in none of the former cases is excommunication capable to be denounced by any Church upon any one but the members of that Church, it being absurd to cut off that which is no part; neither ought the civil magistrate to inflict any punishment upon the score of excommunication, but to punish the fact or forbear, just as he finds it convenient for the preservation of the civil peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, (within which his power is confined,) without any regard to excommunication at all.

THUS I THINK

It is a man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery.

Happiness consists in what delights and contents the mind; misery, in what disturbs, discomposes, or torments it.

I will therefore make it my business to seek satisfaction and delight, and avoid uneasiness, and disquiet; to have as much of the one, and as little of the other, as may be.

But here I must have a care I mistake not; for if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness.

Let me then see wherein consists the most lasting pleasures of this life; and that, as far as I can observe, is in these things:

1st. Health,—without which no sensual pleasure can have any relish.

2nd. Reputation,—for that I find every body is pleased with, and the want of it is a constant torment.

3rd. Knowledge,—for the little knowledge I have, I find I would not sell at any rate, nor part with for any other pleasure.

4th. Doing good,—for I find the well-cooked meat I eat to-day does now no more de-

light me, nay, I am diseased after a full meal. The perfumes I smelt yesterday now no more affect me with any pleasure; but the good turn I did yesterday, a year, seven years since, continues still to please and delight me as often as I reflect on it.

5th. The expectation of eternal and incomprehensible happiness in another world is that also which carries a constant pleasure with it.

If then I will faithfully pursue that happiness I propose to myself, whatever pleasure offers itself to me, I must carefully look that it cross not any of those five great and constant pleasures above mentioned. For example, the fruit I see tempts me with the taste of it that I love, but if it endanger my health, I part with a constant and lasting for a very short and transient pleasure, and so foolishly make myself unhappy, and am not true to my own interest.

Hunting, plays, and other innocent diversions delight me: if I make use of them to refresh myself after study and business, they preserve my health, restore the vigour of my mind, and increase my pleasure; but if I spend all, or the greatest part of my time in them, they hinder my improvement in knowledge and useful arts, they blast my credit, and give

me up to the uneasy state of shame, ignorance, and contempt, in which I cannot but be very unhappy. Drinking, gaming, and vicious delights will do me this mischief, not only by wasting my time, but by a positive efficacy endanger my health, impair my parts, imprint ill habits, lessen my esteem, and leave a constant lasting torment on my conscience; therefore all vicious and unlawful pleasures I will always avoid, because such a mastery of my passions will afford me a constant pleasure greater than any such enjoyments; and also deliver me from the certain evil of several kinds, that by indulging myself in a present temptation I shall certainly afterwards suffer.

All innocent diversions and delights as far as they will contribute to my health, and consist with my improvement, condition, and my other more solid pleasures of knowledge and reputation, I will enjoy, but no farther, and this I will carefully watch and examine, that I may not be deceived by the flattery of a present pleasure to lose a greater.

OF ETHICS IN GENERAL.

1. Happiness and misery are the two great springs of human actions, and though through different ways we find men so busy in the

world, they all aim at happiness, and desire to avoid misery, as it appears to them in different places and shapes.

2. I do not remember that I have heard of any nation of men who have not acknowledged that there has been right and wrong in men's actions, as well as truth and falsehood in their sayings; some measures there have been every where owned, though very different; some rules and boundaries to men's actions, by which they were judged to be good or bad; nor is there, I think, any people amongst whom there is not distinction between virtue and vice; some kind of morality is to be found every where received; I will not say perfect and exact, but yet enough to let us know that the notion of it is more or less every where, and that men think that even where politics, societies, and magistrates are silent, men yet are under some laws to which they owe obedience.

3. But however morality be the great business and concernment of mankind, and so deserves our most attentive application and study; yet in the very entrance this occurs very strange and worthy our consideration, that morality hath been generally in the world rated as a science distinct from theology, religion, and law; and that it hath been the

proper province of philosophers, a sort of men different both from divines, priests, and lawyers, whose profession it has been to explain and teach this knowledge to the world; a plain argument to me of some discovery still amongst men, of the law of nature, and a secret apprehension of another rule of action which rational creatures had a concernment to conform to, besides what either the priests pretended was the immediate command of their God, (for all the heathen ceremonies of worship pretended to revelation, reason failing in the support of them,) or the lawyer told them was the command of the Government.

4. But yet these philosophers seldom deriving these rules up to their original, nor arguing them as the commands of the great God of heaven and earth, and such as according to which he would retribute to men after this life, the utmost enforcements they could add to them were reputation and disgrace by those names of virtue and vice, which they endeavoured by their authority to make names of weight to their scholars and the rest of the people. Were there no human law, nor punishment, nor obligation of civil or divine sanctions, there would yet still be such species of actions in the world as justice, temperance, and fortitude, drunkenness and

theft, which would also be thought some of them good, some bad; there would be distinct notions of virtues and vices; for to each of these names there would belong a complex idea, or otherwise all these and the like words which express moral things in all languages would be empty, insignificant sounds, and all moral discourses would be perfect jargon. But all the knowledge of virtues and vices which a man attained to, this way, would amount to no more than taking the definitions or the significations of the words of any language, either from the men skilled in that language, or the common usage of the country, to know how to apply them, and call particular actions in that country by their right names; and so in effect would be no more but the skill how to speak properly, or at most to know what actions in the country he lives in are thought laudable or disgraceful; *i. e.* are called virtues and vices: the general rule whereof, and the most constant that I can find is, that those actions are esteemed virtuous which are thought absolutely necessary to the preservation of society, and those that disturb or dissolve the bonds of community, are every where esteemed ill and vicious.

5. This would necessarily fall out, for were there no obligation or superior law at all, besides

that of society, since it cannot be supposed that any men should associate together and unite in the same community, and at the same time allow that for commendable, *i. e.* count it a virtue, nay not discountenance and treat such actions as blameable, *i. e.* count them vices, which tend to the dissolution of that society in which they were united; but all other actions that are not thought to have such an immediate influence on society I find not, (as far as I have been conversant in histories,) but that in some countries or societies they are virtues, in others vices, and in others indifferent, according as the authority of some esteemed wise men in some places, or as inclination or fashion of people in other places, have happened to establish them virtues or vices; so that the ideas of virtues taken up this way teach us no more than to speak properly according to the fashion of the country we are in, without any very great improvement of our knowledge, more than what men meant by such words; and this is the knowledge contained in the common ethics of the schools; and this is not more but to know the right names of certain complex modes, and the skill of speaking properly.

6. The ethics of the schools, built upon the authority of Aristotle, but perplexed a great

deal more with hard words and useless distinctions, telling us what he or they are pleased to call virtues and vices, teach us nothing of morality, but only to understand their names, or call actions as they or Aristotle does; which is, in effect, but to speak their language properly. The end and use of morality being to direct our lives, and by showing us what actions are good, and what bad, prepare us to do the one and avoid the other; those that pretend to teach morals mistake their business, and become only language-masters where they do not do this,—when they teach us only to talk and dispute, and call actions by the names they prescribe, when they do not show the inferments that may draw us to virtue and deter us from vice.

7. Moral actions are only those that depend upon the choice of an understanding and free agent. And an understanding free agent naturally follows that which causes pleasure to it and flies that which causes pain; *i. e.* naturally seeks happiness and shuns misery. That, then, which causes to any one pleasure, that is good to him; and that which causes him pain, is bad to him: and that which causes the greater pleasure is the greater good, and that which causes the greater pain, the greater evil. For happiness and misery consisting only in pleasure and

pain, either of mind or body, or both, according to the interpretation I have given above of those words, nothing can be good or bad to any one but as it tends to their happiness or misery, as it serves to produce in them pleasure or pain: for good and bad, being relative terms, do not denote any thing in the nature of the thing, but only the relation it bears to another, in its aptness and tendency to produce in it pleasure or pain; and thus we see and say, that which is good for one man is bad for another.

8. Now, though it be not so apprehended generally, yet it is from this tendency to produce to us pleasure or pain, that moral good or evil has its name, as well as natural. Yet perhaps it will not be found so erroneous as perhaps at first sight it will seem strange, if one should affirm, that there is nothing morally good which does not produce pleasure to a man, nor nothing morally evil that does not bring pain to him. The difference between moral and natural good and evil is only this; that we call that naturally good and evil, which, by the natural efficiency of the thing, produces pleasure or pain in us; and that is morally good or evil which, by the intervention of the will of an intelligent free agent, draws pleasure or pain after it, not by any natural consequence, but by the interven-

tion of that power. Thus, drinking to excess, when it produces the head-ache or sickness, is a natural evil; but as it is a transgression of law, by which a punishment is annexed to it, it is a moral evil. For rewards and punishments are the good and evil whereby superiors enforce the observance of their laws; it being impossible to set any other motive or restraint to the actions of a free understanding agent, but the consideration of good or evil; that is, pleasure or pain that will follow from it.

9. Whoever treats of morality so as to give us only the definitions of justice and temperance, theft and incontinency, and tells us which are virtues, which are vices, does only settle certain complex ideas of modes with their names to them, whereby we may learn to understand others well, when they talk by their rules, and speak intelligibly and properly to others who have been informed in their doctrine. But whilst they discourse ever so acutely of temperance or justice, but show no law of a superior that prescribes temperance, to the observation or breach of which law there are rewards and punishments annexed, the force of morality is lost, and evaporates only into words, disputes, and niceties. And, however Aristotle or Anacharsis, Confucius, or any one amongst us, shall name

this or that action a virtue or a vice, their authorities are all of them alike, and they exercise but what power every one has, which is to show what complex ideas their words shall stand for: for without showing a law that commands or forbids them, moral goodness will be but an empty sound, and those actions which the schools here call virtues or vices, may by the same authority be called by contrary names in another country; and if these be nothing more than their decisions and determinations in the case, they will be still nevertheless indifferent as to any man's practice, which will by such kind of determinations be under no obligation to observe them.

10. But there is another sort of morality or rules of our actions, which though they may in many parts be coincident and agreeable with the former, yet have a different foundation, and we come to the knowledge of them a different way; these notions or standards of our actions not being ideas of our own making, to which we give names, but depend upon something without us, and so not made by us, but for us, and these are the rules set to our actions by the declared will or laws of another, who hath power to punish our aberrations;—these are properly and truly the rules of good and evil, because the conformity or disagreement of our actions

with these, bring upon us good or evil; these influence our lives as the other do our words, and there is as much difference between these two, as between living well and attaining happiness on the one hand, compared with speaking properly and understanding of words on the other. The notion of one, men have by making to themselves a collection of simple ideas, called by those names which they take to be names of virtues and vices; the notion of the other, we come by from the rules set us by a superior power: but because we cannot come to the knowledge of those rules without, 1st, making known a lawgiver to all mankind, with power and will to reward and punish; and 2nd, without showing how he hath declared his will and law, I must only at present suppose this rule, till a fit place to speak of these, viz. God and the law of nature; and only at present mention what is immediately to the purpose in hand, 1st, That this rule of our actions set us by our law-maker is conversant about, and ultimately terminates in, those simple ideas before mentioned; viz. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. 2nd, That the law being known, or supposed known by us, the relation of our actions to it, *i. e.* the agreement or disagreement of any thing we do to that rule, is as easy and

clearly known as any other relation. 3rd. That we have moral ideas as well as others, that we come by them the same way, and that they are nothing but collections of simple ideas. Only we are carefully to retain that distinction of moral actions, that they have a double consideration; 1st, As they have their proper denominations, as *liberality, modesty, frugality,* &c. &c. and thus they are but modes, *i. e.* actions made up of such a precise collection of simple ideas; but it is not thereby determined that they are either good or bad, virtues or vices. 2nd, As they refer to a law with which they agree or disagree, so are they good or bad, virtues or vices. Ευτραπελια, was a name amongst the Greeks, of such a peculiar sort of actions; *i. e.* of such a collection of simple ideas concurring to make them up; but whether this collection of simple ideas called Ευτραπελια, be a virtue or vice, is known only by comparing it to that rule which determines virtue or vice, and this is that consideration that properly belongs to actions, *i. e.* their agreement with a rule. In one, any action is only a collection of simple ideas, and so is a positive complex idea: in the other it stands in relation to a law or rule, and according as it agrees or disagrees, is virtue or vice. So education and piety, feasting and gluttony, are modes alike, being but certain complex ideas called

by one name: but when they are considered as virtues and vices, and rules of life carrying an obligation with them, they relate to a law, and so come under the consideration of relation.

To establish morality, therefore, upon its proper basis, and such foundations as may carry an obligation with them, we must first prove a law, which always supposes a law-maker: one that has a superiority and right to ordain, and also a power to reward and punish according to the tenor of the law established by him. This sovereign law-maker who has set rules and bounds to the actions of men is God, their Maker, whose existence we have already proved. The next thing then to show is, that there are certain rules, certain dictates, which it is his will all men should conform their actions to, and that this will of his is sufficiently promulgated and made known to all mankind.

DEUS.—Descartes's Proof of a God, from the Idea of necessary Existence, examined. 1696.

Though I had heard Descartes's opinion concerning the being of a God often questioned by sober men, and no enemies to his name, yet I suspended my judgment of him till lately setting myself to examine his proof of a God, I found that by it senseless matter might be the

first eternal being and cause of all things, as well as an immaterial intelligent spirit; this, joined to his shutting out the consideration of final causes out of his philosophy, and his labouring to invalidate all other proofs of a God but his own, does unavoidably draw upon him some suspicion.

The fallacy of his pretended great proof of a Deity appears to me thus:—The question between the Theists and Atheists I take to be this, viz. not whether there has been nothing from eternity, but whether the eternal Being that made, and still keeps all things in that order, beauty, and method, in which we see them, be a knowing immaterial substance, or a senseless material substance; for that something, either senseless matter, or a knowing spirit, has been from eternity, I think nobody doubts.

The idea of the Theists' eternal Being is, that it is a knowing immaterial substance, that made and still keeps all the beings of the universe in that order in which they are preserved. The idea of the Atheists' eternal Being is senseless matter. The question between them then is, which of these really is that eternal Being that has always been. Now I say, whoever will use the idea of necessary existence to prove

a God, *i. e.* an immaterial eternal knowing spirit, will have no more to say for it from the idea of necessary existence, than an Atheist has for his eternal, all-doing, senseless matter, v. g. The complex idea of God, says the Theist, is substance, immateriality, eternity, knowledge, and the power of making and producing all things. I allow it, says the Atheist; but how do you prove any real Being exists, answering the complex idea in which these simple ideas are combined? By another idea, says the Cartesian Theist, which I include in my complex idea of God, viz. the idea of necessary existence. If that will do, says the Atheist, I can equally prove the eternal existence of my first being, matter; for it is but adding the idea of unnecessary existence to the one which I have, wherein substance, extension, solidity, eternity, and the power of making and producing all things are combined, and my eternal matter is proved necessarily to exist upon as certain grounds as the immaterial God; for whatsoever is eternal must needs have necessary existence included in it. And who now has the odds in proving by adding in his mind the idea of necessary existence to his idea of the first being? The truth is in this way, that which should be proved, viz.

existence, is supposed, and so the question is only begged on both sides.

I have the complex idea of substance, solidity, and extension joined together, which I call *matter:* does this prove matter to be? No. I, with Descartes, add to this idea of matter a bulk as large as space itself; does this prove such a bulk of matter to be? No. I add to it this complex idea, the idea of eternity; does this prove matter to be eternal? No. I add to it the idea of necessary existence; does this prove matter necessarily to exist? No. Try it in spirit, and it will be just so there. The reason whereof is, that the putting together or separating; the putting in, or leaving out, any one or more ideas, out of any complex one in my head, has no influence at all upon the being of things, without me to make them exist so, as I put ideas together in my mind.

But it will be said that the idea of God includes necessary existence, and so God has a necessary existence.

I answer: The idea of God, as far as the name *God* stands for the first eternal cause, includes necessary existence.

And so far the Atheist and the Theist are agreed; or rather, there is no Atheist who de-

nies an eternal first Being, which has necessary existence. That which puts the difference between the Theist and the Atheist is this: that the Theist says, that this eternal Being, which has necessary existence, is a knowing spirit; the Atheist, that it is blind unthinking matter: for the deciding of which question, the joining the idea of necessary existence to that of eternal first Being or Substance, does nothing. Whether that eternal first Being, necessarily existing, be material or immaterial, thinking or not thinking, must be proved some other way; and when thus a God is proved, necessary existence will be included in the idea of God, and not till then. For an eternal necessary existing Being, material, and without wisdom, is not the Theist's God. So that real existence is but supposed on either side; and the adding in our thoughts the idea of necessary existence to an idea of a senseless material substance, or to the idea of an immaterial knowing spirit, makes neither of them to exist, nor alters any thing in the reality of their existence, because our ideas alter nothing in the reality of things, v. g. The Atheist would put into his idea of matter, necessary existence; he may do that as he pleases, but he will not thereby at all prove the real exist-

ence of any thing answering that idea; he must first prove, and that by other ways than that idea, the existence of an eternal all-doing matter, and then his idea will be proved evidently a true idea; till then it is but a precarious one, made at pleasure, and proves nothing of real existence, for the reason above mentioned, viz. our ideas make or alter nothing in the real existence of things, nor will it follow that any thing really exists in nature answering it, because we can make such a complex idea in our minds. By ideas in the mind we discern the agreement or disagreement of ideas that have a like ideal existence in our minds, but that reaches no farther, proves no real existence, for the truth we so know is only of our ideas, and is applicable to things only as they are supposed to exist answering such ideas. But any idea, simple or complex, barely by being in our minds, is no evidence of the real existence of any thing out of our minds answering that idea. Real existence can be proved only by real existence; and, therefore the real existence of a God can only be proved by the real existence of other things. The real existence of other things without us, can be evidenced to us only by our senses; but our own

existence is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of other things, and that is internal perception, a self-consciousness, or intuition; from whence therefore may be drawn, by a train of ideas, the surest and most incontestable proof of the existence of a God. J. L.

RESURRECTIO ET QUÆ SEQUUNTUR.

St. Paul, treating expressly of the Resurrection, 1 Cor. xv. tells us, 1st, that all men, by the benefit of Christ, shall be restored to life, v. 21, 22. 2nd, That the order of the Resurrection is this: first, Christ rises; second, those that are at his second coming, v. 23; third, That the saints shall then have spiritual and immortal bodies, v. 42; and they shall then bear the image of the heavenly Adam, *i. e.* be immortal, as they before bore the image of the earthly, *i. e.* were mortal, v. 44—49. It is plain St. Paul, in the word *we*, v. 49, 51, 57, 58, speaks not of the dead in general, but of the saints who were to put on incorruption, v. 54, and over whom Death was never to have any more power, because they were dead of all sin, v. 56. He that will read this chapter carefully may observe, that St. Paul, in

speaking of the Resurrection, mentions first Christians, then that of believers, v. 23, which he gives an account of to the end of the chapter and discourse, and so never comes to the resurrection of the wicked, which was to be the third and last in order; so that from verse 27 to the end of the chapter is a description only of the resurrection of the just, though he calls it by the general name of the resurrection of the dead, v. 42, which is plain from almost every verse of it, from 41 to the end. First, that which he here speaks of as raised, is raised in glory, v. 43; but the wicked are not raised in glory. 2dly, He says, *we* shall bear the image of the heavenly Adam, v. 49, which cannot belong to the wicked. 3rd, *We* shall all be changed, that, by putting on incorruptibility and immortality, death may be swallowed up in victory, which God giveth us through our Lord Jesus Christ, v. 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, which cannot likewise belong to the damned; and then, for *we* and *us* here must be understood to be spoken of in the name of the dead that are Christ's, who are to be raised before the rest at his coming. He says, v. 52, that when the dead are raised, they that are alive shall be changed in the twinkling of an eye. Now that the dead are only the dead in Christ, which shall rise first and shall be caught up in the clouds to meet

the Lord in the air, is plain from 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17. 4th, He teaches that by this corruptible putting on incorruption is brought to pass that saying, that death is swallowed up of victory. But I think nobody will say that the wicked have victory over death; yet that, according to the Apostle, here belongs to all those whose corruptible bodies have put on incorruption, which must therefore be only those that rise the second in order, and therefore their resurrection alone is that which is here mentioned and described, a farther proof whereof is given, v. 56, 57, in that their sins being taken away, the sting whereby death kills is taken away; and therefore St. Paul says, God has given *us* the victory; which must be the same *we* which should bear the image of the heavenly Adam, v. 49, and the same *we* which should *all* be changed, v. 51, 52. all which places can therefore belong to none but those who are Christ's, which shall be raised by themselves, the second in order, before the rest of the dead. It is very remarkable what St. Paul says in the 51st verse, *we* shall not *all* sleep, but we shall *all* be changed in the twinkling of an eye. The reason he gives for it, v. 53, because this corruptible thing must put on incorruption, and this mortal thing put on immortality. How? By putting off flesh

and blood by an instantaneous change; because, as he tells them, v. 50, flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, and therefore to fit believers for that kingdom, those who are alive at the sound of the trumpet shall be changed in the twinkling of an eye, v. 51, and those that are in their graves, changed likewise at the instant of their being raised, and so all the whole collection of the saints be put into a state of incorruptibility, v. 52. Taking the resurrection here spoken of to be the resurrection of all the dead in general, St. Paul's reasoning in this place is very hard to be understood; but upon the supposition that he here describes the resurrection of the just only, those who are mentioned, v. 23, to rise next in order after Christ, it is very easy, plain, and natural, and stands thus. Men alive are flesh and blood, the dead in the grave are but the remains of corrupted flesh and blood; but flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither can corruption inherit incorruption *i. e.* immortality. Therefore, to make those who are Christ's capable to enter into the eternal kingdom of life, as well those of them who are alive as those of them who are raised from the dead, shall all be changed, and their corruptible shall put on incorruption, and their mortal shall put on im-

mortality, and thus God give them the victory over death through their Lord Jesus Christ. This is what St. Paul argues here, and the account he gives of the resurrection of the blessed; but how the wicked, which were afterwards to come to life, were to be raised, and what was to become of them, he here says nothing, as not being to his purpose, which was to assure the Corinthians, by the resurrection of Christ, of happy resurrection to believers, and thereby to encourage them to continue in the faith which had such a reward. That this was his desire may be seen by the beginning of his discourse, v. 12—21, and by the conclusion v. 58, in these words: Therefore, my beloved, be ye steadfast, immoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord; forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord: which words plainly show, that what he had been speaking of in the immediately preceding verses, viz. their being changed, and the putting on of incorruption and immortality, and their having therefore the victory through Jesus Christ, belonged solely to the saints as a reward to those who remained steadfast, and abounded in the works of the Lord: the like use of the like though shorter discourse on the resurrection, wherein he describes only

that of the blessed, he makes to the Thessalonians, 1, iv. 13—18, which he concludes thus:—Wherefore comfort one another with these words. Nor is it in this place alone that St. Paul calls the resurrection of the just by the general name of the resurrection of the dead; he does the same, Phil. iii. where he speaks of his sufferings, and endeavours if by any means he might attain to the resurrection of the dead: whereby he cannot mean the resurrection of the dead in general, which, since it will overtake all men, there needs no endeavours to attain. Our Saviour likewise speaks of the resurrection of the just in the same general terms of the resurrection, Mat. xxii. 30, and the resurrection from the dead, Luke xxv. 35, by which is meant only the resurrection of the just, as is plain from the context.

How long after this the wicked shall rise shall be enquired hereafter. I shall only at present take notice; only I think it is plain it shall be before our Saviour delivers up the kingdom to his Father, for there is the end. The whole dispensation of God to the race of Adam will be at an end. 1 Cor. xv. 24. Yet these two things are plainly declared in Scripture concerning them.

1st. That they shall be cast into hell fire to

be tormented there, is so express, and so often mentioned in Scripture, that there can be no doubt about it. Matt. xxv. 41. 46. xiii. 42. 50. xviii. 8.

2nd. That they shall not live for ever. This is so plain in Scripture, and is so everywhere inculcated,—that the wages of sin is death, and the reward of the righteous is everlasting life,—the constant language of the Scripture in the current of the New Testament as well as Old, is life to the just, to believers, to the obedient, and death to the wicked and unbelievers,—that one would wonder how the readers could be mistaken where death is threatened so constantly, and declared everywhere to be the ultimate punishment and last estate to which the wicked must all come. To solve this, they have invented a very odd signification of the word death, which they would have stand for eternal life in torment. They who will put so strange and contrary a signification upon a word in an hundred places, where, if it had not its true and literal sense, one would wonder it should be so often used, and that in opposition to life, which in those places is used literally, ought to have good proofs for giving it a sense in those places of Scripture directly contrary to what it ordinarily has in other parts of

Scripture and everywhere else. But leaving this interpretation of the word death to shift for itself as it can in the minds of reasonable men, there are places of Scripture which plainly show the different state of the just and the wicked to be ultimately life and death, wherein there is no room for that evasion. I shall name one or two of them.—Luke xxv. 35, 36. Our Saviour tells the Sadducees that they who are accounted worthy to attain that world in the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. Where Christ plainly declares of the children of God alone who have been accounted worthy to obtain the resurrection, *i.e.* the resurrection before the others, that they are like the angels, and can die no more; which exception of the saints from dying any more after their resurrection is a confirmation that the rest of mankind may and shall die again. Accordingly St. John, Rev. xx. 5, 6, says of this, which he calls the first resurrection, "Blessed and holy is he who has put on the first resurrection; on such the second death hath no power."

I crave leave to observe here, that as St. Paul, speaking of the resurrection of the dead, 1 Cor.

xv. 42, in general terms, yet means only the first resurrection or the resurrection of the just; so our Saviour does here, where by resurrection he plainly means only the first resurrection, or the resurrection of the blessed, and not the resurrection of all mankind, as is plain not only by making them the children of God who are the children of the resurrection, but by saying that those who are accounted worthy obtain the resurrection; which distinction of worthiness can belong only to those who are Christ's, and cannot promiscuously take in all mankind.

Another text that declares the death and final end of the wicked, is Gal. vi. 7, 8, "Be not deceived, God is not mocked, for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap: for he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." In other places, where life everlasting and death are opposed, say these interpreters, by everlasting life, is meant everlasting perfect happiness joined to life; by death is meant eternal sufferings and torments without death. But here corruption and life everlasting are opposed. Now φθορᾳ, corruption, signifies the dissolution and final destruction of a thing, whereby it ceases to be; but corruption can by nobody

be pretended to signify the endless sense of pain and torment in a being subsisting and continued on to eternity. Corruption is the spoiling any thing, the divesting it of the being it had. Accordingly St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. uses incorruption for an indefinable estate of immortality. That which gives some colour to their understanding by death an endless life in torment is the everlasting fire threatened by our Saviour to the wicked, Mat. xviii. 8. xxv. 41. 46. But not to trouble you with the various significations of duration of the word everlasting in Scripture, and what else has been answered by orthodox divines to show that these texts did necessarily imply eternal or endless torments, especially by Archbishop Tillotson, it may suffice to say, that everlasting in a true Scripture sense, may be said of that which endures as long as the subject it affects endures. So everlasting priesthood, Exod. xl. 15. was a priesthood that lasted as long as the people lasted in an estate capable of the Mosaical worship. Psal. xxiv. 7. everlasting doors, *i. e.* that should last as long as the temple which they belonged to. Isa. xxxv. 10. everlasting joy, *i. e.* that continue as long as they lived. A like expression is that of hell fire, Mark ix. 13, 44, that never shall be quenched, where the worm

dieth not, and the fire is not quenched; an expression taken from Isa. lxvi. 24, which, though we translate hell, is in the original Gehenna, or the valley of Hinnom, where was kept a constant fire to burn up the carcases of beasts and other filth of the city of Jerusalem,—where though the fire never was quenched, yet it does not follow, nor is it said that the bodies that were burnt in it were never consumed, only that the worms that gnawed and the fire that burnt them were constant, and never ceased till they were destroyed. So, though the fire was not put out, yet the chaff was burnt up and consumed, Mat. iii. 12; and the tares, xiii. 30; in both which places, and the parallel, Luke iii. 17, the Greek word signifies, to be consumed by burning, though in our Bibles it is translated burn up but in one of them, viz. Mat. iii. 14. Taking it then for evident that the wicked shall die and be extinguished at last, how long they shall be continued in that inexpressible torment is not, that I know, any where expressed; but that it shall be excessively terrible by its duration as well as its sharpness, the current of the Scripture seems to manifest; only if one may conjecture, it seems to be before our Saviour's delivering up the kingdom to his Father. The account given of it by St. Paul,

1 Cor. xv. 23, 28, at Christ's second coming, the just rise by themselves; then Christ shall set up his kingdom, wherein he shall subdue all rule and all authorities and power that opposes him, for he must reign until he has put all enemies under his feet; the last enemy that shall be destroyed is Death; then he shall deliver up the kingdom to God his Father, and then cometh the end, *i. e.* the full conclusion of God's whole dispensation to Adam and his posterity. After which there shall be no death, no change; the scene will then be closed, and every one remain in the same estate for ever.

One thing upon the occasion may be worth our enquiry; whether the wicked shall not rise with such bodies of flesh and blood as they had before; for that all that is said of the change of bodies, 1 Cor. xv. and 1 Thess. iv. has been already shown to be spoken only of the saints; the like whereof may be observed in other places of Scripture, where bodies changed into a better state are mentioned; as 2 Cor. v. 1—4, it is always spoken of the bodies of the saints, nor do I remember any change of the bodies where the resurrection of the wicked can be supposed to be comprehended; but it is only spoken of thus: "The hour is coming, in which all that are in the grave shall hear his voice and shall

come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." John v. 28, 29. We must all appear before the judgment-seat of God, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad, 2 Cor. v. 10. And so likewise, "Raise the dead." Acts xxvi. 8. 2 Cor. i. 9. "Quicken the dead." Rom. iv. 17. But of the change of their bodies, of their being made spiritual, or of their putting on incorruption or immortality, I do not remember any thing said. They shall be raised, that is said over and over; but how they are raised, or with what bodies they shall come, the Scripture, as far as I have observed, is perfectly silent.

We have seen what the Scripture says of the state of the wicked after the Resurrection, and what is the final catastrophe they are doomed to. Let us now see what Scripture discovers to us of the state of the just after the Resurrection; that whatsoever was earthly, corruptible, mortal about them, shall, at the instant of the sound of the trumpet that is to call them at Christ's coming, be changed into spiritual, incorruptible, immortal, we have already seen.

The following paper appears to be intended as a supplement to the Mode of acquiring Truth; it illustrates Mr. Locke's other works, and shows how deeply his mind was engaged in this particular.

Enthusiasm.

Method. The way to find truth as far as we are able to reach it in this our dark and short-sighted state, is to pursue the hypothesis that seems to us to carry with it the most light and consistency as far as we can without raising objections, or striking at those that come in our way, till we have carried our present principle as far as it will go, and given what light and strength we can to all the parts of it. And when that is done, then to take into our consideration any objections that lie against it, but not so as to pursue them as objections against the system we had formerly erected; but to consider upon what foundation they are bottomed, and examine that in all its parts, and then putting the two whole systems together, see which is liable to most exceptions, and labours under the greatest difficulties; for such is the weakness of our understandings, that, unless where we have clear demonstration, we can scarce make out to ourselves any truths which will not be liable to some exception beyond our power wholly to clear it from; and

therefore, if upon that ground we are presently bound to give up our former opinion, we shall be in a perpetual fluctuation; every day changing our minds, and passing from one side to another we shall lose all stability of thought, and at last give up all probable truths as if there were no such thing, or, which is not much better, think it indifferent which side we take. To this, yet as dangerous as it is, the ordinary way of managing controversies in the world directly tends. If an opponent can find one weak place in his adversary's doctrine, and reduce him to a stand, with difficulties rising from thence, he presently concludes he has got the day, and may justly triumph in the goodness of his own cause; whereas victory no more certainly always accompanies truth, than it does right. It shows indeed the weakness of the part attacked, or of the defence of it; but to show which side has the best pretence to truth and followers, the two whole systems must be set by one another, and considered entirely, and then see which is most consistent in all its parts, which least clogged with incoherencies or absurdities, and which freest from begged principles and unintelligible notions. This is the fairest way to search after truth, and the surest not to mistake on which side she is. There is scarce any controversy which is not a

full instance of this; and if a man will embrace no opinion but what he can clear from all difficulties and remove all objections, I fear he will have but very narrow thoughts, and find very little that he shall assent to. What, then, will you say, shall he embrace that for truth which has improbabilities in it that he cannot master? This has a clear answer. In contradicting opinions, one must be true, that he cannot doubt; which then shall he take? That which is accompanied with the greatest light and evidence, that which is freest from the grosser absurdities, though our narrow capacities cannot penetrate it on every side. Some men have made objections to the belief of a God, and think they ought to be heard and hearkened to, because, perhaps, nobody can unravel all the difficulties of creation and providence, which are but arguments of the weakness of our understandings, and not against the being of a God. Let us take a view, then, of these men's hypotheses, and let us see what direct contradiction they must be involved in who deny a God. If there be no God from eternity, then there was no thinking thing from eternity; for the eternal thinking Thing I call God. If from eternity there were no thinking Thing, then thinking things were made out of unthink-

ing things by an unthinking power: as great an absurdity as that nothing should produce something. If matter be that eternal thinking thing, let us change that deceitful word matter, which seems to stand for one thing when it means the *congeries* of all bodies, and then the opinion will be, that all bodies, every distinct atom, is in its own nature a thinking thing. Let any one then resolve with himself how such an infinite number of distinct independent thinking things came to be of one mind, and to consent and contrive together, to make such an admirable frame as the world, and the species of things and their successive continuation is. How some of them consented to lie buried for long or numberless ages in the bowels and centre of the earth, or other massy globes,—places certainly very uneasy for thinking beings,—whilst others are delighting themselves in the pleasures of freedom and the day. Let them produce harmony, beauty, constancy, from such a *congeries* of thinking independent atoms, and one may, I think, allow them to be creators of this world; and I know not why upon their own grounds they should not think so themselves, since there is no reason why the thinking atoms in them should not be as wise as any other in the universe; for if they once allow

me one atom of matter to have from eternity some degrees of knowledge and power above any other, they must tell us a reason why it is so, or else their supposition will be ridiculous when set up against the supposition of a Being that had from eternity more knowledge and more power than all matter taken together, and so was able to frame it into this orderly state of nature so visible and admirable in all the parts of it.

LETTER OF M. LE CLERC TO LOCKE.

" À Amsterdam, le 12 d'Août, 1694.

" Je reçus, Monsieur, la semaine passée, par la voie de Monsieur Furly, les additions de votre ouvrage, qui m'ont infiniment plû. J'ai lû avidement l'addition du chapitre de la Liberté, qui m'a entièrement satisfait, étant convaincu depuis long-temps que la pluspart du temps, les hommes ne se déterminent pas par la vue distincte ou confuse de ce qui peut être leur plus grand bien, ou qu'ils croient être tel, mais par le plaisir qu'ils prennent à certaines choses, auxquelles ils sont habitués. On pourroit seulement demander si ce plaisir, ou cette *easiness*, comme vous vous exprimez plus commodement que je ne le saurois faire en François, est toujours de telle nature, que malgré cela, l'esprit ne puisse

se déterminer du côté opposé. Pour moi, j'avouë que je ne vois pas bien comment lorsque je lis avec attention ce que vous dites; mais je ne sais si le sentiment ne nous en convainc point. Au moins, il me semble qu'en mille choses je puis faire, ou non, et que je ne me determine que parceque je le veux sans trouver plus de plaisir d'un côté que d'un autre. Mais c'est là une matière qui demande plus d'étendue, qu'un billet écrit à la hâte.—Pour parler d'autres choses, et pour répondre à un article de vos lettres auquel j'ai oublié de répondre trois ou quatre fois, vous disposerez comme il vous plaira de l'exemplaire relié de ma Geneses, soit que vous le veuillez garder pour vous, ou le donner à quelqu'un de vos amis. J'attends avec impatience le livre de Monsieur l'Evêque de Bath et Wells, pour voir ce qu'il dira contre moi, car les François de Londres, gens envieux et malins, s'il y en eut jamais, ont pris plaisir à semer qu'il me refutoit en termes forts. Cela me fâcheroit, non à cause des raisons, auxquelles je ne ferai pas difficulté de me rendre si elles sont bonnes, mais à cause de la consequence: je ne sais si je me trompe, mais je m'imagine que ce sont des raisons de théologie *in quibus magis optant viri pii quàm docent.* On prescrit à Dieu ce qu'il doit avoir

fait comme on le juge à propos, sans rechercher ce qui est effectivement. Quoi qu'il en soit, j'en userai avec lui, avec tout le respect qu'il pourra demander; et pour l'en convaincre, je lui ai déjà envoyé dix-huit feuilles de mon Exode, qu'il m'avoit faites demander par M. Cappel et par M. Limbourg, à qui il avoit écrit exprès pour cela. Il y en a à present environ le double d'imprimées, et j'espère que nous commençerons bientôt le Levitique. Je ne comprends pas qui avoit fait courrir le bruit d'Oxford, dont M. Cappel m'avoit aussi averti. Il n'en est venu aucun vent à mes oreilles que par ce que vous et lui m'avez mandé. Mylord de Salisbury* pourroit beaucoup faire pour moi, s'il vouloit, mais je ne sais s'il le veut. Il a un Chanoine François auprès de lui, qui, feignant de m'estimer, sème par tout que je me suis perdu par ce livre, parce que je n'ai pas donné dans les étranges visions qu'il a debitée sur le Mistic, dans *ses réflections sur les livres de l'Ecriture.* Je tenterai néanmoins de ce côté là, et je ne crois pas qu'il me nuira s'il ne veut pas m'aider. Enfin il en arrivera ce qu'il pourra, et pourvu que personne de nos gens sache rien de ma tentative si elle ne reussit pas, il n'y aura rien de perdu. Mais vos boutiquiers qui sont ici

* Bishop Burnet.

les souverains, et qui regardent leurs ministres comme leurs servantes, me regarderoient de haut en bas plus que jamais, s'ils savoient que je n'eusse pas reussi. Au contraire, si je pouvois me passer d'eux et me retirer d'ici, je me mettrois peu en peine de ce qu'ils diroient. Cependant il n'est pas bon que des personnes mal-intentionnées sachent rien de mes desseins. Il ne se passe rien ici de nouveau. Je vous prie de me mander la voie par laquelle vous m'envoyerez ou vous m'avez envoyé le Pentateuque de M. l'Evêque de Bath. Je suis de tout mon cœur, Monsieur, votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur, J. LE CLERC."

MR. LOCKE'S ANSWER TO M. LE CLERC.

LIBERTY.

As to the determination of the will, we may take it under three considerations.

1st. The ordinary and successive uneasinesses which take their turns in the common course of our lives, and these are what, for the most part, determine the will, but with a power still of suspending.

2nd. Violent uneasiness which the mind cannot resist nor away with: these constantly determine the will without any manner of suspen-

sion, where there is any view of a possibility of their removal.

3rd. A great number of little and very indifferent actions which mix themselves with those of greater moment, and fill up, as it were, the little empty spaces of our time. In these, the will may be said to determine itself without the preponderancy of good or evil, or the motive of uneasiness on either side; as whether a man should put on his right or left shoe first, whether he should fold a margeant in the paper wherein he is going to write a letter to his friend, whether he should sit still or walk, or scratch his head whilst he is in a deep meditation; there are a thousand such actions as these which we do every day, which are certainly voluntary, and may be ascribed to the will determining itself. But there is so little thought precedes them, because of the little consequences that attend them, that they are but as it were appendices to the more weighty and more voluntary actions to which the mind is determined by some sensible uneasiness, and therefore in these the mind is determined to one or the other side, not by the preferable or greater good it sees in either, but by the desire and necessity of dispatch, that it may not be hindered in the pursuit of what is judged of more

moment by a lingering suspense between equal and indifferent things, and a deliberation about trifles; in these, the uneasiness of delay is sufficient to determine and give the preference to one, it matters not which side.—Mem. This writ to Mr. Le Clerc, 9th Oct. 1694, in answer to his of 12th Aug.

The following articles properly belong to the Journal. Their date will show when each was written.

1677.—SPECIES.

The species of things are distinguished and made by chance, in order to naming and names imposed on those things which either the conveniences of life or common observation bring into discourse. The greatest part of the rest, *sine nomine herbæ*, lie neglected, neither differenced by names, nor distinguished into species; viz. how many flies and worms are there which, though they are about us in great plenty, we have not yet named nor ranked into species, but come under the general names of flies or worms, which yet are as distinct as a horse and a sheep, though we never have had so great occasion to take notice of them. So that our ideas of species are almost voluntary, or at least different

from the idea of Nature by which she forms and distinguishes them, which in animals she seems to me to keep to with more constancy and exactness than in other bodies and species of things: those being curious engines, do perhaps require a greater accurateness for their propagation and continuation of their race; for in vegetables we find that several sorts come from the seeds of one and the same individual as much different species as those that are allowed to be so by philosophers. This is very familiar in apples, and perhaps other sorts of fruits, whereof some have distinct names and others only the general, though they begin every day to have more and more given them as they come into use. So that species, in respect of us, are but things ranked into order, because of their agreement in some ideas which we have made essential in order to our naming them, though what it is essentially to belong to any species in reference to Nature be hard to determine; for if a woman should bring forth a creature perfectly of the shape of a man, that never showed any more appearance of reason than a horse, and had no articular language, and another woman should produce another with nothing of the shape, but with the language and reason of a man, I ask which of these you would call by the name man?—both or neither?

UNDERSTANDING.—ARGUMENTS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, 1677.

In questions where there are arguments on both sides, one positive proof is to preponderate to a great many negatives, because a positive proof is always founded upon some real existence, which we know and apprehend; whereas the negative arguments terminate generally in nothing, in our not being able to conceive, and so may be nothing but conclusions from our ignorance or incapacity, and not from the truth of things which may, and we have experience do really exist, though they exceed our comprehension. This amongst the things we know and lie obvious to our senses is very evident; for though we are very well acquainted with matter, motion, and distance, yet there are many things in them which we can by no means comprehend; for, even in the things most obvious and familiar to us, our understanding is nonplussed, and presently discovers its weakness; whenever it enters upon the consideration of any thing that is unlimited, or would penetrate into the modes or manner of being or operation, it presently meets with unconquerable difficulties. Matter, and figure, and mo-

tion, and the degrees of both, we have clear notions of; but when we begin to think of the extension or divisibility of the one, or the beginning of either, our understanding sticks and boggles, and knows not which way to turn. We also have no other notion of operation but of matter by motion,—at least I must confess I have not, and should be glad to have any one explain to me intelligibly any other; and yet we shall find it hard to make out any phenomenon by those causes. We know very well that we think, and at pleasure move ourselves, and yet, if we will think a negative argument sufficient to build on, we shall have reason to doubt whether we can do one or other; it being to me inconceivable how matter should think, and as incomprehensible how an immaterial thinking thing should be able to move material, or be affected by it. We having therefore positive experience of our thinking and motion, the negative arguments against them, and the impossibility of understanding them, never shake our assent to these truths, which perhaps will prove a considerable rule to determine us in very material questions.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING RECREATION, IN ANSWER TO D. G.'S DESIRE, 1677.

As for my recreation, thus I think; that recreation being a thing ordained, not for itself, but for a certain end, that end is to be the rule and measure of it.

Recreation then seeming to me to be the doing of some easy or at least delightful thing to restore the mind or body, tired with labour, to its former strength and vigour, and thereby fit it for new labour, it seems to me,—

1st. That there can be no general rule set to different persons concerning the time, manner, duration, or sort of recreation that is to be used, but only that it be such as their experience tells them is suited to them, and proper to refresh the part tired.

2nd. That if it be applied to the mind, it ought certainly to be delightful, because it being to restore and enliven that, which is done by relaxing and composing the agitation of the spirits, that which delights it without employing it much, is not only the fittest to do so, but also the contrary, *i. e.* what is ungrateful doth certainly most discompose and tire it.

3rd. That it is impossible to set a standing rule of recreation to one's self; because not

only the unsteady fleeting condition of our bodies and spirits requires more at one time than another, which is plain in other more fixed refreshments, as food and sleep, and likewise requires very different according to the employment that hath preceded the present temper of our bodies and inclination of our minds; but also because variety in most constitutions is so necessary to delight, and the mind is so naturally tender of its freedom, that the most pleasant diversions become nauseous and troublesome to us when we are forced to repeat them in a continued fixed round.

It is farther to be considered:—

1st. That in things not absolutely commanded nor forbidden by the law of God, such as is the material part of recreation, he in his mercy considering our ignorance and frail constitution, hath not tied us to an indivisible point, nor confined us to a way so narrow that allows no latitude at all in things in their own nature indifferent; there is the liberty of great choice, great variety, within the bounds of innocence.

2nd. That God delights not to have us miserable either in this or the other world, but having given us all things richly to enjoy, we cannot imagine that in our recreations we should

be denied delight, which is the only necessary and useful part of it.

This supposed, I imagine:—

1st. That recreation supposes labour and weariness, and therefore that he that labours not, hath no title to it.

2nd. That it very seldom happens that our constitutions (though there be some tender ones that require a great deal) require more time to be spent in recreation than in labour.

3rd. We must beware that custom and the fashion of the world, or some other by-interest, doth not make that pass with us for recreation which is indeed labour to us, though it be not our business; as playing at cards, though no otherwise allowable but as a recreation, is so far from fitting some men for their business and giving them refreshment, that it more discomposes them than their ordinary labour.

So that God not tying us up of time, place, kind, &c. in our recreations, if we secure our main duty, which is in sincerity to do our duty in our calling as far as the frailty of our bodies or minds will allow us, (beyond which we cannot think any thing should be required of us,) and that we design our diversions to put us in a condition to do our duty, we need not per-

plex ourselves with too scrupulous an inquiry into the precise bounds of them; for we cannot be supposed to be obliged to rules which we cannot know: for I doubt first whether there be any such exact proportion of recreation to our present state of body and mind, that so much is exactly enough, and whatsoever is under is too little, whatsoever is over is too much; but be it so or no, this I am very confident of, that no one can say in his own or another man's case, that thus much is the precise dose; hitherto you must go and no farther;—so that it is not only our privilege, but we are under a necessity of using a latitude, and where we can discover no determined, precise rule, it is unavoidable for us to go sometimes beyond, and sometimes to stop short of, that which is, I will not say the exact, but nearest proportion; and in such cases we can only govern ourselves by the discoverable bounds on the one hand or the other, which is only when we find that our recreation, by excess or defect, serves not to the proper end for which we are to use it, only with this caution, that we are to suspect ourselves most on that side to which we find ourselves most inclined. The cautious, devout, studious man, is to fear that he allows not himself enough; the gay,

careless, and idle, that he takes too much; to which I can only add these following directions as to some particulars:—

1st. That the properest time for recreating the mind is when it feels itself weary and flagging; it may be wearied with a thing when it is not weary of it.

2nd. That the properest recreation of studious, sedentary persons, whose labour is of the thought, is bodily exercise; to those of bustling employment, sedentary recreations.

3rd. That in all bodily exercise, those in the open air are best for health.

4th. It may often be so ordered that one business may be made a recreation to another, visiting a friend to study.

These are my sudden extemporary thoughts upon this subject, which will deserve to be bet ter considered when I am in better circumstances of freedom, of thought and leisure. Vale, March, 77. J. L.

MEMORY—IMAGINATION—MADNESS.

Memory. When we revive in our minds the idea of any thing that we have before observed to exist, this we call memory; viz. to recollect in our minds the idea of our father or

brother. But when, from the observations we have made of divers particulars, we make a general idea to represent any species in general, as man; or else join several ideas together, which we never observed to exist together, we call it imagination. So that memory is always the picture of something, the idea whereof has existed before in our thoughts, as near the life as we can draw it: but imagination is a picture drawn in our minds without reference to a pattern. And here it may be observed, that the ideas of memory, like painting after the life, come always short, *i. e.* want something of the original. For whether a man would remember the dreams he had in the night, or the sights of a foregoing day, some of the traces are always left out, some of the circumstances are forgotten; and those kind of pictures, like those represented successively by several looking-glasses, are the more dim and fainter the farther they are off from the original object. For the mind, endeavouring to retain only the traces of the pattern, losing by degrees a great part of them, and not having the liberty to supply any new colours or touches of its own, the picture in the memory every day fades and grows dimmer, and oftentimes is quite lost. But the imagination, not being tied to any pattern, but adding

what colours, what ideas it pleases, to its own workmanship, making originals of its own which are usually very bright and clear in the mind, and sometimes to that degree that they make impressions as strong and as sensible as those ideas which come immediately by the senses from external objects,—so that the mind takes one for the other, and its own imagination for realities. And in this, it seems, madness consists, and not in the want of reason; for allowing their imagination to be right, one may observe that madmen usually reason right from them: and I guess that those who are about madmen, will find that they make very little use of their memory, which is to recollect particulars past with their circumstances: but having any particular idea suggested to their memory, fancy dresses it up after its own fashion, without regard to the original. Hence also one may see how it comes to pass that those that think long and intently upon one thing, come at last to have their minds disturbed about it, and to be a little cracked as to that particular. For by repeating often with vehemence of imagination the ideas that do belong to, or may be brought in about the same thing, a great many whereof the fancy is wont to furnish, these at length come to take so deep an impression, that

they all pass for clear truths and realities, though perhaps the greater part of them have at several times been supplied only by the fancy, and are nothing but the pure effects of the imagination.

This at least is the cause of several errors and mistakes amongst men, even when it does not wholly unhinge the brains, and put all government of the thoughts into the hands of the imagination; as it sometimes happens when the imagination, being much employed, and getting the mastery about any one thing, usurps the dominion over all the other faculties of the mind in all other. But how this comes about, or what it is that gives it on such an occasion that empire,—how it comes thus to be let loose, I confess, I cannot guess. If that were once known, it would be no small advance towards the easier curing of this malady; and perhaps to that purpose it may not be amiss to observe, what diet, temper, or other circumstances they are, that set the imagination on fire, and make it active and imperious. This I think, that having often recourse to one's memory, and tying down the mind strictly to the recollecting things past precisely as they were, may be a means to check those extravagant or towering flights of the imagination. And it is good often to divert the mind from that which it has

been earnestly employed about, or which is its ordinary business to other objects, and to make it attend to the informations of the senses and the things they offer to it. J. L. 1678.

MADNESS.

Madness seems to be nothing but a disorder in the imagination, and not in the discursive faculty; for one shall find amongst the distract, those who fancy themselves kings, &c. who discourse and reason right enough upon the suppositions and wrong fancies they have taken. And any sober man may find it in himself in twenty occasions, viz.—in a town where he has not been long resident, let him come into a street that he is pretty well acquainted with at the contrary end to what he imagined, he will find all his reasonings about it so out of order and so inconsistent with the truth, that should he enter into debate upon the situation of the houses, the turnings on the right or left hand, &c. &c. with one who knew the place perfectly, and had the right ideas which way he was going, he would seem little better than frantic. This, I believe, most people may have observed to have happened to themselves, especially when they have been carried up and down

in coaches, and perhaps may have found it sometimes difficult to set their thoughts right, and reform the mistakes of their imagination. And I have known some, who upon the wrong impressions which were at first made upon their imaginations, could never tell which was north or south in Smithfield, though they were no very ill geographers: and when by the sun and the time of the day they were convinced of the position of that place, yet they could not tell how to reconcile it to other parts of the town that were adjoining to it, but out of sight; and were very apt to relapse again as soon as either the sun disappeared, or they were out of sight of the place, into the mistakes and confusion of their old ideas. From whence one may see of what moment it is to take care that the first impressions we settle upon our minds be conformable to the truth and to the nature of things; or else all our meditations and discourse thereupon will be nothing but perfect raving.

ERROR.

The foundation of error and mistake in most men lies in having obscure or confused notions of things, or by reason of their confused ideas, doubtful and obscure words; our words always

in their signification depending upon our ideas, being clear or obscure proportionably as our notions are so, and sometimes have little more but the sound of the word for the notion of the thing. For in the discursive faculty of the mind, I do not find that men are so apt to err; but it avails little that their syllogisms are right, if their terms be insignificant and obscure, or confused and indetermined, or that in their internal discourse deductions be regular, if their notions be wrong. Therefore, in our discourse with others, the greatest care is to be had that we be not misled or imposed on by the measure of their words, where the fallacy oftener lies than in faulty consequences.

And in considering by ourselves to take care of our notions, where a man argues right upon wrong notions or terms, he does like a madman; where he makes wrong consequences, he does like a fool: madness seeming to me to lie more in the imagination, and folly in the discourse.

SPACE.—1677.

Space, in itself, seems to be nothing but a capacity, or possibility, for extended beings or bodies to be, or exist, which we are apt to conceive infinite; for there being in nothing no

resistance, we have a conception very natural and very true, that let bodies be already as far extended as you will, yet, if other new bodies should be created, they might exist where there are now no bodies: viz. a globe of a foot diameter might exist beyond the utmost superficies of all bodies now existing; and because we have by our acquaintance with bodies, got the idea of the figure and distance of the superficial part of a globe of a foot diameter, we are apt to imagine the space where the globe exists to be really something, to have a real existence before and after its existence there. Whereas, in truth, it is really nothing, and so has no opposition nor resistance to the being of such a body there; though we, applying the idea of a natural globe, are apt to conceive it as something so far extended, and these are properly the imaginary spaces which are so much disputed of. But as for distance, I suppose that to be the relation of two bodies or beings near or remote to one another, measurable by the ideas we have of distance taken from solid bodies; for were there no beings at all, we might truly say there were no distances. The fallacy we put upon ourselves which inclines us to think otherwise is this, that whenever we talk of distance, we first suppose some real beings existing separate from one

another, and then, without taking notice of that supposition, and the relation that results from their placing one in reference to another, we are apt to consider that space as some positive real being existing without them: whereas, as it seems to me, to be but a bare relation; and when we suppose them to be, viz. a yard asunder, it is no more but to say extended in a direct line to the proportion of three feet or thirty-six inches distance, whereof by use we have got the idea: this gives us the notion of distance, and the vacuum that is between them is understood by this, that bodies of a yard long that come between them, thrust or remove away nothing that was there before.

1. I take it for granted that I can conceive a space without a body; for, suppose the universe as big as you will, I can, without the bounds of it, imagine it possible to thrust out or create any the most solid body of any figure, without removing from the place it possesses any thing that was there before. Neither does it imply any contradiction to suppose a space so empty within the bounds of the universe, that a body may be brought into it without removing from thence any other; and if this be not granted, I cannot see how one can make out any motion supposing your bodies of what figures or

bulk you please, as I imagine it is easy to demonstrate.

If it be possible to suppose nothing, or, in our thoughts, to remove all manner of beings from any place, then this imaginary space is just nothing, and signifies no more but a bare possibility that body may exist where now there is none. If it be impossible to suppose pure nothing, or to extend our thoughts where there is, or we can suppose no being, this space void of body must be something belonging to the being of the Deity. But be it one or the other, the idea we have of it we take from the extension of bodies which fall under our senses; and this idea of extension being settled in our minds, we are able, by repeating that in our thoughts, without annexing body or impenetrability to it, to imagine spaces where there are no bodies—which imaginary spaces, if we suppose all other beings absent, are purely nothing, but merely a possibility that body might there exist. Or if it be a necessity to suppose a being there, it must be God, whose being we thus make, *i. e.* suppose extended, but not impenetrable: but be it one or the other, extension seems to be mentally separable from body, and distance nothing but the relation of space, resulting from the existence of two positive beings; or, which is all one, two parts of the same being.

RELATION—SPACE. 1678.

Besides the considering things barely and separately in themselves, the mind considers them also with respect, *i. e.* at the same time looking upon some other, and this we call relation. So that if the mind so considers any thing that another is necessarily supposed, this is relation; there is that which necessarily makes us consider two things at once, or makes the mind look on two things at once, and hence it is that relative terms or words that signify this relation so denominate one thing, as that they always intimate or denote another; viz. father, countryman, bigger, distant; so that whatsoever necessarily occasions two things, looked on as distinct, this connection in our thoughts of whatsoever it be founded in, that is properly relation, which perhaps may serve to give a little light to that great obscurity which has caused so much dispute about the nature of space, whether it be something or nothing, created or eternal. For when we speak of space (as ordinarily we do) as the abstract distance, it seems to me to be a pure relation, and we call it distance; but when we consider it as the distance or space between the extremities

of a continued body, whose continued parts do, or are supposed to fill up all the interjacent space, we call it extension, and it is looked on to be a positive inherent property of the body, because it keeps constantly with it, always the same, and every particle has its share of it; whereas, whether you consider the body in whole mass, or in the least particles of the body, it appears to me to be nothing but the relation of the distance of the extremities. But when we speak of space in general, abstract and separate from all consideration of any body at all or any other being, it seems not then to be any real thing, but the consideration of a bare possibility of body to exist: to this, I foresee, there will lie two great objections:—

1st. The Cartesians will except against me, as speaking of space without body, which they make to be the same thing; to whom let me say, that if *spacium* be *corpus*, and *corpus spacium*, then it is as true too that *extensio* is *corpus*, and *corpus extensio*, which is a pretty harsh kind of expression, and that which is so distant from truth, that I do not remember that I have anywhere met with it from them; and yet I would fain know any other difference between *extensio* and *spacium* than that which I have

above mentioned. If they will say *omne extensum et omnis res positiva extensa corpus, et vice versâ*, I fully consent. But then it is only to say that body is the only being capable of distance between its own parts, which is extension, (for I do not know why angels may not be capable of the relation of distance, in respect of one another,) which shows plainly the difference of the words extension, which is for distance, a part of the same body, or that which is considered but as one body, and that of space, which is the distance between any two beings, without the consideration of body interjacent. Besides this, there seems to me this great and essential difference between space and body, that body is divisible into separable parts, but space is not. This, I think, is so plain that it needs no proof; for if one take a piece of matter, of an inch square, for example, and divide it into two, the parts will be separated if set at farther distance one from another; but yet nobody, I think, amongst those who are most for the reality of space, say the parts of space are or can be removed to a farther distance one from another. And he that, imagining the idea of a space of an inch square, can tell how to separate the parts of it, and remove them one

from another, has, I confess, a much more powerful fancy than I.

It is no more strange, therefore, that extension, which is the relation of distance between parts of the same being, should be proper only to body, which alone has parts, than that the relation of filiation should be proper only to men.

To my supposition, that space, as it may be conceived antecedent to, and void of all bodies, or, if you will, all determinate beings, is nothing but the idea of the possibility of the existence of body; for, when one says there is space for another world as big as this, it seems to me to be no more than there is no repugnancy why another world as big as this might not exist; and in this sense space may be said to be infinite; and so in effect space, as antecedent to body, or some determinate being, is in effect nothing—To this I say will be objected, that space being, as it is, capable of greater and less, cannot properly be nothing. To this I say, that space, antecedent to all determinate beings, is not capable of greater or less. The mistake lies in this, that we, having been accustomed to the measures of a foot, an ell, a mile, &c. &c., can easily frame ideas of them, where we suppose no body to be even beyond the bounds of

the world, but our having ideas in our head proves not the existence of any thing without us. But you will say, is not the space of a foot beyond the extremity of the universe less than the space of a yard? I answer, yes; that the idea of one, which I place there, is bigger than the idea of the other; but that there is any thing real there existing, I deny; or by saying or imagining the space of a foot or yard beyond the extremity of the world would suppose or mean any thing more than that a body of a foot or a yard (of which I have the idea) may exist there, I deny. Indeed, should a body be placed a foot distant from the utmost extremity of the universe, one might say it was a foot distant from the world, which seems to me to be a bare relation, resulting from its position there, without supposing that space to be any real being existing there before, and interposed between them, but only that a real body of such dimensions may be placed between them without removing them farther one from the other. For the relation makes itself appear in this, that whatsoever is so spoke of requires its correlative; and therefore, speaking of the universe, one cannot say it is distant, because without it we suppose no other determinate or finite being which may be the other

term of this relation. It will be answered, perhaps, that one may suppose a point in that empty space, and then say it is a foot from that point. I answer, one may as easily suppose a body as a point, if the point be *quid reale;* if not, it being nothing, one cannot say the extremity or superficies of the world is a foot from nothing; so that, be it a point, or body, or what other being one pleases, that is supposed there, it is evidence there is always required some real existence to be the other term of the relation.

And after all the suppositions that can be made, it can never truly be said that the utmost superficies of the world is a foot distant from any thing, if there be nothing really existing beyond it, but only that imaginary space.

That which makes us so apt to mistake in this point, I think, is this, that having been all our lifetime accustomed to speak ourselves, and hear all others speak of space, in phrases that import it to be a real thing, as to occupy or take up so much space, we come to be possessed with this prejudice, that it is a real thing and not a bare relation. And that which helps to it is, that by constant conversing with real sensible things, which have this relation of distance one to another, which we, by the reason just now

mentioned, mistake for a real positive thing, we are apt to think that it as really exists beyond the utmost extent of all bodies, or finite beings, though there be no such beings there to sustain it, as it does here amongst bodies, which is not true. For though it be true that the black lines drawn on a rule have the relation one to another of an inch distance, they being real sensible things; and though it be also true that I, knowing the idea of an inch, can imagine that length, without imagining body, as well as I can imagine a figure without imagining body; yet it is no more true that there is any real distance in that which we call imaginary space, than that there is any real figure there.

ADVERSARIA THEOLOGICA.

In a book with this title, commenced 1694, Mr. Locke had written several pages, of which the following have been selected as specimens; they may be considered also as indications of his opinions. The other subjects in the book are:—

Anima humana materialis.	Anima humana non materialis.
Spiritus sanctus Deus.	Spiritus sanctus non Deus.
Christus merus homo.	Christus non merus homo.
Lex operum.	Lex fidei.

TRINITAS.	NON TRINITAS.
1. Gen. i. 26. Let us. 2. Man is become as one of us. 3. Gen. iii. 22. Gen. xi. 6, 7. Isa. vi. 8.	Because it subverteth the unity of God, introducing three gods.
	Because it is inconsistent with the rule of prayer directed in the SS. For if God be three persons, how can we pray to him through his Son for his spirit?
	The Father alone is the most high God. Luke i. 32, 35.
	There is but one first independent cause of all things, which is the most high God. Rom. xi. 36.
	The Lord shall be one, and his name one. Zec. xiv. 9.
	The Lord our God, the Lord is one. Mark xii. 29.
	'Tis life eternal to know thee [Father], the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. John xvii. 3.
	If the Holy Spirit were God,

TRINITAS. NON TRINITAS.

the knowledge of him would be necessary too, to eternal life. It is eternal life to know Christ as sent, not as eternally begotten, nor as co-essential to the Father. Biddle, 1-24. 1 Cor. viii. 5, 6.

There is one Spirit manifestly distinguished from God, *i. e.* one created spirit by way of excellency; *i. e.* the Holy Spirit. 2. There is one Lord distinguished from God, and therefore made, else there would be two unmade Lords; *i. e.* one made Lord by way of excellency, which is Jesus. Eph. iv. 4—6. Acts ii. 22, 23, 33, 36. Matt. xxiv. 36. Mark xiii. 32.

Rom. xv. 6.

John vi. 27.

James iii. 9.

John viii. 54. The Jews knew no God but the Father, and that was St. Paul's God.

TRINITAS.	NON TRINITAS.
	2 Tim. i. 3. Acts iii. 13., v. 30, 31., xxii. 14. Neh. ix. 6. Thou art Lord alone. *Thou* denoteth a single person.
	1. Let us make man, no more proves the speaker to be more persons than one, than the like form, Mark iv. 30; John iii. 2; 2 Cor. x. 1, 2.
	This, if any thing, proves only that there was some other person with God whom he employed, as in the creation of other things, so of man, viz. the Spirit, ver. 2; Psal. civ. 30; Job xxvi. 13, xxxiii. 4.
	Gen. iii. 22. This was spoken also to the Holy Spirit, as also that, Gen. xi. 6, 7; Isa. vi. 8.

CHRISTUS DEUS SUPREMUS.	CHRISTUS NON DEUS SUPREMUS.
1. If Christ were not God, he could not satisfy for our sins.	Because we are to honour him, for that the Father hath committed all judgment to him. John v. 22, 23. But the highest is to be honoured with the highest honour for himself, and for no other reason but his own sake.
2. He is called the mighty God. Isa. ix. 6.	
3. Rom. ix. 5. ων επι παντων Θεος ευλογητος εις τους αιωνας.	Because the love to the Father is made the ground and reason of love to the Son. 1 John v. 1. He is the Son of the Most High, Luke i. 32., and thereby distinguished from the Most High. The Father is greater than he. John xiv. 28.
	Phil. ii. 5—8; v. Biddle, 5-24., nobody can be equal with himself; equality is always between two. Ib.
	1 Cor. viii. 6. By whom are all things, *i. e.* pertaining to

CHRISTUS DEUS SUPREMUS.	CHRISTUS NON DEUS SUPREMUS.
	our salvation, ib. 7. God has made him Lord, Acts ii. 39; Phil. ii. 9, 10.
	The glory and thanks which we give to Christ, and the faith and hope which we place in him, do not rest in him, but through him tend to God the Father, Phil. ii. 9, 10; 1 Pet. i. 21; John xii. 44; Rom. i. 8, xvi. 27; and therefore he is not equal to God.
	He shall deliver up the kingdom, and be subject to the Father. 1 Cor. xv. 24, 25, 28.
	And he shall be subject according to his human nature. Rev. 1. This distinction is not to be found in God's word. 2. It begs the question; for it supposes two natures in Christ, which is the thing in question. 3. It makes two persons in

CHRISTUS DEUS SUPREMUS.

CHRISTUS NON DEUS SUPREMUS.

Christ; for he is to be subject who ruled and subdued, *i. e.* a person, for no other can be a king; and therefore they must grant that the person of Christ, which they hold to be a Person of supreme Deity, delivereth up his kingdom, and becomes subject, or that his human nature is a person. The latter of these subverts the Trinitarian doctrine, the former itself, ib. 7. 4. It is said the Son himself shall be subject: but how can the Son himself become subject, if only a human nature, added to the Son, is subjected, and not the very person of the Son? Biddle 8-24. God has exalted him and made him Lord, Phil. ii. 9, 11, and raised him from the dead. Rom. x. 9, iv. 24.

CHRISTUS DEUS SUPREMUS.

CHRISTUS NON DEUS SUPREMUS.

If the eternal Son of God, co-equal, and co-essential with the Father, were conceived and born of the Virgin Mary, how said the Angel to Joseph, that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit? Matt. i. 20. Biddle, 11-24.

Luke i. 35.

Acts x. 38.

Luke xxii. 48.

Matt. xxvii. 46.

1. How can God satisfy God? If one person satisfies another, then he that satisfies is still unsatisfied, or forgives. —Ib. 12.

John xx. 17.

Eph. i. 7.

Heb. i. 8, 9.

2. A mighty God; for, in the Heb., El Gibbor, not Hael Haggibbor, as the Lord of Hosts is called, Jer. xxxii. 18.

CHRISTUS DEUS SUPREMUS.	CHRISTUS NON DEUS SUPREMUS.
	Besides the words in the close of ver. 9. distinguish Christ from the Lord of Hosts, making his Godhead depend on the bounty of the Lord of Hosts. Biddle, 15-24.
	3. A God over all, for Θεὸς there, is without an article, and so signifies not the supreme Deity.

THERE is an unpublished work of some length amongst Mr. Locke's papers, but as all interest on the subject to which it relates is now gone by, it would be useless to print any thing except a few extracts as a specimen. It was an answer to Dr. Stillingfleet, (Bishop of Worcester,) who had preached, 1680, a sermon before the Lord Mayor, styled "The Mischief of Separation," an elaborate and severe attack upon the Nonconformists. This discourse was answered by Mr. Baxter, Mr. Alsop, Dr. Owen, and other leading writers amongst the Presbyterians and Independents. Dr. Stillingfleet published, in reply, a larger work, 1683, which he entitled "The Unreasonableness of Separation," and this is evidently the work on which Mr. Locke animadverts.

Bishop G. was probably Dr. Gauden, Bishop of Exeter, the author of the Εικων Βασιλικη; P. the Catholic, may be conjectured to have been Parsons the Jesuit.

* * * *

ALL the arguments used from the Church, or established Church, &c. amount to no more than this, that there are a certain set of men in the world upon whose credit I must without farther examination venture my salvation, so that all the directions and precepts to examine doctrines, try the spirit, take heed what you believe, hold the truth, &c. are all to no purpose, when all the measure and stamp of truth, whereby I am to receive it, will then be only the hand that delivers it, and not the appearance of rectitude it carries with it. This is to deal worse with men in their great eternal concernment of their souls, than in the short and trivial concernment of their estates; for though it be the allowed prerogative of Princes to stamp silver and gold, and thereby make them current money, yet every man has the liberty to examine even those very pieces that have the magistrate's stamp and image, and if they have the suspicion and appearance of a false alloy, they may avoid being cozened, and not receive them; the stamp makes it neither good nor current. But no authority that I know on

earth, unless it be the infallible Church of Rome, boldly claims a right to coin opinions into truths, and make them current by their authority; and yet in all places all men are unreasonably required to receive and profess doctrines for truths, because this governor, or that priest, says they are so: yet how senseless soever, it helps not the case, nor profits the opinions of any one sort of them; for if the Pope demands an obedient faith to him and his emissaries, the Bishops of England tell us, that they and such as have episcopal ordination under them are the true Church, and are to be believed: the Presbyterians tell us those of Presbyterian ordination have no less authority, and that in all matters of doctrine and discipline they are to be believed. The Independents and Anabaptists think they have as much reason to be heard as the former; and the Quakers think themselves the only true guides, whilst they bid us be guided by the light within us. All these we have within ourselves, every one of them calling on us to hearken to them, as the sole deliverers of unmixed truth in doctrine and discipline; this they all do severally with the same confidence and zeal, and, for aught I know, with the same divine authority; for as for human authority, I am sure that weighs nothing in the

case. If we will look further, and add to these the Lutheran, Greek, Armenian, Jacobite, and Abyssine Churches, and yet further out of the borders of Christianity, into the Jewish synagogues and Mahometan mosques, the Mufti and the Rabbis are men of authority, and think themselves as little deceivers or deceived as any of the rest. What will it avail then to the Church of England, among so many equal pretenders, to say they are the true Church, and must be believed, and have the magistrate on their side, and must be obeyed? If they are to be believed the true Church because Bishop G. or Dr. S. says so, Mr. B. or Dr. O. will say as much for the Presbyterian or Independent; Cardinal H. and Mr. P. for the Popish and Quakers; and upon the same authority; for they are all men that say it, endowed with the like faculties to know themselves, and subject to the same frailties of mistaking or imposing. If they will prove themselves to be in the right, or to be the true Church, they take indeed the right course; but then they lay by their authority in proposing, as I myself lay it by in considering, their arguments: they appeal to my reason, and that I must make use of to examine and judge; but then we are but just where we were at first setting out, and where we shall be,

whether the Church of England be or be not in the right, whether its constitution be or be not "jure divino," *i. e.* every one judging for himself of what Church he thinks it best and safest to be. If it be said, as it is, "we have the law on our side, our constitution is established by the law of the land, you ought to be of our Church because the civil magistrate commands it," I know not how short a cut this may be to peace, or rather uniformity; but I am sure it is a great way about, if not quite out of the way, to truth; for if the civil magistrates have the power to institute religions and force men to such ways of worship they shall think fit to enact, I desire any one, after a survey of the present potentates of the earth, to tell me how it is like to fare with truth and religion, if none be to appear and be owned in the world but what we receive out of the courts of princes, or senate-houses of the states that govern it. I say not this with any reflection on the present age we live in; but let him, if he please, take any other age recorded in history, and then (if the rulers of the earth were to prescribe the way to Heaven, if their laws were to be the standards of truth and religion,) let him tell me what advantage it would ever have been to true religion to subject it to the power of the magistrate;

and if princes and potentates are not like for the future to be better informed, or more in love with true religion, than they have been heretofore; if they are not like to be more sincerely concerned for the salvation of their people's souls than every man himself is for his own, I do not see what reason we have to expect that these laws should be the likeliest way to support and propagate truth, and make subjects of the kingdom of Heaven for the future.

* * * *

BONDS.—The bonds given to their pastors in Independent Churches, show how in this contest churches are made like bird-cages with trap-doors, which give free admission to all birds, whether they have always been the wild inhabitants of the air, or are got loose from any other cages; but when they are once in, they are to be kept there, and are to have the liberty of going out no more; and the reason is, because if this be permitted our volary will be spoiled, but the happiness of the birds is not the business of these bird-keepers.

* * * *

In the dispute of ceremonies, our men speak of their Church as if it had such a divine power that it needed not consider whether any thing

were suited to the ends for which they are made use of, and so the Church need not consider whether any thing be fit, and therefore appoint it; but as good as say that they make them fit by appointing, which whether God himself ever did I much doubt, but I am sure nothing can do but an infinite power.

It is not enough to justify the imposing of ceremonies, because in themselves they are not unlawful; but if by their number or inconvenience they are burdensome, they cannot be justified who impose them. This was the reason Peter uses against circumcision, Acts xv. 10. because it was a yoke that could not be well borne. To continue them as necessary when the ends are ceased for which they were appointed, is to extend the metaphor of pastor and flock a little too far. Circumcision in itself was indifferent, and in the time of the Gospel might be used when there was a good end in it, as Paul circumcised Timothy; but if its injunction proved burthensome, as Acts xv., or there was an opinion that it was unnecessary, it became unlawful.

It is not unlawful to separate from a Church which imposes even indifferent things, if those who imposed them had not the power of imposing; for what is imposed by those who have

not the authority to impose, can have no obligation on any to observe it, and therefore they may go where there are no such impositions, and this is more for the peace of the Church than to continue in it, and oppose it. The convocation, with or without the civil magistrate, have not a power to impose on all Englishmen.

The charge of separating from our Church will not reach many of the Dissenters, who were never of it.

I suppose it will be allowed that a man may be saved in the Presbyterian, Independent, or Hugonot Church, of which there are now in England, and are or are not distinct Churches from the Church of England. If they are not, they cannot be accused of separation, being still parts of the Church of England: if they are, and a man be a member of the Presbyterian Church, will he not be guilty of sin if he separate from it, and go to the Independent, unless he can prove any doctrines and ceremonies sinful in the Presbyterian Church? And if so, the same sin will he be guilty of if he separate from that Church and come over to the Church of England; for if there be no sin in the doctrine and discipline of the Church he leaves, there is sin in his separating from it by the Doctor's

rule, wherever he goes after separation; for being supposed both of them innocent in their doctrine and discipline, the only odds upon the Doctor's foundations remaining between them will be the law of the land, which I think I have shown can give neither authority nor advantage to one Church above another, but only in preferments and rewards, and that indeed they have, but are not content with it unless they have dominion too. But if the Doctor should say that they may without sin come over to ours, because our ceremonies and discipline are better, (for we suppose them to agree in doctrine,) they are only better as they are better means of salvation: so that it will follow a man may separate from a Church lawfully in whose communion there is no sin, only for better edification; for suppose the state in England, being again Popish or Heathen, or on any other consideration, should take off all the secular laws that oblige to conformity, would it be any more sin, upon the Doctor's ground, to separate from the Presbyterian Church to come to the Episcopal, than it would be to quit the Episcopal to go to the Presbyterian?

If the Doctor, who is so well versed in Church history, would in the heat of dispute have recollected himself a little, he would cer-

tainly not have said that the great reason of retaining of the ceremonies in our Church by our Reformers, was the reverence to the ancient Church, since they themselves, in the preface to a book he has every day in his hands, say so much otherwise. In the preface made and prefixed to the Liturgy in Edward the Sixth's time, and continued there till this very day, concerning the service of the Church and ceremonies, they declare that the great reason of the changes they made, and the chief aim they all along had in it, was the edification of the people, wherein, though with great reason they referred themselves to the ancient Fathers of the Church, yet it was only so far as the Fathers of the Church followed the great rule of edification. · Why else did they leave out many of the most ancient ceremonies of the Church, though in themselves innocent, when they suspected them rather a burthen than profitable to the people? And what they say concerning bringing in use again the reading Scriptures in a known tongue; viz. that the people might continually profit more and more in the knowledge of God, and be more inflamed with the love of his true religion: and therefore left out a multitude of responds, verses, vain repetitions, commemorations, synodals, an-

thems, and such like things, as did break the continued course of reading: I suppose A. will not say in themselves unlawful, but the reason they give, was because they made the service hard and intricate, and jostled out the more profitable reading of the Scriptures. And concerning ceremonies they say thus: "Of such ceremonies as be used in the Church and have had their beginning from the institution of man, some were at first of godly intent and purpose devised, yet at length turned to vanity and superstition," (whereby I think it is plain, that things not only lawful in themselves, but godly in their first institution, may come to be unlawful.) "Some entered into the Church by indiscreet devotion, which not only for their unprofitableness, but also because they much blinded the people and obscured the glory of God, are worthy to be cut away and rejected; others there be which, although they have been devised by man, yet it is thought good to reserve them still, as well for decent order in the Church, for which they were first devised, as because they are for edification, to which all things done in the Church, as the Apostle teacheth, ought to be referred." Whereby I think it is plain that no ceremony devised by man ought to find admittance in the worship of

God, even upon pretence of decency and order, unless it some way or other conduces also to edification.

Now, if we will but take a view of the Reformation and its discreet and sober progress, we may observe how the Reformers, in their management of it, kept steady to this great rule and aim, viz. of bringing the people to the knowledge of God and the practice of his true religion. See Burnet's History of the Reformation, page 73, respecting the Ceremonies.

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It is plain that several of the ceremonies were retained and allowed only to the *desires* of the people, and allowed with limitation.

When the Common Prayer Book was reviewed, (see Burnet, page 155, 170) the additions were very sparing, and such as were very necessary for the edification of the people at that time. The other changes, p. 283, 392, History of Reformation.

* * * *

I have been thus particular to show what governed those wise and pious Reformers in their proceedings at that time, and we may observe all through, that the great difficulty that pressed them, was how they might lessen the

ceremonies without lessening their converts; the men they had to do with were, we see, fond and loth to part with them, and therefore they retained as many of them as they could, and added some again in Queen Elizabeth's time, which had been disused in King Edward the Sixth's time, only to satisfy the people, and as a fit means to hold them in or bring them over to our communion: whereby they plainly kept close to the rule of the Scriptures which they had set to themselves, of doing all things for edification, and had been, besides the precept, the command of St. Paul, who became all things to all men, that he might gain some. But is the case so now with us? have we now any hopes of fresh harvests amongst the Papists, and to gain them over to us by the multitude of lawful ceremonies? I fear not; I hear of nobody that after so long an experience to the contrary, (and their being now fixed upon quite different fundamentals by the Council of Trent,) that thinks it now reasonable to expect it. But on the other side, since Protestant dissenters are so great a part of the people upon the same principles with us, and agree with us perfectly in doctrine, and are excluded from our communion not by the desire of more, but by their scruples against many

of those ceremonies we have in our Church, can any one say that the same reason holds now for their rigorous imposing, that did at the Reformation at first for their retaining, where the Reformers did not so much contend for, as against ceremonies? I appeal to the Doctor himself, whether he thinks that if those wise and worthy men were now again to have the revising of our liturgy and ceremonies, they would not as well leave out the cross in baptism now, (as well as they left it out in confirmation and consecration of the sacramental elements wherein they had once retained it,) and as well as they left out several others in use in the ancient Church, to comply with the weakness and perhaps mistake of our dissenting brethren, and thereby hold some and gain others to our communion, as well as they retained several they had no great liking to, only to avoid offending those who by such compliance were more likely to be wrought upon? And of this mind I think every one must be, who will not say that more charity and Christian forbearance, more care and consideration is to be used for the saving the souls of Papists than of dissenting Protestants.

I hope it will be thought no breach of modesty in me, if from a heart truly cha-

ritable to all pious and sincere Christians, I offer my thoughts in the case. At the beginning of the Reformation, the people who had been bred up in the superstition and various outward forms of the Church of Rome, and had been taught to believe them substantial and necessary parts, nay almost the (* * *) of religion, could not so easily quit their reverend opinion of them; and therefore, in a Church that endeavoured to bring over as many converts as they could, the retaining of as many of those ceremonies as were not unlawful, was then to enlarge the communion of the Church, and not narrow it: since the people at that time were apt to take offence at the too few rather than too many ceremonies. So that ceremonies then had one of their proper ends, being a means to edification, when they were inducements to the people to join in communion with the Church, where better care was taken for their instruction. But the sad experience of these latter years makes it, I fear, but too plain, that the case is now altered: and as we at present stand with the Church of Rome, we have more reason to apprehend we shall be lessened by the apostacy of those of our Church to them, than increased by gaining new proselytes from them to us. The harvest for

such converts has been long since at a stand, if not an ebb; and being therefore likelier to lose than gain by any approaches we make towards them in outward agreement of rites and ceremonies, the retaining now of such, though lawful, cannot but in that respect be injurious to our Church, especially if we consider how many there are on the other side who are offended at and shut out by the retaining of them. And therefore, the taking away of as many as possible of our present ceremonies, may be as proper a way now to bring the Dissenters into the communion of our Church, as the retaining as many of them as could be, was of making converts at the Reformation. So that, what then was for the enlargement, now tends to the narrowing of our Church, and *vice versâ*. Since Dissenters may be gained, and the Church enlarged by parting with a few things, which when the law which enjoins them is taken away are acknowledged to be indifferent, and therefore may still be used by those that like them, I ask whether it be not, not only prudent, but a duty incumbent on those whose business it is to have a care of the salvation of men's souls, to bring members into the union of the Church, and so to put an end to the guilt they are charged and lie under of error and schism, and division, when

they can do it at so cheap a rate? whereas, whatever kindness we may have for the souls of those who remain in the errors of the Church of Rome, we can have small hopes of gaining much by concessions on that side.

* * * *

Speaking of the obedience required from a rational creature in Church government, it is never obedience for obedience sake, since the end God has prescribed of Church society, and all the institutions thereof, are for the preservation of order and decency; whatsoever is arbitrarily imposed in the Church, no way subservient to that end, is beyond the authority of the imposer, nor can any one be bound by the terms of communion which our Saviour does not allow to be made. This fundamental mistake is the reason, I suppose, why in this dispute about ceremonies, the champions for conformity speak generally of the Church in such manner as if it had such a divine power that it need not consider whether any thing were suited to the end for which only its use can be allowed; and therefore this, our Mother, (whether it be the mark of an indulgent one I will not say,) need not consider whether any thing be fit, and therefore appoint it, but as good as tells us that she makes it fit by appointing, which

whether God our merciful Father ever does in such cases I much doubt; this I am sure, nothing but an infinite Being can do; and therefore to make things necessary by an arbitrary power, and continue them as necessary when the ends are ceased for which they were appointed, is to extend the metaphor of pastors and flocks a little too far, and treat men as if they were brutes in earnest.

All the Dissenters can be accused of is nothing but their refractoriness in choosing to lose the privileges of our Church communion, which they lawfully may do.

2nd. The Doctor answers: "that there can be no reasonable suspicion that our Church should impose any other ceremony than it has already done, because the Church has rather retrenched than increased ceremonies, as will appear to any one that compares the first and second Liturgies of Edward the Sixth, and since that time no new ceremony has been required as a condition of communion."

If the Doctor can prove that the Church has had these last twenty years the same ground for retaining the ceremonies as it had at the beginning of the Reformation, I yield there will be no such reasonable suspicion; but if, that ground ceasing, the ceremonies have been

still retained, and no other ground left for many of them but the will of those that retain them being once imposed, the argument he brings that very little has been altered since Edward the Sixth's time, will serve only to make such a suspicion more reasonable, since those who keep up the imposition of ceremonies when the ground they were first imposed on had long before ceased, may for the same reason be suspected to have no other restraint from increasing them, but some accidental hinderance, especially if the Prelates of our Church practise and countenance more ceremonies than are enjoined, and these new and voluntary additions are understood to be the terms of preferment, though the law has not yet made them the terms of communion. But the Nonconformists (I believe) will not think the present Church of England gets much advantage upon them, or shows much of her condescension by the proof the Doctor offers, that the present Church is not like to increase her ceremonies, because in Edward the Sixth's time she did review and retrench those of her own appointment; which does only tell us that the Church then did more towards a full reformation in two years than has been done in one hundred years since, viz. review her own constitutions, and retrench the

ceremonies as much as the present temper of the people would permit; and though that Church and this have the same name of the Church of England, yet I imagine that the Dissenters think they are under far different churchmen, and do very much doubt whether the conduct of these now, and those then, tend both the same way.

As to the law of the land, it can never be judged to be a sin not to obey the law of the land commanding to join in communion with the Church of England, till it be proved that the civil magistrate hath a power to command and determine what Church I shall be of; and therefore all the specious names, established constitution, settled Church, running through all the Doctor's sermons, and on which he seems to lay so much stress, signify nothing, till it be evident the civil magistrate has that power. It is a part of my liberty as a Christian and as a man to choose of what Church or religious society I will be of, as most conducing to the salvation of my soul, of which I alone am judge, and over which the magistrate has no power at all; for if he can command me of what Church to be, it is plain it follows that he can command me of what religion to be, which, though nobody dares say in direct words, yet they do in

effect affirm, who say it is my duty to be of the Church of England, because the law of the land enjoins it.

* * * *

To understand the extent, distinction, and government of particular Churches, it will be convenient to consider how Christianity was first planted and propagated in the world. The apostles and evangelists went up and down, preaching the new doctrine, and the better to propagate it, went from city to city, or one great town to another, and there published their doctrines, where great collections of men gave them hopes of most converts. Having made a sufficient number of proselytes in any town, they chose out of them a certain number to take care of the concernments of that religion: these they called the elders, or bishops, who were to be the governors of that city, which so became a particular Church, formed much after the manner of a Jewish synagogue: such a constitution of a Church we find at Ephesus, Acts xx. and in several other cities. When a church was thus planted in any city, these itinerant preachers left it to grow and spread of itself, and from thence, as from a root, to take in not only those who from thenceforth should be converted in the city, but in the neighbour-

ing villages; and having done this, I say, they went to plant the Gospel in some other city. And the apostle St. Paul, having preached the Gospel, and made converts in all the cities of Greece, stayed not himself to appoint the elders, but left Titus there to do it, whilst he himself went on to publish the doctrines of life and salvation to those that sat yet in darkness.

The particular churches in different cities, directed by the prudence and enlarged by the preaching of these presbyters under whose care they were left, spread themselves so that, in succession of time, in some places, they made great numbers of converts in the neighbourhood and villages round about, all which so converted made an accession to, and became members of the Church of the neighbouring city, which became an episcopacy, παροικια, from which our own name parish comes, the diocese, which was the name that remained in use for a bishop's diocese a good while in the Church. How far the παροικια in the first times of Christianity reached, the signification of the word itself, which denotes neighbourhood, will easily tell us, and could certainly extend no farther than might permit the Christians that lived in it to frequent the Christian assemblies in the city, and enjoy the advantage of Church com-

munion. Though the number of believers were in some of these cities more than could meet in one assembly for the hearing of the Word, and performing public acts of worship, and so, consequently, had divers basilicas, or churches, as well as several presbyters to officiate in them, yet they continued one church and one congregation, because they continued under the government of the same presbyters, and the presbyters officiated promiscuously in all their meeting-places, and performed all the offices of pastors and teachers indifferently to all the members, as they, on their side, had the liberty to go to which assembly they pleased, a plain instance whereof we have in several Protestant Churches beyond sea, at Nismes, at St. Gall.

This, probably, seems to be the constitution and bounds of particular Churches in the most primitive times of Christianity, different from our present parochial congregations and episcopal dioceses; from the first, because they were independent Churches, each of them governed within themselves by their own presbytery; from the latter they differ in this, that every great town, wherein there were Christians, was a distinct church, which took no greater extent round about for its parochia, than what would allow the converts round about to have the

convenience of communion and church fellowship in common with the assemblies of Christians in that town; but afterwards, when these Churches were formed into episcopacies, under the government of single men, and so became subjects of power and matter of ambition, these parochias were extended beyond the convenience of church communion; and human frailty, when it is got into power, naturally endeavouring to extend the bounds of its jurisdiction, episcopal parochias were enlarged, and that name being too narrow, was laid by, and the name of diocese, which signifies large tracts of ground, was taken to signify a bishoprick; which way of uniting several remote assemblies of Christians and Churches under one governor, upon pretence of preventing schism and heresy, and preserving the peace and unity of the Church, gave rise to metropolitans and archbishops, and never stopped (nor indeed upon that foundation well could it) till it at last ended in supremacy.

ADDITIONS INTENDED BY THE AUTHOR TO HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

Book ii. c. 21.—God if he will.* Sec. 54.

Perhaps it will be said if this be so, that men can suspend their desires, stop their actions, and take time to consider and deliberate upon what they are going to do. If men can weigh the good and evil of an action they have in view; if they have a power to forbear till they have surveyed the consequences, and examined how it may comport with their happiness or misery, and what a train of one or the other it may draw after it; how comes it to pass that we see men abandon themselves to the most brutish, vile, irrational, exorbitant actions, during the whole current of a wild or dissolute life, without any check, or the least appearance of any reflection, who, if they did but in the least consider what will certainly overtake such a course here, and what may possibly attend it hereafter, would certainly sometimes make a stand, slacken their pace, abate of that height of wickedness their actions rise to? Amongst

* These are the concluding words of the preceding Section.

the several causes there may be of this, I shall set down some of the most common.

1st. It sometimes happens, that from their cradles some were never accustomed to reflect, but by a constant indulging of their passions have been all along given up to the conduct and swing of their inconsiderate desires, and so have, by a contrary habit, lost the use and exercise of reflection, as if it were foreign to their constitution, and can no more bear with it than as a violence done to their natures. How much fond or careless parents and negligent inspectors of the education of children have to answer on this account, they were best look—for both the poor and rich, I fear, offend this way; the one in not opening their children's mind at all, the other in letting them loose only to sensual pleasures; and hence the one never have their thoughts raised above the necessities of a needy drudging life, on which they are wholly intent, and the other have no thought besides their present pleasures, which wholly possess them. To the latter of these, all proposals of consideration are nonsense; to the other, the names of virtue and worth are utterly unintelligible; and to talk of a future state of happiness or misery, is looked on as a trick, and mere mockery, and they are ready to answer, You shall not

make me such a fool as to believe that. This, in a country of so much preaching as ours, may seem strange, but I have very good witnesses of such instances as these; and I think nobody need go far to find people ignorant and uninstructed to that degree, for it is plain the instructions of the pulpit will not make people knowing if those be begun with and relied on.

2nd. There seems to me to be in the world a great number of men who want not parts, but who, from another sort of ill education, and the prevalency of bad company and ill-imbibed principles of mistaken philosophy, cast away the thoughts and belief of another world as a fiction of politicians and divines conspiring together to keep the world in awe, and to impose on weak minds. If any of them, by their miscarriages, have brought this discredit on this fundamental truth, I think they have a great deal to answer for; for this I imagine is certain, that when in this age of the world the belief of another life leaves a man of parts who has been bred up under the sound and opinion of heaven and hell, virtue seldom stays with him; and then all his happiness being resolved into the satisfaction of his temporal desires, it is no wonder that his will should be determined, and his

life guided by measures that, by men of other principles, seem to want consideration.

3rd. To these we may add a third sort, who, for want of breeding, not arriving at a learned irreligion, or an argumentative disbelief of a future state, find a shorter cut to it from their own ill manners, than the others do from study and speculation; for having plunged themselves in all sorts of wickedness and villany, their present lives give them but a very ill prospect of a future state, they resolve it their best way to have no more thoughts about it, but to live in a full enjoyment of all they can get and relish here, and not to lessen that enjoyment by the consideration of a future life, whereof they expect no benefit.

N. B. This addition to the chapter may be spared.

Book iii. c. 10. § 11.—Organs of Speech.

By this learned art of abusing words and shifting their significations, the rules left us by the ancients for the conducting our thoughts in the search, or at least the examination of truth have been defeated. The logic of the schools contains all the rules of reasoning that are generally taught, and they are believed so suffi-

cient, that it will probably be thought presumption in any to suppose there needs any other to be sought or looked after. I grant the method of syllogism is right as far as it reaches; its proper business is to show the force and coherence of any argumentation, and to that it would have served very well, and one might certainly have depended on the conclusions as necessarily following from the premises in a rightly ordered syllogism, if the applauded art of disputing had not been taken for knowledge, and the credit of victory in such contests introduced a fallacious use of words, whereby even those forms of arguing have proved rather a snare than an help to the understanding, and so the end lost for which they were invented. For the form of the syllogism justifying the deduction, the conclusion, though never so false, stood good, and was to be admitted for such. This set men who would make any figure in the schools, to busy their thoughts, not in a search into the nature of things, but in studying of terms and varying their signification of words with all the nicety and, as it was called, the subtlety they could strain their thoughts to, whereby they might entangle the respondent, who if he let slip the observation and detection of the sophistry whenever any of

the terms were used in various significations, he was certainly gone without the help of a like sort of artifice; and therefore, on the other side, was to be well-furnished with good store of words, to be used as distinctions, whether they signified any thing to the purpose, or any thing at all, it mattered not, they were to be thrown in the opponent's way, and he was to argue against them; so that whilst one could use his words equivocally, which is nothing but making the same sound to stand for different ideas, and the other but use two sounds, as determining the various significations of a third, whether in truth they had any the least relation to its signification or no, there could be no end of the dispute, or decision of the question. Or if it happened that either of the disputants, failing in his proper artillery, was brought to a nonplus, this, indeed, placed the laurels on his adversary's head, victory was his, and with it the name of learning and renown of a scholar: he has his reward, and therein his end; but truth gets nothing by it: every one says he is the better disputant and carried the day, but nobody finds or judges of the truth by that: the question is a question still, and after it has been the matter of many a combat, and by being carried sometimes on one side and some-

times on the other, has afforded a triumph to many a combatant, is still as far from decision as ever. Truth and knowledge hath nothing to do in all this bustle; nobody thinks them concerned, it is all for victory and triumph: so that this way of contesting for truth may be, and often is, nothing but the abuse of words for victory,—a trial of skill, without any appearance of a true consideration of the matter in question, or troubling their heads to find out where the truth lies. This is not the fault of mode and figure, the rules whereof are of great use in the regulating of argumentation, and trying the coherence and force of men's discourses. But the mischief has been brought in by placing too high a value and credit on the art of disputing, and giving that the reputation and reward of learning and knowledge, which is in truth one of the greatest hindrances of it.

Book iii. c. 10. § 13.—To do so.

We cannot but think that angels of all kinds much exceed us in knowledge, and possibly we are apt sometimes to envy them that advantage, or at least to repine that we do not partake with them in a greater share of it. Whoever thinks of the elevation of their knowledge

above ours, cannot imagine it lies in a playing with words, but in the contemplation of things, and having true notions about them, a perception of their habitudes and relations one to another. If this be so, methinks we should be ambitious to come, in this part, which is a great deal in our power, as near them as we can; we should cast off all the artifice and fallacy of words, which makes so great a part of the business and skill of the disputers of this world, and is contemptible even to rational men, and therefore must needs render us ridiculous to those higher order of spirits. Whilst we, pretending to the knowledge of things, hinder as much as we can the discovery of truth by perplexing one another all we can by a perverse use of those signs which we make use of to convey it to one another, must it not be matter of contempt to them to see us make the studied and improved abuse of those signs have the name and credit of learning? Should not we ourselves think the Chinese very ridiculous, if they should set those destined to knowledge out of the way to it by praising and rewarding their proficiency in that which leads them quite from it?

The study of such arts as these is an unac-

countable wasting of our time; they serve only to continue or spread ignorance and error, and should be exploded by all lovers of truth and professors of science; at least, ought not to be supported by the name and rewards of learning given to them. Those who are set apart to learning and knowledge, should not, one would think, have that made the chief, or any part of their study, which is an hindrance to their main end—knowledge. The forms of argumentation should be learned and made use of; but to teach an apprentice to measure well, would you commend and reward him for cheating by putting off false and sophisticated wares? It is no wonder men never come to seek and to value truth sincerely, when they have been entered in sophistry, and questions are proposed and argued, not at all for the resolving of doubts nor settling the mind upon good grounds on the right side, but to make a sport of truth, which is set up only to be thrown at, and to be battled as falsehood, and he has most applause who can most effectually do it. What, then, shall not scholars dispute? how else will they be able to defend the truth, unless they understand the ways and management of arguments? To this I answer—

1st. This way of managing arguments is nothing but the forms of syllogism, and may quickly be learned.

2dn. If disputing be necessary to make any one master of those forms, it must be allowed to be absurd for beginners to dispute in any science, till they have well studied that science: if they be accustomed and required to dispute before they know, will it not teach them to take words for things,—to prefer terms to truth,—and take disputing for knowledge?

3rd. If disputing be necessary, every one should dispute in earnest for the opinion he is really of; that truth and falsehood might not appear indifferent to him, nor was it matter which he held, victory was all, truth nothing in the case.

4th. But that can never teach a man to defend truth which teaches him not the love of it, and when he gets commendation not by holding the truth, but for well maintaining falsehood. Besides, if it find approbation, never to come to an end of his syllogisms or distinctions till he has got the last word, what is this but to persuade a man it is a fine worthy thing never to have done talking,—to take no answer as long as he can find any terms of opposing,—nor ever to yield to any arguments? than which

there can be nothing more odious to those who have a regard to truth, to say nothing of civil conversation and good breeding.

In Locke's fourth Letter for Toleration there is an hiatus, where the Editor informs the reader that '[the two following leaves of the copy are either lost or mislaid].' That deficiency is now supplied from the original rough draft.

[But since, perhaps, it would have laid the matter a little too open, if you had given the reason why you say I was concerned to make out that there are as clear and solid arguments for the belief of false religion as there are for belief of the true; or that men may both as firmly and rationally believe and embrace false religions as they can the true,—I shall endeavour here to do it for you.

Knowledge, properly so called, or knowledge of the true religion, upon strict demonstration, as you are pleased to call it, not being to be had, his knowledge could not point out to him that religion which he is by force to promote. The magistrate being thus visibly destitute of knowledge to guide him in the right exercise of his duty, you will not allow his belief or

persuasion, but it must be firmness of persuasion, or full assurance; and this you think sufficient to point out to him that religion which by force he is to promote. And hereupon you think your cause gained, unless I could prove that which I think utterly false, viz. that there are as clear and solid grounds for the belief of false religions as there are for belief of the true, and that men may both as firmly and as rationally believe and embrace false religions as true. All which is bottomed upon this very false supposition, that in the want of knowledge nothing is sufficient to set the magistrate upon doing his duty in using of force to promote the true religion, but the firmest belief of its truth; whereas his own persuasion of the truth of his own religion, in what degree soever it be . . . he believes it to be true, will, if he think it his duty, be sufficient to set him to work.

This, as well as several other things in my former letters, stick with some readers, who want to have them clear; but such poor spirits deserve not to be regarded by a master of fencing, who answers by specimen, and relates by wholesale, and whose word is to be taken for sufficient guarantee of truth—the most commodious way that hath been yet found out for silencing objections, and putting an end to controversy.]

ABSTRACT OF THE ESSAY.

On opening the MS. copy of the Essay on Human Understanding, dated 1671, I found the following paper without title or date: it is an Epitome or Abstract of the Essay, drawn up by Locke himself;—the same which was translated by Le Clerc, and published in the Bibliothèque Universelle of 1688, before the Essay was given to the world.

Lib. 1. In the thoughts I have had concerning the Understanding, I have endeavoured to prove that the mind is at first *rasa tabula.* But that being only to remove the prejudice that lies in some men's minds, I think it best, in this short view I design here of my principles, to pass by all that preliminary debate which makes the first book, since I pretend to show in what follows the original from whence, and

the ways whereby, we receive all the ideas our understandings are employed about in thinking.

Lib. II. Chap. 1. The mind having been supposed void of all innate characters, comes to receive them by degrees as experience and observation lets them in; and we shall, upon consideration, find they all come from two originals, and are conveyed into the mind by two ways, viz. *sensation* and *reflection.*

1st. It is evident that outward objects, by affecting our senses, cause in our minds several ideas which were not there before: thus we come by the idea of red and blue, sweet and bitter, and whatever other perceptions are produced in us by *sensation.*

2d. The mind, taking notice of its own operation about these ideas received by sensation, comes to have ideas of those very operations that pass within itself: this is another source of ideas, and this I call *reflection*; and from hence it is we have the ideas of *thinking*, *willing*, *reasoning*, *doubting*, *purposing*, &c.

From these two originals it is that we have all the ideas we have; and I think I may confidently say, that, besides what our senses convey into the mind, or the ideas of its own

operations about those received from *sensation*, we have no ideas at all. From whence it follows—first, that where a man has always wanted any one of his senses, there he will always want the ideas belonging to that sense; men born deaf or blind are sufficient proof of this. Secondly, it follows that if a man could be supposed void of all senses, he would also be void of all ideas; because, wanting all sensation, he would have nothing to excite any operation in him, and so would have neither *ideas of sensation*, external objects having no way by any sense to excite them, nor *ideas of reflection*, his mind having no ideas to be employed about.

Chap. 2. To understand me right, when I say that we have not, nor can have, any ideas but of sensation, or of the operation of our mind about them, it must be considered that there are two sorts of ideas, simple and complex. It is of simple ideas that I here speak; such as are the white colour of this paper, the sweet taste of sugar, &c., wherein the mind perceives no variety nor composition, but one uniform perception or idea; and of these I say we have none but what we receive from *sensation* or *reflection*; the mind is wholly passive in them, can make no new ones to itself, though

out of these it can compound others, and make complex ones with great variety, as we shall see hereafter; and hence it is, that though we cannot but allow that a sixth sense may be as possible, if our all-wise Creator had thought it fit for us, as the five he has bestowed ordinarily upon man, yet we can have by no means any ideas belonging to a sixth sense, and that for the same reason that a man born blind cannot have any ideas of colours, because they are to be had only by the fifth sense, that way of sensation which he always wanted.

Chap. 3, 4, 5, 6. I think I need not go about to set down all those ideas that are peculiar objects of each distinct sense, both because it would be of no great use to give them by tale, they are most of them obvious enough to our present purpose, and also because they most of them want names; for, bating colours, and some few tangible qualities, which men have been a little more particular in denominating, though far short of their great variety, tastes, smells, and sounds, whereof there is no less a variety, have scarce any names at all, but some few very general ones. Though the taste of milk and a cherry be as distinct ideas as white and red, yet we see they have no particular names; sweet, sour, and bitter, are almost all the appellations

we have for that almost infinite difference of relishes to be found in Nature. Omitting, therefore, the enumeration of the simple ideas peculiar to each sense, I shall here only observe that there are some ideas that are conveyed to the mind only by one sense, viz. colours by the sight only, sounds by the hearing, heat and cold by the touch, &c. Others again are conveyed into the mind by more than one sense, as motion, rest, space, and figure, which is but the termination of space, by both the sight and touch. Others there be that we receive only from reflection; such are the ideas of thinking, and willing, and all their various modes. And some again that we receive from all the ways of *sensation*, and from *reflection* too, and those are number, existence, power, pleasure, and pain, &c. &c.

These, I think, are in general all, or at least the greater part, of the simple ideas we have, or are capable of, and which contain in them the materials of all our knowledge, out of which all our other ideas are made, and beyond which our minds have no thoughts nor knowledge at all.

Chap. 7. One thing more I shall remark concerning our simple ideas, and then proceed to show how out of them are made our complex ideas; and that is, that we are apt to mistake

them, and take them to be resemblances of something in the objects that produce them in us, which, for the most part, they are not. This, though it lead us into the consideration of the way of the operation of bodies upon us by our senses, yet, however unwilling I am to engage in any physical speculations, pretending here to give only an historical account of the understanding, and to set down the way and manner how the mind first gets the materials, and by what steps it proceeds in the attainment of knowledge; yet it is necessary a little to explain this matter, to avoid confusion and obscurity. For to discover the nature of sensible ideas the better, and discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us.

Whatsoever immediate object, whatsoever perception, be in the mind when it thinks, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in the mind, I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is. Thus, whiteness, coldness, roundness, as they are sensations or perceptions in the understanding, I call ideas; as they are in a snow-ball, which has the power to produce

these ideas in the understanding, I call them qualities.

The original qualities that may be observed in bodies, are solidity, extension, figure, number, motion, or rest; these, in whatsoever state body is put, are always inseparable from it.

The next thing to be considered is, how bodies operate one upon another; and the only way intelligible to me is by impulse; I can conceive no other. When, then, they produce in us the ideas of any of their original qualities which are really in them,—let us suppose that of extension or figure by the sight,—it is evident that the thing seen being at a distance, the impulse made on the organ must be by some insensible particles coming from the object to the eyes, and by a continuation of that motion to the brain, those ideas are produced in us. For the producing, then, of the ideas of these original qualities in our understandings, we can find nothing but the impulse and motion of some insensible bodies. By the same way we may also conceive how the ideas of the colour and smell of a violet may as well be produced in us as of its figure, viz. by a certain impulse on our eyes or noses, of particles of such a bulk, figure, number, and motion, as those that come from

violets when we see or smell them, and by the particular motion received in the organ from that impulse, and continued to the brain; it being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions with which they have no similitude, than that He should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea has also no resemblance.

What I have said concerning colours and smells may be applied to sounds and tastes, and all other ideas of bodies produced in us by the texture and motion of particles, whose single bulks are not sensible. And since bodies do produce in us ideas that contain in them no perception of bulk, figure, motion, or number of parts, as ideas of warmth, hunger, blueness, or sweetness, which yet it is plain they cannot do but by the various combinations of these *primary qualities*, however we perceive them not, I call the powers in bodies to produce these ideas in us secondary qualities.

From whence we may draw this inference, that the ideas of the *primary qualities* of bodies are resemblances of them, and their archetypes do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these *secondary qualities* have no resemblance of them at all. There

is nothing existing in the bodies themselves that has any likeness to our ideas. 'Tis only in them a power to cause such sensations in us, and what is blue, sweet, or warm, in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts of the bodies themselves to which we give those denominations. Chap. 8. 9. 10.

Chap. 11. Having showed how the mind comes by all its simple ideas, in the next place I shall show how these simple ideas are the materials of all our knowledge, and how, from several combinations of them, complex ones are made.

Though the mind cannot make to itself any one simple idea more than it receives from those two sole inlets, *sensation* and *reflection*, wherein it is merely passive, yet out of these being lodged in the memory, it can make, by repeating and several ways combining them, a great variety of other ideas, as well as receive such combinations by the senses. I shall give some few instances of this in those that seem the most abstruse, and then proceed to other things.

Chap. 12. That our eyes and touch furnish us with ideas of space, I think nobody will deny; we cannot open our eyes nor move our

bodies, or rest them upon any thing, but we are convinced of it. Having got the idea of the length of our span, or the height and breadth of the door we usually go in and out at, or of the bulk of any body that familiarly comes in our way, we can repeat this idea in our minds as often as we will, and so increase that idea to what bigness we please by still adding the like or the double to the former; and by this way, though sensation should supply us with no idea but of a foot, a yard, or a mile long, we could by this repetition attain and form to ourselves the idea of immensity, which had its foundation still in that idea of space we received by our senses, and is nothing but the enlargement of that by repetition. I shall not here set down what I have at large written, to show the clear distinction between the idea of body and space, which some have endeavoured to confound; it shall suffice only to mention, that when *distance* is considered between any two things, abstract from any consideration of body filling up the interval, it may most properly be called *space*—when the distance is considered between the extremes of a solid body, it may fitly be called *extension*. The right application of these two terms, would, I hope, help us to avoid some confusion, which

sometimes happens in discourses concerning body and space.

Chap. 13. Time and duration have a great conformity with extension and space. Had the original, from whence we have our idea of duration, been well considered, I imagine time would never have been thought *mensura motûs*, since it hath truly nothing to do with motion at all, and would be the same it is, were there no motion at all. He that will look into himself and observe what passes in his own mind, will find that various ideas appear and disappear there in train all the time he is waking, and this so constantly, that though he is never without some whilst he is awake, yet it is not one single one that possesses his mind alone, but constantly new ones come in and go out again. If any one doubts of this, let him try to keep his thoughts fixed upon any one idea without any alteration at all; for if there be any the least alteration of thought by addition, subtraction, or any manner of change, there is then another, a new idea.

From this perpetual change of ideas observable in our minds, this train of new appearances there, we have the clear idea of succession. The existence of any thing commensurate to any part of such succession, we call *duration;* and

the distance between any two points of duration, we call *time*. That our ideas of time and duration have their original from this reflection is evident from hence, that whenever this succession of ideas ceases in our minds, we have no idea, no perception at all of duration, and therefore a man that sleeps without dreaming perceives no distance betwixt his falling asleep and waking; but if dreams furnish him with trains of ideas, the perception of duration accompanies them, and that comes in to his account of time.

Though mankind have made choice of the revolution of the sun and moon as the fittest measure of time, because they are every where observable, and not easily discernible to be unequal, yet this is not because of any connection between duration and motion; for any other regular periodical appearances, that were common to all the world, would measure time as well, were it without any sensible motion.

Chap. 14. And though the word *time* is usually taken for that part of *duration* which is taken up by the existence of natural things, or the motions of the heavens, as extension for that part of space which is commensurate and filled by body, yet the mind having got the

idea of any portion of time, as a day, or a year, it can repeat it as often as it will, and so enlarge its ideas of duration beyond the being or motion of the sun, and have as clear an idea of the 763 years of the Julian period before the beginning of the world, as of any 763 years since; and from this power of repeating and enlarging its ideas of duration, without ever coming to an end, frame to itself the idea of eternity, as by endless addition of ideas of space it doth that of immensity.

Chap. 15. The idea of number, as has been observed, is suggested to us by reflection, and all the ways of sensation we count ideas, thoughts, bodies, every thing; and having got the idea of an unit, by the repetition and addition of one or more such units, make any combinations of numbers that we please.

Chap. 16. Whereas the mind can never come to the end of these additions, but finds in itself still the power of adding more in the proportion it pleases, hence we come by the idea of infinite, which, whether applied to space or duration, seems to me to be nothing else but this infinity of number, only with this difference, that in number, beginning at an unit, we seem to be at one end of the line, which we can extend infinitely forward. In duration we extend the

infinite end of number or addition two ways from us, both to duration past and duration to come; and in space, as if we were in the centre, we can on every side add miles or diameters of the *orbis magnus*, &c. till number and the power of addition fail us, without any prospect or hopes of coming to an end.

That this is the idea we have of infinite, made up of additions, with still an inexhaustible remainder, as much as there is in number, and not in any positive comprehensive idea of infinity, I shall not, in the brevity I now propose to myself, set down the proofs of at large: let any one examine his own thoughts and see whether he can find any other but such an idea of infinity; in the mean time, it suffices me to show how our idea of infinite is made up of the simple ideas derived from *sensation* and *reflection*. C. 18, 19.

Chap. 20. Amongst the simple ideas we receive both from *sensation* and *reflection*, *pleasure* and *pain* are none of the most inconsiderable; they are our great concernment, and they often accompany our other sensations and thoughts. For as there are few sensations of the body that do not bring with them also some degrees of *pleasure* or *pain*, so there are few thoughts of our minds so indifferent to us that do not

delight or disturb us; all which I comprehend under the names of *pleasure* and *pain*. That satisfaction or delight, uneasiness or trouble, which the mind receives from any either external sensation or internal thought whatsoever, has an aptness to cause, increase, or continue pleasure in us, or to lessen or shorten any pain, we call *good*, and the contrary we call *evil:* upon these two, *good* and *evil*, all our passions turn, and by reflecting on what our thoughts about them produce in us, we get the ideas of the passions.

Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in the spring when there are none, that he loves grapes, he means no more but that the taste of grapes delights him. The being and welfare of a man's children and friends producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. On the contrary, the thought of the pain which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred.

The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that

we call *desire*, which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less.

Joy is a delight of the mind from the consideration of the present or future assured possession of a good. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief even before he tastes it; and we are then possessed of any good when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we please; a father in whom the very well being of his children causes delight, is in the possession of that good always as long as his children are in such an estate; for he needs but to reflect on it to have that pleasure.

Fear is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

I will not go over all the passions; they are not my business; these are enough, I think, to show us how the ideas we have of them are derived from *sensation* and *reflection*.

Chap. 21. I shall only mention one more simple idea, and show how we come by it, and give some instances of some modifications of it, and then put an end to this part of simple ideas and their modes. Every man experiences in himself that he can move his hand or tongue, which before was at rest; that he can apply his

mind to other thoughts, and lay by those that he has at present; hence he gets the idea of *power*.

All power regarding action, we have, as I think, the ideas but of two sorts of action: viz. *motion* and *thinking*.

The power we find in ourselves to prefer this or that peculiar thought to its absence, this or that peculiar motion to rest, is that we call *will*. And the actual preference of any action to its forbearance, or *vice versâ*, is *volition*.

The power we find in ourselves to act, or not to act, conformable to such preference of our minds, gives us the idea we call *liberty*.

Chap. 22. Having thus, in short, given an account of the original of all our simple ideas, and in the instances of some of them showed how, from certain modifications of them, the mind arrives at those that seem at first sight to be very far from having their original in any ideas received from sensation, or from any operation of our minds about them, I shall now proceed to those that are more complex, and show that all the ideas we have (whether of natural or moral things, bodies or spirits,) are only certain combinations of these simple ideas got from *sensation* or *reflection*, beyond

which our thoughts, even when they ascend up into the highest heavens, cannot extend themselves.

The complex ideas we have, may, I think, be all reduced to these three sorts, viz.—

Substances,

Modes, and

Relations.

Chap. 23. That there are a great variety of substances in this world is past doubt to every one; let us then see what ideas we have of those particular substances about which our thoughts are at any time employed. Let us begin with those more general ideas of body and spirit. I ask, what other idea a man has of body, but of *solidity*, *extension* and *mobility* joined together, which are all simple ideas received from sense. Perhaps some one here will be ready to say, that to have a complete idea of body, the idea of *substance* must be added to *solidity* and *extension*. But of him that makes that objection, I shall demand what his idea of substance is? So likewise, our idea of spirit is of a substance that has the power to *think* and to *move body*, from which, by the way, I conclude that we have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of body; for in one we have the clear ideas of *solidity*, *extension* and *mobility*, or a

power of being moved, with an ignorance of its *substance*, and in the other we have two as clear ideas, viz. of *thinking* and *motivity*, if I may so say, or a power of moving, with a like ignorance of its *substance*. For substance in both is but a supposed but unknown substratum of those qualities, something, we know not what, that supports their existence; so that all the idea we have of the substance of any thing, is an obscure idea of what it does, and not any idea of what it is. This farther I have to add, that our idea of substance, whether spiritual or corporeal, being equally obscure, and our ideas of *mobility* and *motivity* (if I may for shortness' sake coin that new word) being equally clear in both, there remains only to compare *extension* and *thinking*. These ideas are both very clear, but the difficulty that some have raised against the notion of a spirit, has been, that they said they could not conceive an unextended thinking thing, and I on the contrary affirm that they can as easily conceive an unextended thinking thing as an extended solid. To make an extended solid, there must be an idea of a cohesion of parts, and I say it is as easy to conceive how a spirit thinks, as how solid parts cohere; that is, how a body is extended; for where there are no cohering parts, there are no parts *extra partes*,

and consequently no extension; for if body be divisible, it must have united parts, and if there were no cohesion of the parts of body, body would quite be lost, and cease to be. He that can tell me what holds together the parts of steel or a diamond, will explain a fundamental difficulty in natural philosophy. Bernouli, who has endeavoured to explain the coherence of the parts of all bodies by the pressure of the ether, hath made two great oversights: 1st. That he takes no notice that let the pressure of any ambient fluid be as great as it will, yet that if there be nothing else to hold the parts of any body together, though they cannot be pulled asunder perpendicularly, yet it is demonstrable they may be slid off from one another, as easily as if there were no such pressure; and the experiment of two polished marbles held together by the pressure of the atmosphere, makes it evident to sense, since they can so easily by a side motion be separated, though they cannot by a perpendicular.

That he takes no care of the particles of the ether itself, for they too being bodies, and consisting of parts, must have something to hold them together, which cannot be themselves; for it is as hard to conceive how the parts of the least atom of matter are fastened together, as

how the greatest masses, and yet, without this, we have as great a difficulty to conceive body as spirit, an extended as a thinking thing.

But whether the notion of a spirit be more obscure, or less obscure, than that of body, this is certain, that we get it no other way than we do that of body; for as, by our senses, receiving the ideas of *solidity, extension, motion,* and *rest,* and supposing them inherent in an unknown substance, we have the idea of body; so by collecting together the simple ideas we have got by reflecting on those operations of our own minds which we experience daily in ourselves, as *thinking, understanding, willing, knowing,* and the *power of moving* bodies, and by supposing those, and the rest of the operations of our minds, to be co-existing in some substance, which also we know not, we come to have the idea of those beings we call spirits.

The ideas we have of *understanding,* and *power,* which we have from reflection on what passes in ourselves, joined to *duration,* and all these enlarged by our idea of *infinite,* gives us the idea of that Supreme Being we call *God;* and to satisfy us that all our complex ideas contain nothing in them but the simple ideas taken from *sensation* and *reflection,* we need but cast our thoughts on the different species of spirits

that are or may be; for though it be possible there may be more species of spiritual beings between us and God upwards, than there are of sensible beings between us and nothing downwards, we being at a greater distance from infinite perfection than from the lowest degree of being, yet it is certain we can conceive no other difference between those various ranks of angelic natures, but barely different degrees of understanding and power, which are but different modifications of the two simple ideas we got from reflecting on what passes in ourselves.

As to our ideas of natural substances, it is evident they are nothing but such combinations of simple ideas as have been observed by *sensation* to exist together; for what is our idea of *gold*, but of a certain *yellow shining* colour, a certain degree of *weight, malleableness, fusibility*, and perhaps *fixedness*, or some other simple ideas put together in our minds, as constantly co-existing in the same substance, which complex idea consists of more or fewer simple ones as his observation who made this combination was more or less accurate? And thus I think from *sensation* and *reflection*, and the simple ideas got thence, differently combined and

modified, we come by all our ideas of substances.

Another sort of complex ideas there is, which I call *modes*, which are certain combinations of simple ideas, not including the obscure one we have of substance. Of these *modes* there are two sorts: one where the combination is made of simple ideas, of the same kind as a dozen or a score made up of a certain collection of units; the other sort of modes is, when the combination is made up of ideas of several kinds, such are the ideas signified by the words obligation, friendship, a lie. The former sort, whereof I have above given several instances, I call *simple modes*; the latter I call *mixed modes*.

These mixed modes, though of an endless variety, yet they are all made up of nothing but simple ideas, derived from sensation or reflection, as is easy for any one to observe who will, with ever so little attention, examine them. For example, if a lie be speaking an untruth knowingly, it comprehends the simple ideas—1st. Of articulate sounds: 2nd. The relation of these sounds to ideas, whereof they are the marks: 3rd. The putting those marks together differently from what the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker: 4th. The

knowledge of the speaker, that he makes a wrong use of these marks: all which are either simple ideas, or may be resolved into them. In like manner are all other mixed modes made up of simple ideas combined together. It would be endless, as well as needless, to go about to enumerate all the mixed modes that are in the minds of men, they containing almost the whole subject about which Divinity, Morality, Law, and Politics, and several other sciences, are employed. Chap. 24.

Chap. 25, 26, 27. Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another: this we call *relation*; which is such a consideration of one thing as intimates or involves in it the consideration of another. Now since any of our ideas may be so considered by us in one thing as to intimate and lead our thoughts to another, therefore all, both simple and complex, may be foundations of relation, which, however large it is, yet we may perceive hereby how it derives itself originally from *sensation* and *reflection*, it having no other foundation but ideas derived from thence. I shall not need to go over the several sorts of relations to show it; I shall only remark that to relation it is neces-

sary there should be two ideas or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, which being not both always taken notice of, makes several terms pass for the marks of positive ideas, which are in truth relative: viz. great and old, &c. are ordinarily as relative terms as greater and older, though it be not commonly so thought; for when we say Caïus is older than Sempronius, we compare these two persons in the idea of duration, and signify one to have more than the other; but when we say Caïus is old, or an old man, we compare his duration to that which we look on to be the ordinary duration of men. Hence it is harsh to say a diamond or the sun is old, because we have no idea of any length of duration belonging ordinarily to them, and so have no such idea to compare their age to as we have of those things we usually call old.

This is, in short, what I think of the several sorts of complex ideas we have, which are only these three, viz. of *substances*, *modes*, and *relations*, which being made up, and containing in them nothing but several combinations of simple ideas received from sensation and reflection, I conclude that in all our thoughts, contemplations, and reasonings, however abstract or enlarged, our minds never go beyond those simple

ideas we have received from those two inlets, viz. sensation and reflection. Chap. 28, 29, 30, 31.

Lib. III. When I had considered the ideas the mind of man is furnished with, how it comes by them, and of what kind they are, I thought I had no more to do but to proceed to the further examination of our intellectual faculty, and see what use the mind made of those materials or instruments of knowledge which I had collected in the foregoing book; but when I came a little nearer to consider the nature and manner of human knowledge, I found it had so much to do with propositions, and that words, either by custom or necessity, were so mixed with it, that it was impossible to discourse of knowledge with that clearness one should, without saying something first of words and language.

Chap. 1. The ideas in men's minds are so wholly out of sight to others, that men could have had no communication of thoughts without some signs of their ideas.

The most convenient signs, both for their variety and quickness, that men are capable of, are articulate sounds, which we call words. Words then are signs of ideas; but no articu-

late sound having any natural connection with any idea, but barely of the sound itself, words are only signs (Chap. 2) by voluntary imposition, and can be properly and immediately signs of nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them; for being employed to express what he thinks, he cannot make them signs of ideas he has not, for that would be to make them signs of nothing. It is true, words are frequently used with two other suppositions—1st. It is commonly supposed that they are signs of the ideas in the mind of him with whom we communicate: this is reasonably supposed, because, unless this be so, the speaker cannot be understood; but it not always happening that the ideas in the mind of the hearer always exactly answer those to which the speaker applies his words, this supposition is not always true. 2nd. It is commonly supposed that words stand not only for ideas, but for things themselves; but that they should stand immediately for things is impossible, for since they can be signs immediately of nothing but what is in the mind of the speaker, and there being nothing there but ideas, they stand for things no otherwise than as the ideas in the mind agree to them.

Chap. 3. Words are of two sorts, general terms, or names of particular things: all things

that exist being particular, what need of general terms? and what are those general natures they stand for, since the greatest part of words in common use are general terms? As to the first; particular things are so many, that the mind could not retain names for them, and in the next place, could the memory retain them, they would be useless, because the particular beings known to one would be utterly unknown to another, and so their names would not serve for communication where they stood not for an idea common to both speaker and hearer: besides, our progress to knowledge being by generals, we have need of general terms. As to the second, the general natures general terms stand for, are only general ideas, and ideas become general only by being abstracted from time and place and other particularities, that make them the representatives only of individuals, by which separation of some ideas which annexed to them make them particular, they are made capable of agreeing to several particulars: thus ideas come to represent not one particular existence, but a sort of things as their names, to stand for sorts, which sorts are usually called by the Latin terms of art, genus and species, of which each is supposed to have

its particular essence; and though there be much dispute and stir about genus and species, and their essences, yet in truth the essence of each genus and species, or, to speak English, of each sort of things, is nothing else but the abstract idea in the mind which the speaker makes the general term the sign of. It is true, every particular thing has a real constitution by which it is what it is; and this, by the genuine notion of the word, is called its essence or being; but the word essence having been transferred from its original signification, and applied to the artificial species and genera of the schools, men commonly look on essences to belong to the sorts of things as they are ranked under different general denominations, and in this sense essences are truly nothing but the abstract ideas which those general terms are by any one made to stand for. The first of these may be called the *real*, the second the *nominal essence*, which sometimes are the same, sometimes quite different one from another.

Chap. 4. The nature and signification of words will be made a little more clear if we consider them with relation to those three several sorts of ideas I have formerly mentioned, viz. simple ideas, substances, and modes,

under which also I comprehend relations. 1st. The names of simple ideas and substances intimate some real existence from whence they are taken, as from their patterns; but the names of mixed modes terminate in the mind, and therefore I think it is they have the peculiar names of notions. 2nd. The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal essences; the names of substances seldom, if ever, any thing but the nominal essence. 3rd. The names of simple ideas are of all other the least doubtful and uncertain. 4th. But that which I think of great use to remark, and which I do not find any body has taken notice of, is, that the names of simple ideas are not definable, but those of all complex ideas are; for a definition being nothing but the making known the idea that one word stands for by several others not synonymous words, it cannot have place in any but complex ideas. It is very manifest how both the Peripatetics, and even modern philosophers, for want of observing this, have trifled or talked jargon in endeavouring to define the names of some few of the simple ideas, for, as to the greatest part of them, they found it best to let them alone; for though they have attempted the definitions of motion and light,

yet they have forborne to offer any definitions of the greatest part of simple ideas; and those definitions of light and motion they have ventured at, when strictly examined, will be found to be as insignificant as any thing can be said to explain what the term red or sweet signifies; when a man can be found that can by words make a blind man understand what idea the word blue stands for, then also may he be able by a definition to make a man have the true signification of the word motion or light who never had it any other way. 5th. The names of simple ideas have but few assents in *linea prædicamentali*, as they call it, because these ideas, not being compounded, nothing can be left out of any of them to make it more general and comprehensive, and therefore the name *colour*, which comprehends *red* and *blue*, &c. denotes only the simple ideas that come in by the sight.

Chap. 5. As to the names of mixed modes and relations, which are all of them general terms—1st. The essences of their several sorts are all of them made by the understanding. 2nd. They are made arbitrarily and with great liberty, wherein the mind confines not itself to the real existence of any patterns. 3rd. But though the essences or species of mixed modes

are made without patterns, yet they are not made at random without reason. Not only signification, but shortness also, and dispatch, is one of the great conveniences of language; and hence it is suitable to the end of speech not only that we should make use of sounds for signs of ideas, but also that one short sound should be the sign of many distinct ideas combined into one complex one. Suitable to this end, men unite into one complex idea many scattered and independent ones, and give a name to it where they have occasion often to think on such combinations and express them to others, and thus several species of mixed modes are made arbitrarily by men giving names to certain combinations of ideas, which have in themselves no more connexion than others which are not by any denomination so united. This is evident in the diversity of languages, there being nothing more ordinary than to find many words in one language which have none that answer them in another.

Chap. 6. The names of substances signify only their nominal essences, and not their real essences, which two essences in substances are far different things, *v. g.* the colour, weight, malleability, fusibility, fixedness, and perhaps some other sensible qualities, make up the complex idea men have in their minds, to which

they give the name gold; but the texture of the insensible parts, or whatever else it be, on which these sensible qualities depend, which is its real constitution or essence, is quite a different thing, and would give us quite another idea of gold if we knew it; but since we have no idea of that constitution, and can signify nothing by our words but the ideas we have, our name gold cannot signify that real essence. It is therefore by their nominal essences that substances are ranked into sorts under several denominations, which nominal essences being nothing but abstract, complex ideas, made up in various men of various collections of simple ideas which they have observed or imagined to co-exist together, it is plain the essences of the species of substances, and consequently the species themselves as ranked under distinct denominations, are of men's making. I do not say the substances themselves are made by men, nor the likeness and agreement that is to be found in them, but the boundaries of the species, as marked by distinct names, are made by men.

But though men make the essences whereby the species of substances are limited and distinguished, yet they make them not so arbitrarily as they do in modes; for in substances they propose to themselves the real existence of things as the patterns they would

follow, yet through their variety of skill or attention, their complex idea, made up of a collection of sensible qualities, signified by the same specific name, is in various men very different, the one putting in simple ideas that the other has omitted; but the real essences supposed of the species of things must be, if there were any such, invariably the same. If the first sorting of individuals into their lowest species depend on the mind of man, as has been shown, it is much more evident that the more comprehensive classes, called *genera* by the masters of logic, are so, which are complex ideas designedly imperfect, out of which are purposely left several of those qualities that are to be found constantly in the things themselves as they exist; for as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending several particular beings, leaves out those of time and place, and others that make them incommunicable to more than one individual, so, to make others yet more general that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves out these qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts; so that in this whole business of genus and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the species, and the species

but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. This is suited to the true end of speech, which is to denote by one short sound a great many particulars as they agree in one common conception *genera*; and species, then, seem to me to be nothing but sorting of things in order to denomination, and the essence of each sort is nothing but the abstract idea to which the denomination is annexed; for a little attention will teach us that to particular things nothing is essential; but as soon as they come to be ranked under any general name, which is the same as to be reckoned of any species, then presently something is essential to them, viz. all that is comprehended in the complex idea that that name stands for.

This farther is to be observed concerning substances, that they alone, of all the several sorts of ideas, have proper names; to which we may add, that though the specific names of substances can signify nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind of the speaker, and so consequently the substances that agree to that idea, yet men, in their use of them, often substitute them in the room of, and would suppose them to stand for, things having the real essence of that species, which breeds great confusion and uncertainty in their use of words.

Chap. 7. Words have a double use; 1st. to record our own thoughts; and for this any words will serve, so they be kept constantly to the same ideas. 2nd. To communicate our thoughts with others, and for this use they must be common signs standing for the same ideas in those who have communication together. In communication they have also a double use:

1st. Civil.

2nd. Philosophical.

The first of these is that which serves for the upholding of common conversation and commerce. The philosophical use is to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge.

In this last use of words they are especially liable to great imperfections of uncertainty and obscurity in their signification.

Words naturally signifying nothing, it is necessary that their signification, *i. e.* the precise ideas they stand for, be settled and retained, which is hard to be done:

1st. Where the ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of ideas put together.

2nd. Where the ideas that make up the complex one they stand for have no connection in nature, and so there is no settled standard any where existing in nature to rectify and adjust them by.

3rd. Where the signification of the word is referred to a standard existing, which yet is not easy to be known.

4th. Where the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same. The names of mixed modes are very much liable to doubtfulness, for the two first of these reasons; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter.

According to these rules, as well as experience, we shall find, First, That the names of simple ideas are the least liable to uncertainty, 1st. because they are simple, and so easily got and retained; 2nd. because they are referred to nothing but that very perception which things in nature are fitted to produce in us.

Second, That names of mixed modes are very uncertain, because the complex ideas they are the signs of have no standing patterns existing in nature whereby to be regulated and adjusted; their archetypes are only in the minds of men, and therefore uncertain to be known, and being very much compounded and often decom-

pounded, are very hardly to be exactly agreed on and retained. Where shall one find an assemblage of all the ideas the word *Glory* stands for, existing together? And the precise complex idea the name Justice is the sign of, is seldom, I imagine, settled and retained.

"Third, The names of substances are very uncertain, because their complex ideas not being voluntary compositions, but referred to patterns that exist, are yet referred to patterns that cannot at all be known, or at least can be known but very imperfectly. 1st. as has been showed, sometimes the names of substances are supposed to stand for their supposed real essences. Every thing having a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, this is apt to be called its essence, as if it were the essence of a species; but whether it be or no, this is certain, that, it being utterly unknown, it is impossible to know in such a supposition or reference, of the name which any word stands for. 2nd. Sometimes the ideas the names of substances stand for are copied from the sensible qualities to be observed in bodies existing; but in this which is their proper use, it is not easy to adjust their significations, because the qualities that are to be found in substances out of which we make their complex ideas, being for the most part powers, they

are almost infinite, and one of them having no more right than another to be put into our complex ideas, which are to be copies of these originals, it is very hard by these patterns to adjust the signification of their names, and therefore it is very seldom that the same name of any substance stands in two men for the same complex idea.

Chap. 8. To this natural imperfection of words it is not unusual for men to add voluntary abuses, some whereof I take notice of, as, 1st. The using of words without any clear and determinate signification: this whole sects in philosophy and religion are frequently guilty of, there being very few of them who, either out of affectation of singularity, or to cover some weak part of their system, do not make use of some terms which it is plain have no clear and determinate ideas annexed to them. Besides these appropriated terms of parties, which never had any distinct meaning, there are others who use ordinary words of common language, without having in their minds any precise ideas they stand for; it is enough that they have learned the words that are common in the language of their country, which serving well enough to be produced in talk, they dispense with themselves from being solicitous about

any clear notions to be signified by them; and if men who have them often in their mouths should be examined what they mean by *Reason* or *Grace*, &c. they would often be found to have in their minds no distinct ideas which these and the like words were the signs of. 2nd. Another abuse is inconstancy, or putting the same word as the sign sometimes of one idea, sometimes of another, in the same discourse. There is nothing more ordinary in all controversies, where one can seldom miss to find the same sound often put for different significations, and that not only in the incidental parts of the discourse, but in those terms which are the most material in the debate, and on which the question turns. 3rd. To this may be added an affected obscurity, either in the use of old words, or the coining of new ones. To this nothing has so much contributed as the method and learning of the schools, where all has been adapted to and measured by dispute. This way of proceeding unavoidably runs all into multiplication and perplexity of terms. This perverse abuse of language, having under the esteemed name of subtility gained the reputation and rewards of true knowledge, how much it has hindered real improvements the world is now satisfied. 4th. The next abuse of

language is the taking words for things: this most concerns the names of substances, for men having feigned to themselves peculiar and groundless ideas, proportionably as they have thought fit to contrive or espouse some certain system of natural philosophy, have suited names to them, which, growing into familiar use, came afterwards among their followers to carry with them the opinion of reality, as if they were the necessary and unavoidable marks of things themselves. Thus, substantial forms and intentional species, and abundance of such other terms, have by their common and unquestioned use carried men into the persuasion that there were such things, it being hard for them to believe that their fathers and masters, learned men and divines, should make use of names that stood for fancies only, that never had any real being in the world. The supposing words to stand for the real essences of substances is an abuse which I have already mentioned. 5th. Another more general, though less observed abuse of words is, to suppose their signification so clear and settled that a man cannot be mistaken what ideas they stand for; and hence men think it strange to ask or be asked the meaning of their words, when yet it is plain that many times the certain significa-

tion of a man's words cannot be any otherwise known but by his telling what precise idea he makes any word the sign of. 6th. Figurative speeches and all the artificial ornaments of rhetoric are truly an abuse of language also; but this, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against, and it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find a pleasure to be deceived.

Chap. 9. That which has nourished disputes and spread errors in the world being chiefly the imperfection or abuse of words before mentioned, it would be of no small advantage to truth and quiet, if men would apply themselves seriously to a more careful and candid use of language, wherein I shall offer some easy and obvious cautions to those who have a mind to be ingenuous; for I am not so vain as to think of reforming so prevailing an abuse, wherein so many men imagine they find their account. Though I think nobody will deny, 1st. That every one should take care to use no word without a signification,—no vocal sign without some idea he had in his mind, and would express by it. 2nd. That the idea he uses a sign for, should be clear and distinct; all the simple ideas it is made up of, if it be complex, should

be settled. This, as it is necessary in all our names of complex ideas, so is most carefully to be observed in moral names, which being compounded and decompounded of several simple ones, our ideas are not right as they should be, and consequently our words are full of uncertainty and obscurity, and neither others nor we ourselves know what we mean by them till we have so settled in our minds the complex idea we would have each word stand for, that we can readily enumerate all the particulars that make it up, and resolve it into all its component simple ones. 3rd. These ideas must be accommodated as near as we can to the common signification of the word in its ordinary use. It is this propriety of speech which gives the stamp under which words are current, and it is not for every private man to alter their value at pleasure.

But because common use has left many if not most words very loose in their signification, and because a man is often under a necessity of using a known word in some with a peculiar sense, therefore it is often his duty to show the meaning of this or that term, especially where it concerns the main subject of discourse or question. This showing the meaning of our terms, to do it well, must be suited to the several sorts of ideas they stand for. The best, and

in many cases the only, way to make known the meaning of the name of a simple idea is by producing it by the senses. The only way of making known the meaning of the names of mixed modes, at least moral words, is by definition; and the best way of making known the meaning of the names of most bodies is both by showing and by definition together; manyof their distinguishing qualities being not so easily made known by words, and many of them not without much pains and preparation discoverable by our senses.

Chap. 10. What words signify, and how much we are to beware that they impose not on us, I have shown, it being necessary to be premised to our consideration of knowledge, the business of the next book; only, before I conclude this, I take notice of one ordinary distinction of words, because I think it gives us some light into our ideas; viz. Abstract and concrete terms, concerning which we may observe, 1st. That no two abstract ideas ever affirmed one of another. 2nd. That simple ideas and modes have all of them abstract as well as concrete names; but substances only concrete, except some few abstract names of substances in vain affected by the schools, which could never get into common use of *cor-*

porietas and *animalitas*, &c. The first of these seems to me to show us that two distinct ideas are two distinct essences that cannot be affirmed one of another. The latter carries with it a plain confession that men have no ideas of the real essences of the sorts of substances, since they have put into their languages no names for them.

LIB. IV.

The two foregoing books were of ideas and words, this is of knowledge.

Chap. 1. The first chapter shows that knowledge is nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas.

This agreement or disagreement, for the clearer explaining of this matter, is reduced to these four sorts:

1. Identity,
2. Co-existence,
3. Real Existence,
4. Relation.

1st. It is the first and fundamental act of our understanding to perceive the ideas it has, to know each what it is, and perceive wherein it differs from any others; without this, the mind could neither have variety of thoughts nor discourse, judge or reason about them. By this faculty, the mind perceives what idea it has when it sees a violet and knows blue is not yellow.

2nd. Our ideas of substances, as I have showed, consist in certain collections of single ideas which the specific name stands for; and our inquiry, for the most part, concerning substances, is what other qualities they have; which is no more but this, what other ideas co-exist and are to be found united with those of our complex ideas. Thus, whether gold be fixed, is to inquire whether the power of abiding in the fire without wasting be an idea which co-exists in the same subject with those ideas of yellowness, weight, malleability and fusibility, whereof my idea of gold is made up.

The 3rd sort of agreement is, whether a real existence out of my mind agrees to any idea I have there.

4th. The last sort of agreement or disagreement of any ideas, is in any other sort of relation between them. Thus, *sweetness is not bitterness,* is of identity. *Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions,* is of co-existence. *God is,* is of existence. *Two triangles upon equal basis between two parallels are equal,* is of relation.

Chap. 2. According to the different way of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, so is the evidence of our knowledge different. Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of

two ideas immediately; thus it perceives that red is not yellow, that a circle is not a triangle, that three is more than two, and equal to one and two; and this we may call *intuitive knowledge.* When the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas cannot be immediately perceived, but the mind makes use of the intervention of other ideas to show it, then (as the word imports) it is *demonstration.*

Thus the mind not being able to bring the three angles of a triangle and two right ones so together as to be able immediately to perceive their equality, it makes use of some other angles to measure them by.

To produce knowledge this way, there must be an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the deduction, for without that there can be no demonstration, the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under consideration is not shown; for where any agreement or disagreement of any two ideas is not self-evident, *i.e.* cannot be immediately perceived, there it will always need a proof to show it. This sort, which may be called *rational or demonstrative knowledge,* however certain, is not so clear and evident as *intuitive,* because here the memory must intervene to retain the connection of all

the parts of the demonstration one with another, and be sure that none is omitted in the account, which in long deductions requires great attention to avoid mistake. Why demonstration is generally thought to belong only to ideas of quantity, I shall not in this short epitome mention.

These two sorts are all the knowledge we have of general truths. Of the existence of some particular finite beings we have knowledge by our senses, which we may call *sensitive knowledge.*

Chap. 3. From what has been said, it follows:

1st. That we can have no knowledge where we have no ideas.

2nd. That our intuitive knowledge reaches not so far as our ideas, because the greatest part of them cannot be so immediately compared as to discover the agreement or disagreement we seek.

3rd. Neither can *rational* and *demonstrative knowledge* make out the agreement or disagreement of all those of our ideas wherein we fail of intuitive knowledge, because we cannot always find mediums to connect them intuitively together.

4th. Sensitive knowledge reaching no further than the actual presence of particular things to

our senses, is much narrower than either of the former.

That which I would infer from this is, that our knowledge is not only infinitely short of the whole extent of beings, if we compare this little spot of earth we are confined to, to that part of the universe which we have some knowledge of, which probably is, all of it, but a point in respect to what is utterly beyond our discovery, and consider the vegetables, animals, rational corporeal creatures, (not to mention the ranks and orders of spirits,) and other things with different qualities suited to senses different from ours, whereof we have no notion at all, which may be in them, we shall have reason to conclude that the things whereof we have ideas, are very few in respect of those whereof we have none at all.

In the next place, if we consider how few, how imperfect, and how superficial, those ideas are which we have of the things that lie nearest our examination, and are best known to us; and lastly, if we consider how few they are of those few ideas we have, whose agreement or disagreement we are able to discover, we shall have reason to conclude that our understandings were not proportioned to the whole extent of being, nor men made capable of knowing all

things, but that it fails us in the greatest part of the inquiry concerning those ideas we have.

1st. As to identity and diversity, it is true our intuitive knowledge is as large as our ideas themselves; but, 2nd, on the other side, *we have scarce any general knowledge at all of the co-existence of any ideas*, because not being able to discover the causes whereon the secondary qualities of substances depend, nor any connexion between such causes and our ideas, there are very few cases wherein we can know the co-existence of any other idea with that complex one we have of any sort of substances, whereby our knowledge of substances comes to be almost none at all. 3rd. As to other relations of our ideas, how far our knowledge may reach is yet uncertain; this I think, morality, if rightly studied, is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics. 4th. As to existence, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own, a demonstrative one of a God, and a sensible one of some few other things.

I shall not here, in this short compendium I am giving of my thoughts, mention those particulars which I have set down to show up the narrowness of our knowledge; that which I have here said may, I suppose, suffice to convince

men, that what we know bears no proportion to that which we are invincibly ignorant of.

Besides the extent of our knowledge in respect of the sorts of things, we may consider another kind of its extent, which is in respect of its universality. When the ideas are abstract, our knowledge about them is general: abstract ideas are the essences of species, howsoever named, and are the foundations of universal and eternal verities.

Chap. 4. It will perhaps be said, that knowledge placed thus in the consideration of our ideas may be chimerical, and leave us ignorant of things as they really are in themselves, since we see men may often have very extravagant ideas; to which I answer, that our knowledge is real so far as our ideas are conformable to things, and no farther. To be able to know what ideas are conformable to the realities of things, we must consider the different sorts of ideas I have above mentioned.

1st. Simple ideas we cannot but know to be conformable to things, because the mind not being able to make any simple ideas to itself, those it has must needs be conformable to that power which is in things to produce them, which conformity is sufficient for real knowledge.

2nd. All our complex ideas, but those of

substances, are conformable to the reality of things; and this we may certainly know, because they being archetypes made by the mind, and not designed to be copies of any thing existing, things are intended in our discourses and reasonings about these ideas no farther than as they are conformable to these ideas.

3rd. Our complex ideas of substances being designed to be copies of archetypes existing without us, we can be no farther sure that our knowledge concerning any of them is real, than the real existence of things has made it evident that such a collection of simple ideas, as our complex one is made up of, can co-exist together; the reason whereof is, because not knowing the real constitution on which these qualities depend, we cannot but by experience know which of them are, and which are not, capable to exist together in the same subject; and if we put other than such that are capable to exist together into any complex idea, our knowledge concerning such an idea of a substance will be only concerning a chimera of our own, and not of any real being.

Chap. 5. According to this account of knowledge, we may come to discover what *truth* is, which appears to be nothing else but the joining or separating of signs according as things

themselves agree or disagree. The joining and separating I here mean is, such as is made by affirmation and negation, and is called *proposition*. Now the signs we use being of two sorts, viz. ideas and words; propositions also are of two sorts, viz. *mental* or *verbal;* truth also is twofold, either *real* or *barely verbal.* Real truth in any proposition is when the terms are affirmed or denied as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree, and as the ideas also themselves agree to their archetypes. Verbal truth is when the affirmation or negation is made according to the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, but the ideas themselves have no conformity with their archetypes.

Chap. 6. Truth being for the most part conveyed to our understandings, or considered by us in propositions, it will be of moment to examine what propositions are capable to convey to our understandings the certain knowledge of general truths.

1st. Then I say, that in all general propositions, where the terms are supposed to stand for species constituted and determined by real essences distinct from the nominal, we are not capable of any certain knowledge, because not knowing that real essence, we cannot know what particular things have it, and so can never know

what particular things are of that species. This frequently happens in propositions concerning substances in other things, not because in the species of other things there is no supposed real essence different from the nominal.

2nd. In all general propositions where the terms are substituted only in the place of the nominal essence or abstract idea, and so the species determined by that alone, there we are capable of certainty as far as the agreement or disagreement of such abstract ideas can be perceived; but this also reaches but a very little way in substances, because the necessary coexistence or inconsistency of any other ideas with any of those that make up one complex one of any sort of substances, is in very few cases discoverable.

Chap. 7. There are a sort of propositions which, passing under the title of maxims, are by some men received as innates, and by most esteemed as the foundations of knowledge; but if what we have said concerning self-evident or intuitive knowledge be well considered, we shall find that these dignified axioms are neither innate nor have any other self-evidence than a thousand other propositions, some whereof are known before them, and others altogether as clearly, and therefore they are neither innate,

nor be the foundations of all our knowledge or reasonings as they are thought to be.

Whatsoever is, is, and it is impossible for the same to be and not to be, it is granted are self-evident propositions; but he that considers the nature of the understanding and the ideas in it, and that it is unavoidable for the understanding to know its own ideas, and to know those to be distinct that are so, must needs observe, that these supposed fundamental principles of knowledge and reasoning are no more self-evident than that one is one, and red red, and that it is impossible one should be two, or red blue: of these and the like propositions, we have as certain a knowledge as of those other called maxims, and a much earlier; and can any body imagine that a child knows not that wormwood is not sugar, but by virtue of this axiom? That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. Intuitive knowledge extends itself to all our ideas in respect of identical agreement or disagreement, therefore all propositions made concerning this sort of agreement or disagreement, whether in more or less general terms, so the ideas they stand for be but known, are all equally self-evident. As to the agreement or disagreement of co-existence, we have very little intuitive knowledge, and therefore,

concerning that there are very few self-evident propositions and little talk of axioms. In the third sort of agreement, viz. relation, the mathematicians have dignified several general propositions concerning equality with the title of axioms, though these have no other sort of certainty than all other self-evident propositions; and though, when they are once made familiar to the mind, they are often made use of to show the absurdity of wrong reasoning and erroneous opinions in particular instances; yet the way wherein the mind attains knowledge, is not by beginning and setting out from these general propositions, but in the quite contrary method; it begins its knowledge in particulars, and thence gradually enlarges it to more general ideas.

Chap. 8. Besides these there are other propositions, which are many of them certain, but convey no real truth to our knowledge, being barely about the signification of words.

1st. Where any part of any complex idea is predicated of the name of that complex idea, such a proposition is only about the signification of the terms, and such are all propositions wherein more comprehensive terms are predicated of less comprehensive, as genera of species or individuals.

2nd. Wherever two abstract terms are pre-

dicated one of another, there the proposition carries no real knowledge in it, but is barely about the import of names. Were such trifling propositions as these shut out of discourses, the way to knowledge would be less perplexed with disputes than it is.

Chap. 9. Universal propositions, that have certain truth or falsehood in them, concern essences only. The knowledge of existence goes no farther than particulars of our own existences; it is plain we have such an intuitive knowledge, that nothing can be more evident.

Chap. 10. Of the existence of God there is demonstration, for which we need go no farther than ourselves for a proof, though God has given * * * * *.

Chap. 11. The existence of all other things can be known only by the testimony of our senses; our knowledge reaches in this as far as our senses and no farther. For the existence of any other being having no necessary connexion with any of the ideas I have in my memory, I cannot from them infer the necessary existence of any particular being, and can receive the knowledge of it only by the actual perception of my senses.

Chap. 12. For the improvement of our knowledge, we must suit our methods to our

ideas: in substances, where our ideas are but imperfect copies, we are capable of very little general knowledge, because few of our abstract ideas have a discoverable agreement or disagreement of co-existence, and therefore in substances we must enlarge our knowledge by experiment and observation in particulars; but in modes and relations, where our ideas are archetypes, and real as well as nominal essences of species, there we attain general knowledge only by views of our own abstract ideas; and in them our inquiries not being concerning the agreement or disagreement of co-existence, but of other relations more discoverable than that of co-existence, we are capable of greater advances in knowledge: and that which is proposed for the improvement of it, is to settle in our minds clear and steady ideas, with their names or signs, and then to contemplate and pursue their connexions, and agreements, and dependencies: whether any method may be found out as useful in other modes as Algebra is in the ideas of quantity, for the discovery of their habitudes and relations, cannot, beforehand, be determined, and therefore not to be despaired of. In the mean time, I doubt not but that Ethics might be improved to a much greater degree of certainty, if men, affixing

moral names to clear and settled ideas, could with freedom and indifferency pursue them.

Chap. 13. Knowledge is not born with us, nor does it always force itself upon our understandings; animadversion and application is, in most parts of it, required, and that depends on the will; but when we have thoroughly surveyed, and to our utmost traced our ideas, it depends not then on our wills whether we will be knowing or ignorant.

Chap. 14. The shortness of our knowledge, not reaching to all the concernment we have, is supplied by that which we call judgment, whereby the mind takes ideas to agree or not agree; *i. e.* any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs.

Chap. 15. The ground on which such propositions are received for true, is what we call *probability*, and the entertainment the mind gives such propositions is called *assent*, *belief*, or *opinion*, which is the admitting any proposition to be true without certain knowledge that it is so. The grounds of probability are these two —1st. The conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation, or experience. 2nd. The testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience.

Chap. 16. The variety of these in concurring or counterbalancing circumstances, affording matter for assent in several degrees of assurance or doubting, is too great to be set down in an extract.

Chap. 17. Error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of judgment, giving assent to what is not true; the causes whereof are these—

First. Want of proofs, whether such as may be, or as cannot be had.

Secondly. Want of ability to use them.

Thirdly. Want of will to use them.

Fourthly. Wrong measures of probability, which are these four—

1. Doubtful opinions taken for principles.
2. Received hypotheses.
3. Predominant passions.
4. Authority.

Chap. 18. Reason, that serves us to the discovery of both demonstration and probability, seems to me to have four parts—1st. The finding out of proofs. 2nd. The laying them in their due order for the discovery of truth. 3rd. In the perception of the more or less clear connexion of the ideas in each part of the deduction. 4th, and last of all, The drawing a right

judgment and conclusion from the whole. By which it will appear that syllogism is not the great instrument of reason, it serving but only to the third of these, and that only, too, to show another's wrong arguing; but it helps not reason at all in the search of new knowledge, nor the discovery of yet unknown truths, and the proofs of them, which is the chief use of that faculty, and not victory in dispute, or the silencing of wranglers.

Chap. 19. Faith is by some men so often made use of in opposition to reason, that he who knows not their distinct bounds will be at a loss in his inquiries concerning matters of religion.

Matters of reason are such propositions as may be known by the natural use of our faculties, and are deducible from ideas received from sensation or reflection. Matters of faith, such as are made known by supernatural revelation. The distinct principles and evidence of these two, being rightly considered, show where faith excludes or overrules reason, and where not.

1. Original revelation cannot be assented to contrary to the clear principles of our natural knowledge, because, though God cannot lie,

yet it is impossible that any one, to whom a revelation is made, should know it to be from God more certainly than he knows such truths.

2. But original revelation may silence reason in any proposition, whereof reason gives but a probable assurance, because the assurance that it is a revelation from God may be more clear than any probable truth can be.

3. If original revelation cannot, much less can traditional revelation be assented to, contrary to our natural clear and evident knowledge; because, though what God reveals cannot be doubted of, yet he to whom the revelation is not originally made, but has only received it by the delivery or tradition of other men, can never so certainly know that it was a revelation made by God, nor that he understands the words aright in which it is delivered to him. Nay, he cannot know that he ever heard or read that proposition which is supposed revealed to another, so certainly as he knows those truths. Though it be a revelation that the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised, yet it not being revealed anywhere that such a proposition, delivered by a certain man, is a revelation, the believing of such a proposition to be a revelation is not a

matter of faith, but of reason; and so it is if the question be, whether I understand it in the right sense.

According to these principles, I conclude all with a division of the sciences into three sorts — 1st. Φυσικὴ, or the knowledge of things, whether bodies or spirits, or of any of their affections in their true natures; the end of this is bare speculation. 2d. Πρακτικὴ, or the rules of operation about things in our power, and principally those which concern our conduct; the end of this is action. 3d. Σημιωτικὴ, or the knowledge of signs, *i. e.* ideas and words, as subservient to the other two, which, if well considered, would perhaps produce another kind of logic and critique than has yet been thought on.

At the end of Le Clerc's* translation of the above Abstract, in *Bibliothèque Universelle*, is the following notification, published evidently under Locke's immediate direction, and affording one amongst the many proofs of his sincerity in the search for truth.

" C'est là, l'extrait d'un ouvrage Anglois que l'auteur a bien voulu publier, pour satisfaire quelqu'uns de ses amis particuliers, et pour leur donner un abrégé de ses sentimens. Si quelqu'un de ceux qui prendront la peine de les examiner, croit y remarquer quelque endroit, où l'auteur se soit trompé, ou quelque chose d'obscur, et de défectueux dans ce système, il n'a qu'à envoyer ses doutes, ou ses objections, à Amsterdam, aux Marchands Libraires, chez qui s'imprime la Bibliothèque Universelle. Encore que l'auteur n'ait pas une grande envie de voir son ouvrage imprimé, et qu'il croie qu'on

* Stated to be translated by Le Clerc, on his own authority, as I find in Mr. Locke's copy of that work these words. in Le Clerc's handwriting :

" Tout ce qui est depuis le commencement jusqu'à là, p. 261, est de moi." Vol. viii.

doive avoir plus de respect pour le public que de lui offrir d'abord ce que l'on croit être veritable, avant que de savoir si les autres l'agréront, ou le jugeront utile ; neanmoins il n'est pas si réservé, qu'on ne puisse esperer qu'il se disposera à donner au public son traité entier, lorsque la manière dont cet abrégé aura été reçu, lui donnera occasion de croire qu'il ne publiera pas mal à propos son ouvrage. Le lecteur pourra remarquer dans cet version quelques termes, dont on s'est servi dans un nouveau sens, ou qui n'avoient peut-être jamais paru dans aucun livre François. Mais il auroit été trop long de les exprimer par des periphrases ; on a crut qu'en matière de philosophie il étoit bien permis de prendre en nôtre langue la même liberté que l'on prend en cet occasion dans toutes les autres, c'est de former des mots analogiques quand l'usage commun ne fournit pas ceux dont on a besoin. L'auteur l'a fait en son Anglois, et on le peut faire en cette langue, sans qu'il soit necessaire d'en demander permission au lecteur. Il seroit bien à souhaiter qu'on en pût autant faire en François, et que nous pussions égaler dans l'abondance des termes une langue, que la nôtre surpasse dans l'exactitude de l'expression."

APPENDIX.

THOMAS BURNETT TO MR. LOCKE.

" WORTHY SIR, London.

" I WAS sorry I could not see you at my coming back from Tunbridge in September last, having called twice at your lodgings. I was necessitated to go to the country immediately thereafter, and made a ramble from the Bath through the West of England to Salisbury, and at last to Oxford, where the good society and most kind treatment from all I made acquaintance with, did charm me for more than three months, and made me at last leave that place with regret. I have lately received a letter from your worthy admirer Monsieur Leibnitz. He hath been kept back from making his returns to his correspondents this

long time, having more to do in the public affairs of that country, as I understand from the new title I find given him, of Conseiller intime de S. A. E. de Brunswick. In this letter he gives a new proof of the esteem he hath of your writings, having writ seven or eight pages of his observations concerning your dispute with the Bishop of Worcester, and seeming to hold the balance betwixt your learned antagonist and you with all the fairness of an honest man, and the judgment of a philosopher; though the weight of what is thrown into the scales seems to make him incline sometimes to one side, sometimes to another. It appears he hath not yet seen the last letter of the Bishop's, nor your two last to him, though I have sent him all that was come out, with several books of other authors, by three packets at several times. There is a young gentleman who was here a long time to search for records relating to the House of Brunswick, for whom I did buy all the curious books that have come out these several years, with whom I have also sent all what he could not find himself out of my own library. He will open his pack at Hanover, and both the Electrix and Monsieur Leibnitz will see what books are for their service. In speaking to the certainty and clearness of ideas, he pleases himself with the difference

he makes betwixt the two terms of clear and distinct. That he calls clear, which can be differenced in our notion by a certain characteristic from all things besides itself. This knowledge he calls distinct, when we know a thing in its whole essence or nature with all its conditions and requisites, or when we can give its definition. So that the knowledge of substance, in so far as we know its certain differences and accidents, may be called clear, but cannot be termed distinct. But if I may add my own thoughts, this distinct notion is not applicable to any thing else we know, any more than it is to our ideas of substance; since no human knowledge reaches a complete understanding of the nature of the most minute subject, reasoning so as to exhaust its whole nature, essence, and all that is to be known about it, no more than the understanding of the nature of the least grain of the dust we trample upon: this knowledge by comprehensive ideas is too wonderful for us, and can only belong to that infinite Being who is perfect in knowledge. Monsieur Leibnitz desires the names of all your works, that he may have all sent him. Now you are best able to inform him of that particular. I thought fit to acquaint you (Sir) with this letter, and of two long articles in it relating to the metaphysical

subject of ideas, and your discourses of the coin also. I was transcribing all that belongs to these two parts, and sending them to you; but I imagine you will be no less pleased to see the whole contexture of the letter itself, where there is an account of many other particulars that may be interesting. I need not send you the news of the town; I only take the liberty to acquaint you of some particulars concerning Dr. Bentley's book, which is at last come out. He read to me a great part of the preface long before it was published, and I then thought his narration of the matter of fact (if he be to be believed *in verbo sacredotis*) did justify very much his behaviour to Mr. Boyle at the beginning. And as to the controversy itself, if he like, many good judges think he is able to defend himself against the reason, if not against the authority of his contrary party. He told me then the Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield was so far of his opinion, that he would publish something of his own at the same time upon the same subject, which he had kept by him many years; wherein though there were some small things wherein they dissented, the Bishop said it was so much the better, since thereby was taken away all suspicion of combination; and that the Bishop himself would send the Doctor's book to Mons. Spanheim; so that Grevius, Mons.

Spanheim, and that Bishop, a learned triumvirate, seemed to be engaged on the Doctor's side. But I doubt not that a greater number will be of another sentiment, who would not be thought to be of the unlearned tribe; and I heard yesterday morning from Mr. Gasterell that the Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield hath thought fit to suppress his own dissertation; and that there would come forth an apology for the bookseller by himself within a day or two. The Doctor told me likewise, the Bishop thought Mr. Dodwell's opinion was wholly overturned upon this occasion, who founded his hypothesis upon the authenticness and the supposed antiquity of the Epistles of Phalaris. There is also come out, Master Gasterell's book, in 8vo. of the Certainty of the Christian religion, as the second part of his Discourses intended upon Mr. Boyle's Lecture; and I doubt not but will argue as much of the reason and judgment of the author as his Sermons on that occasion. I have read over Doctor Bentley's long preface, and a great part of the book, and have just now finished the new piece that is come out against him, exposing his plagiary, ingratitude, and inhumanity, particularly to Mr. Stanley, in the edition (as the Doctor calls it himself) of his Callimachus. The bookseller's Vindication, and

Letter of Dr. King's, and the Judgment of Sir Wm. Temple, &c. are annexed to the end. I do profess, upon second thoughts, (which sometimes are best,) I think, considering Doctor Bentley's magisterial and supercilious way of treating his adversaries, his hard words, and opprobrious language to Mr. Bennet; and, on the other hand, Mr. Bennet's manner of justifying himself, and representing the matter in a sober and far less passionate, but more natural, narration of every thing, so that his story seemeth the more likely, if not the most true, of the two; and though the Doctor may have both truth and learning on his side, he hath no ways shown the spirit of meekness in reproving, but rather hath made not only his own character but that of his order cheap and * * * * by writing so much and in such a manner to take off little reflections upon his civility and breeding, which he had easier wiped off by slighting and forgetting than answering. I have presumed to communicate to you these accounts, since I have them from immediate hands. I have sent you Mr. Leibnitz's letter, consisting of pieces. I shall be glad to receive your orders, if you have any thing to charge me with, when you send back the papers, at which time I am to write again to Mr. Leibnitz. I did write to him from Oxford, at the

same time Dr. Wallis received a line from him, which was six weeks ago; and now lately I did write with that gentleman, who is gone to Hanover, but he will expect I should write to him again, since the receipt of this I now send you, wherein (you see) he desires to know what things are unclear in what he did formerly write in the first paper of reflections I sent you. I have not been so well as to write to you sooner, since I had this last letter. To hear of your own health will be the best news to Mr. Leibnitz, and to, Sir, your most ready and most obliged,

And humble servant,

T. BURNETT."

"Pall-Mall Street, in London,
17th March, 1699."

"Sir, I thought once of sending this packet with Mr. Cunningham, who told me at my chambers some days ago he was to go out to you; but now, after waiting longer than his set time, I was resolved to delay no longer. I wish you would indulge him before he leaves you to piece together his proofs of the Christian Religion, that the world may enjoy that light he hath so long promised. You may send back the papers to Mr. C., and I shall send for them; or direct them for me at the Two Pigeons, on the east end of the Pall Mall."

The following letter from Mr. Thomas to Locke was the occasion which led to the acquaintance with Lord Shaftesbury.

"MY DEAR FRIEND,

"THIS town is very barren of news, and therefore you must not expect much. The most considerable is, that the Commissions are granted for raising sixteen troops of horse; amongst others to Lord Fairfax, Col. Inglesby, Sir W. Waller, &c. &c. The fleet will set sail the beginning of the next week, if the London be ready, but not without her, as I am now informed by a gentleman of Prince Rupert's, who came yesterday from the fleet, consisting, as he says, of eighty-nine sail, which are ready, and eighteen, or as some say twenty-five, fire-ships, which will be made thirty. After all the great noise of a press, I am informed that not above 2200 were sent from hence to the fleet. The Gazette will inform you of more, which is, the story of Capt. Reeves is true, and the King much troubled at it, and has given orders that the Captain, who was to be exchanged for him, be laid in irons.

"I must request one favour of you, which is to send me word by the next opportunity whether you can procure twelve bottles of water for my

Lord Ashley, to drink in Oxford Sunday and Monday mornings: if you can possibly do it, you will very much oblige him and me. I have this day spoke with C. Grant, and will give you an account of vipers by my next. I am to-morrow resolved to go for the fleet; however, let me receive a letter by the next opportunity.

Your affectionate friend and servant,

DAVID THOMAS."

"Half-Moon Street, Bread Street.
9 July, 1666."

The first of the following letters from Limborch to Locke relates to the Letter for Toleration, published anonymously at Tergou in Holland, with Locke's answer, reproaching his friend for having divulged to others the name of the author of that celebrated publication. The other ten letters from Limborch have been selected and printed, because Locke's answers to them have long since been printed in the best editions of his works; and therefore it is presumed that their publication will not be unacceptable, as it will so far make that correspondence complete.

" AMPLISSIME VIR,

" POSTQUAM tuis postremis respondi, D. Consuli Hadde communicavi quæ de Sladó nostro scripsisti, quæ gratissima ipsi erant, omnemque simplici quam exhibes narratione sinistram suspicionem nullo negotio dilui posse videt. De Epitaphio virum illustrem interpellare ausus non fui: res est hic admodum rara, et à nobis negligi solita: omnes quos consului amici dissuadent de re apud nostros exigui admodum momenti compellare Consulem, neque credunt hac in re quicquam suasurum aut dissuasurum hæredibus Sladi. Quare pro more apud nos recepto epitaphio carebit, nisi amici et consanguinei eo propendeant. Verùm id non tam imputandum amicis aliis quàm sorori, mulieri fatuæ, quæ quoniam Sladus absque testamento mortuus est, ex asse hæres est; liberi itaque ejus jam nihil possunt. Male, hac in parte Sladus, cui sororis indoles notissima erat, liberis illius consuluit. Verùm hoc jam mutari nequit.

Accessit me nuperrimè cognatus Guenellon, dixitque se ex D. d'Aranda intellexisse, amicum quendam meum tractatûs cujusdam valde hic laudati autorem esse, idque fratrem D. d'Aranda ex Anglia scripsisse, quasi rem illic notissimam. Ego mirabar admodum:

ille me urgebat, primò an ego autor essem; negavi. Tum porrò, an nescirem amicum illum meum esse autorem? volui quidem dissimulare: verùm ita ab homine amicissimo prorsus negare non potui. Hactenus autor in patria nostra nulli, nisi mihi uni cognitus fuit: imo nulla, nè levissima quidem de ipso suspicio fuit. Nunc coram homine, et quidem vel indiciis instructo, negare non potui; qui si postea rescivisset merito succensere potuisset, quod hoc de viro etiam ipsi amicissimo, tam pertinaciter dissimulare nedum negare voluerim. Considerans ergo et intimam illius cum autore familiaritatem, coram ipso ac socero ipsius autorem me scire fassus sum: obtestans maximopere, ut eadem fide, quâ alia ipsis ab autore credita, etiam hoc sibi solis concreditum servent, neque ulli divulgent. Ita, quod hactenus uni cognitum fuit, tribus commune factum est. Unitas omnis multiplicationis est expers: sed quamprimùm ab eâ receditur, diversæ fieri possunt multiplicationes. Ego arcanum mihi creditum, quantum possum, servabo; quod à me propalatum non est. Verùm quod nunc inter tres dispersum est, facile inter plures divulgari potest; idque præcavere jam meæ potestatis non est. Verùm si expediat autorem non latere? Nomen illius et plures lectores alliciet et tractatui

autoritatem conciliabit. Duo illi quos memoravi viri, audito autoris nomine, majore cum voluptate ejus lectionem repetere voluerunt. Ego singulis exemplar dedi, quod hactenus ausus non fueram; typographus mihi pauca dederat, quia correctioni præfueram. Idem pluribus futurum presagio; non eum credo, licet ego fidem datam sanctissime servem, nunc celari posse, quod pluribus innotuit; et duobus amicis indicavi, quia eos metaphysicâ meâ circumducere non potui, neque veritatem rogatus negare. Verùm de hisce satis.

Hactenus nullum à D. Decano Petroburgensi accepi responsum: sed nec à D. Allix, cui prolixiorem de Albigensium et Valdensium dogmatibus ac ritibus, unde illos duas fuisse diversas sectas constat, scripsi historiam, quam se accepisse ad D. Clericum scripsit: verum verbis ita tectis ut nomen meum exprimere non fuisse ausus videri debeat: commendat quippe D. Clerico, ut scriptori historiæ Albigensium et Valdensium salutem dicat et gratias agat. Nescio quæ tanti timoris causa. An simili metu cohibeatur D. Decanus, cujus mihi amicitiam conciliavit D. Allix, ignoro. Hoc scio Anglorum amicorum neminem ad literas meas declinare responsum. Nuperrime litteras à D. Decano Sarisburiensi accepi, eadem qua antea libertate scriptas.

Quis viros hosce eruditos scrupulus urgeat, ignoro.

Cum hasce huc usque scripsissem, convenit me amicus noster Cyprianus, qui mihi salutem à te dixit, prosperamque tuam valetudinem nuntiavit. Nihil mihi hoc nuntio gratius: cùm de te tuoque statu ex illis qui tibi adfuerunt audio, quodammodo tibi presens videor, suavissimamque tuam conversationem ac familiaritatem in memoriam revoco, nihilque magis mihi displicet, quàm quod Oceano ab invicem dividamur. Si nunc Cliviæ hæreres, ad te excurrerem, ut eruditissimis tuis sermonibus eadem qua solitus sum voluptate fruerer: nunc grata eorum recordatione me oblecto. Interim summo cum gaudio te bene valere intellexi: Deus valetudinem hanc velit esse diuturnam. Furlæum nostrum ex quo ex Anglia rediit, non vidi. Dedit mihi præterita hebdomade D. Remontius literas illius, cui respondi. Opus Sancti Officii adhuc apud me est. Wetstenius adhuc cunctatur, credo ob summam chartæ caritatem. Recepit à te Wetstenius exemplar Actorum Eruditorum anni 1688, quare summa, quam mihi debuisti, detrahendi sunt tres florini nostrates, ita ut solummodo restent f. 35 : 8ϕ de quibus me brevi post Pentecostes festum, quando mihi Roterodamum morandum erit, cum Furlæo transacturum spero. De negotio pacificationis eccle-

siasticæ nihil jam audimus: Videtur tota illa transactio sufflaminata, et penitùs abiisse in fumum. Ecclesiæ facili negocio scinduntur; scissæ verò ægerrime coalescunt. Omnes causam Christi et Ecclesiæ prætendunt: sed nisi propriam agerent, iniquas pacis conditiones non præscriberent aliis, nec æquas sibi oblatas respuerent. Deus pacis orandus, ut omnibus eam inspiret mentem, quam sibi quisque vindicat, et in alio requirit. Vale, vir amplissime. Uxor mea liberique plurimam tibi precantur salutem.

Tui amantissimus,

PHILIPPUS A LIMBORCH."

"Amstelodami, 25 Aprilis, $16\frac{1}{18}$ 90.

"Amplissimo doctissimo Viro
D. Joanni Locke, Londinum."

PHILIPPO A LIMBORCH JOANNES LOCKE.

"London. Ap. 22, (1690.)

"VIR DOCTISSIME,

"LITERAS tuas 25° datas heri accepi, et perculsus sum legendo ea quæ transacta esse inter te et Doctorem Guenolleonem scribis. Miratus sum, ut fatear, tuam in dicendo facilitatem, et quod aliqui hic non nimis benevolè in me curi-

osi id ex te expiscari poterant, quod ego in tuto collocatum speraveram. Rumores enim hic ab iisdem orti, cum sine autore spargerentur, nihil me movebant, mox sponte interituri. Quid de iis scissitanti Guenolloni responderim, ex ultimis ad eum literis scire potest. Sed jam te fatente certum nacti sunt autorem. Hoc solum dicam, si tu hujusmodi arcanum meæ commisisses fidei, ego illud nec cognato nec amico nec cuipiam mortalium quavis conditione evulgassem. Nescis in quas res me conjecisti. Quod solum restat, fac, si posses, ut quod tu solus tacere non poteras, id duo alii jam taceant. Quod tamen minimè spero; non dubito enim quin Dr. Guenollon, (qui non suâ sponte tam intemperanter in alienâ re fuit curiosus, sed Darandæ instructu) ante harum adventum Darandæ dixerit. Id si perspexeris, nihil tentandum frustra laboraveris. Actum est, nec remedio restat locus. Vale.

Tui observantissimus,

J. L."

" VIR AMPLISSIME,

" LITERÆ tuæ 13 Martii scriptæ demum 17 Maii ad me perlatæ sunt, cum parte versionis doctissimi tui de intellectu humano tractatûs. Ubi tam diu hæserint, incertus sum. Furlæus noster,

qui ante paucos (ut audio) dies uxorem suam amisit, has se pridie accepisse scribit. Interim conspectis tuis maxime gavisus sum, quoniam ob diuturnum tuum ac inusitatum silentium mens mihi nescio quid mali præsagiebat. Nunc me omni sollicitudine de te ac tua valetudine tuæ liberarunt. Quid prioribus meis de Verrini literis, quas ipse Verrinus fasciculo chartarum alligavit, acciderit, nescio. Doleo ego versionem non felicius successisse, meâ causâ, qui jam uberrimo fructu, quem ex libri tui lectione sperabam, spoliatus sum. Non autem ut ingenue ac rotunde tecum agam, id plane præter exspectationem meam evenit: quia semper non satis linguæ Anglicanæ peritum credidi, ut tractatum de materiis philosophicis subtiliter disserentem ita Latine posset scribere, ut et sensum autoris, et argumentorum vim ac ἐνεργείαν perspicue representet. Nondum ego interpretem conveni; cupio enim integrum scriptum antequam ipse reddam, perlegere. Sed licet non ederetur, non periit ipsi penitus suus labor. Tractatum enim tuum cum attentione legit, plurima non vulgaria (quæ utinam et ego Latine legere possem) et didicit, et horas suas quæ forte alias ipsi periissent, studio sibi utilissimo impendit. Ambiebat nuptias, quas nuper confirmavit: erant impedimenta quædam, quæ has

ad tempus aliquod differre coegerunt: ille ut tempus istud, amantibus valde tædiosum, honesto labore transigeret, versionem hanc suscepit et perfecit. Interim doleo versionem illam non melius successisse, tum mea, tum et omnium eorum, qui linguam Anglicanam non intelligunt causa. Cum D. Clerico, qui nunc etiam uxoratus est, aliisque amicis consulam, et interpreti consilium dabimus, quod quale sit futurum, facile vides. Speraveram ego volumen Sententiarum Inquisitionis Tholosanæ hoc mense prelo subjiciendum; verùm Wetstenius confatur, Diogenis Laertii editionem nondum esse ad finem perductam: nullius autem novi operis editionem inchoare cupit, nisi hac prius plene ad finem perducta: denuo itaque quatuor aut quinque mensibus editionem differt. Ego meum quem præmittam tractatum, constitui ab initio ad finem relegere, si quid desit supplere, et ita perficere, ut editioni paratus sit, ut quamprimum Wetstenius se paratum dicit, in me ne minima quidem sit mora: quamquam jam per me inchoare posset. Præmitto ego brevem narrationem antiquiorum sæculorum, et sententiæ patrum (ut vocantur) de hereticorum persecutione. Non possum quin edicta imperatorum quædam reprehendam, et maxime doctrinam Augustini, qui omnium apertissime

Donatistarum persecutiones propugnavit: singulorum testimonia, tam qui persecutiones impugnarunt, quàm propugnarunt, adscribam: atque ita transibo ad sæcula quibus Papæ Romani se Ecclesiæ Dominos confirmaverunt, et imperatorum ac regum sceptra subjecerunt. Proxima occasione mittam tibi Indicem capitum, ut pleniorem totius operis ideam conspicias.

Hæc jam præcedente hebdomade scripta erant: verum subito Harlemum evocatus ob funus neptis cujusdam ex fratre uxoris meæ, hanc non potui nisi jam absolvere et ad te mittere. Ego interim tractatûs tui interpretem conveni, inspexit correctiones tuas. Salutem à te plurimam dixi: non se ausum dixit ea libertate in alieno opere uti: an suæ versionis correctionem tentaturus sit, ignoro: puto tamen eum literas ad te daturum, quas si mittat meis includam: in iis plenius se explicabit: Ego nondum ipsi scriptum reddidi, sed hac hebdomade, postquam perlegero, redditurus sum: tum uberius cum ipso loquar.

Maxime gratum fuit ex tuis cognoscere, Dominam Cudwortham honestam mei memoriam servare. Inter amicos Anglos maxime semper D. Doctorem Cudworthum colui. Spirabant ejus epistolæ eruditionem non vulgarem: unicum doleo quod occupatior rariores ad me de-

derit. Nunc illustri adeo feminæ gratulor, quòd non tam opum paternarum, quam ingenii ac eruditionis paternæ hæres sit, patremque ea parte, quâ proprie homines sumus, referat. Gaudeo illi institutum meum ac scribendi methodum probari: spero ipsum opus, quando prodierit, ipsi placiturum, quando interprete in eò totum illud iniquitatis mysterium revelatum viderit, quod verbis vix exprimi potest, quàm atrox ac detestandum sit. Rogo humillima mei servitia illi offeras, illique dicas, me ardentibus votis precari, ut quicquid honesto lectionis assiduæ exercitio oculorum aciei deperiit, Deus judicii acumine aliisque gratiæ suæ donis compenset, ut sic mente contempletur ea, ad quæ oculorum acies, etiam acutissima penetrare nequit. Ipsam ego colere ac venerari non desinam, ejusque dotes minime vulgares semper suspiciam.

Antequam finiam, memorabile quid, et quod miraculi instar est adjiciam. Novi ego Harlemi puellam, quæ jam octavum annum explevit, et nonum ingressa est: nata est penitus surda, ita ut neve clamorem licet vehementem, neve campanarum sonitum, neve quemcunque alium sonum unquam audiverit. Hoc narro non ex relatu aliorum, sed ipse testis sum ocularius, qui à prima infantia puellam illam sæpius vidi,

et ipsam auditu penitus destitutam deprehendi. Surda cùm esset, nullum sermonem differre potuit, neque ullorum verborum significationem comprehendere; nutibus et gestibus omnia præcipiebat, et exprimebat; et in hisce admodum solertem se ostendit. Nunc tamen paucos intra menses arte et industria loqui didicit. Est hic quidam Sweverius, medicus, juvenis viginti quinque circiter annorum, qui artem excogitavit, surdis motu oris, labiorum, ac linguæ monstrandi, qua ratione voces formare et pronunciare possint. Hic intra spatium quinque mensium, nam decimo quarto die Decembris institutionem puellæ inchoavit, eam plurima non tantum verba, sed et integras sententias eloqui, et apte satis pronuntiare, et, quod mireris, legere docuit. Ipse die Adsensionis experimentum cepi: cum uxore mea in parentum ædibus diverti: hospites mei humanissimi coram me producunt filiam, quam anno elapso plane mutam videram: gratulatur illa mihi et uxori adventum: scribo in charta, verùm literis majusculis, nomen meum et uxoris: illa distincte legit: offertur ipsi schedula, quâ hic in funus homines invitari solent, in qua extabant non tantùm literæ majusculæ, sed et romanæ et cursivæ, uti vocantur: omnes distincte legit, et,

quod miratus sum, singularum totius alphabeti literarum vim distincte novit, et unamquamque literam primo intra labia formabat, mox totam syllabam pronuntiabat, atque ita pergens totam formabat vocem ; peccabat quidem aliquatenus contra accentum : quia enim auditu caret, necesse est ut aliquoties in accentum erret : sed distincte tamen quicquid legebat et loquebatur intelligebamus : quin et numeros per cifras legebat : idque didicerat puella octo annorum intra tam breve temporis spatium : recitabat cōram nobis integram precationem dominicam : verba percipiebat ex motu oris paterni : si quid vero minus perciperet, innuebat patri ut scriberet, et mox legebat. Cùm abirem, et mihi et uxori meæ valedixit, expressis nominibus nostris, quæ ex lectione bis tantum repetita memoriæ ipsius inhæserant. Plurima jam noverat verba, et vocum significationem, et quotidie plura addiscit. Ita videmus et mutos jam loqui in patria nostra, magno parentum, quibus unica hæc est soboles, gaudio. Non potui, quin non adeo mirum tibi indicarem : ad certum quendam patris gestum, quem intelligebat, mihi dixit verbis Belgicis, ego sum surda, verùm ego non sum muta. Omnes non sine admiratione puellam adspiciunt. Et quo-

tidie ex aliis civitatibus plures adveniunt in ædes viri illius ut puellam videant. Tu mecum miraberis, et agnosces benignitatem divinam, quæ ea homines solertia extruxit, ut et surdos verba, quæ audire nequeunt, pronunciare doceant. Verum ego nimia prolixitate jam pecco. Vale, vir amplissime, et mei memor vive. Salutant te amici omnes, Verrinus, Guenellonus, Grevius advocatus Utrajectinus, præcipue vero uxor mea, ac liberi, imprimis ego,

Tui amantissimus,

PHILIPPUS A LIMBORCH."

"Amstelodami, 29 Maji, 16 9/19 91.

"Hodie Archithalassus noster Trompius in hac civitate diem suum obiit, lento morbo consumtus.

"For Mr. John Locke, at Mrs. Smithby's in Dorset Court in Chand^e row, Westminster."

Mr. Locke's answer to this letter, dated June 18, 1691, will be found page 407 of the quarto edition of Locke's Works.

" VIR AMPLISSIME,

" ACCEPTIS tuis literis non mediocriter gavisus sum, quia anxiam de tua valetudine sollicitudinem exemerunt. Statueram confestim iis respondere, sed impedimento admodùm molesto hactenus retentus fui. Cognata quædam mea moriens me liberorum suorum tutorem designavit. Negotium hoc, quod commode declinare non potui, à studiis meis alienum, plures mihi dies abstulit. Jam scribendi opportunitatem nactus, calamum arripio, ut et me omnesque meas valere scias, et per gratiam divinam totam meam familiam hactenus à morbis ac febribus admodùm in patria nostra grassantibus fuisse immunem. Scotus, qui tibi renuntiavit historiam S^ti Officii jam sub prelo esse, erravit. Wetstenius editionem de die in diem differt: Confatur Diogenem Laertium nondum in lucem exiisse: nullius autem operis novi editionem se inchoaturum antequàm illa prodierit. Cùm urgerem, ut semel tandem tot dilationibus finem imponeret, respondit se circa Pascha editionem inchoaturum, et ante anni finem absoluturum firmissime promisit. Interim ego historiam meam relego; et si quid desit, suppleo; hiantia connecto, superflua reseco, ut nihil editionem à meâ parte remorari possit. Doctor ille Theo-

logus, qui de Angelis paradoxa illa docuit, satis fratrum suorum pro puritate zelo experitur. In Synedrio Amstelodamensi liber est condemnatus, aut, ut ipsis Synedrii verbis utar, Synedrium librum illum pronuntiavit abominabilem. Synodus Hollandiæ Borealis non tantùm Synedrii sententiam approbavit; sed etiam Synedrio mandavit, ut ante primum Septembris jam elapsi diem, scandalum illo libro datum, efficaciter repararet: quod si intra constitutum diem non possit, mandatum dedit classi Amstelodamensi scandalum illud efficaciter reparandi; utque majore cum autoritate classis procedat, illi adjunxit quatuor Synodi deputatos. Jam multum sudatum est, ut Doctor hic ad palinodiam cogatur: plures sunt concepti articuli, quibus ut subscribat cupiunt: his non tantùm continetur rejectio sententiæ ipsius, verùm etiam approbatio omnium actorum Synedrii contra ipsum. Ille articulos illos rejecit: primo dati ipsi sunt duo menses ad deliberandum: Magistratus zelum illum ecclesiasticum temperare conatur: sed ipse nôsti, claves regni cœlorum Synedrio creditos, non posse committi magistratui, nec judicium ecclesiasticum ullo modo sæculari esse obnoxium. Interim hoc effectum est, ut alterum duorum mensium ad deliberandum spatium ipsi concessum sit: ne vero sine

ulla censura ecclesiasticâ interea vivat, breve scriptum è suggestu Ecclesiæ est prælectum, quo indicatur, processum cum Doctore ipso nondum esse ad finem perductum, ideoque rogatur Ecclesia ut duobus adhuc mensibus illius eventum expectare velit. Durius erat conceptum decretum, sed magistratu intercedente mitigatum est: à quibusdam etiam, Doctori illi minùs adversis, pronuntiatum est voce adeo submissâ, ut vix audiri potuerit: hæc dilatio ipsi per Amstelodamenses est procurata: Classis enim sententiam pronuntiare voluit. Multi credunt Amstelodamenses jam esse mitiores, quoniam metuunt, ne, si hic exauctoretur, illis denegetur facultas alium in ipsius locum vocandi: ne ergo ministerium ipsorum aliquo onere gravetur, hunc creduntur retinere malle, quàm illius exauctorati vices supplere: de quo tamen certi nihil affirmare possum. Nunc alterum deliberandi spatium elapsum est, et propediem expectatur quid Classis decretura sit: illa ubi sententiam pronunciaverit, quæ tantum interlocutoria est, Synodus Hollandiæ borealis, quæ proximâ æstate conveniet, sententiam decretoriam pronuntiatura est. Interea plures adversus illum calamum stringunt; quidam admodùm imperite et infeliciter: alii felicius paulum: verùm quod mireris, nec ipse in toto suo tractatu, nec ullus

eorum qui ipsum impugnant, hactenus controversiæ statum rite formarunt: ideoque tota hæc disputatio satis est confusa. Prostat libellus Anglicus, titulo, *Doctrina Demonum probata quòd sit magna illa apostasia horum ultimorum temporum:* scripta ab *N. Orchard, Ministro in Nova Anglia:* illius sententiam noster sequitur, variisque pugnat argumentis ex illo libello depromptis: sed et alia plura habet de demonibus. Negari nequit, multa à Doctore hoc valde imprudenter esse asserta, quæ profanis hominibus Scripturæ historias aliquot cavillandi præbent occasionem; quæ tamen salva ipsius sententia abesse potuissent: ipsum etiam absque ulla necessitate quædam obiter dicere, quæ ipsis suspicionem præbent heterodoxias, et quidem ejusmodi in capitibus, quæ si quis vel leviter tangat heretici infame nomen evadere nequit. Verùm de hoc negotio hactenus.

Noster D. de Cene hæret Londini: aliquam in Anglia sibi promotionem sperat. Doleo viri illius vicem. Commendatitias ipsi dedi ad Reverendum Episcopum Bathensem et Wellensem nuper electum, qui amicissime mihi rescripsit. Ostendit se in epistola pacis ecclesiasticæ quàm maxime studiosum. Verrinus noster rus concessit habitatum, valetudine ejus id flagitante: aliquoties sanguinem evomuit: corpus ejus con-

tinuas illas fatigationes non fert: quare ruri degit in otio; aut potius in studiis; sed molesto illo medicinæ praxeos exercitio non fatigatur. Habes jam epistolam prolixiorem, cui malo brevi epistolio respondeas, quàm longam meditando nullam mihi mittas. Salveat plurimum D. Cudwortha, cui indicem librorum et capitum historiæ S^ti. Officii probari gaudeo. Spero integram historiam, quando prodierit, non displicituram. Fortassis jam sedatioribus animis excipientur, quæ in hoc tractatu, qui unice pontificiis oppositus videtur, de persecutionibus ob religionem à me dicentur; quæ, si vel paucula quædam de Reformatis immiscerem, primo statim aspectu à zelotis rejicerentur. Plerumque enim sua vitia in aliis taxari minus gravate ferunt homines: et fortasse quidam meliora docebuntur. Vale, vir amplissime. Salutat te Verrinus, Guenellonus, uxor mea ac liberi: imprimis ego

Tui amantissimus,
PHILIPPUS A LIMBORCH."

8
" Amstelodami, 22 Januar. 16 92.
13
" For Doctor John Locke, at Mr. Smithsby's,
in Dorset Court, in Chanell Row, Westminster."

Locke's answer, dated Feb. 29, 1692, at page 409, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

" VIR AMPLISSIME,

" PRELUM Wetstenianum jam fervet. Historiæ sancti Officii editio ex voto procedit. Jam tertia operis pars excusa est. Duo nimirum prela hoc opere occupantur: alterum historiâ meâ, cujus jam primus liber excussus est; et in secundo jam pervenimus ad caput de cruce signatis; in indice tibi misso facile videbis quousque processerimus: alterum prelum occupat Liber Sententiarum Inquisitionis Tholosanæ; et illius tertia pars jam impressa est. Spero intra tres menses opus integrum proditurum: non eo labore meo defunctus ante finem editionis. Nuperrime mihi liber ad manum venit, unde et nonnulla historiæ meæ magis expoliendæ apta depromsi, et quotidie, etiam inter excudendum, depromo. Quando liber prodierit, istiusmodi augmentis et correctionibus non erit ampliùs locus. Et tamen is sum, qui, dum opus adhuc in manibus meis est, negligere aut contemnere non possum, quæ mihi nova, mihique inaudita suppeditantur. Catalogum autorum, è quibus historia mea concinnata est, illi præmittam, ut unusquisque de fide meâ certus esse possit. Verùm est aliud, in quo operam tuam flagito. Non is sum, qui quæ à me eduntur alteri dedicare gestio: hoc tamen opus, pro conscientiarum libertate, contra

persecutionem ob religionem multo labore deumbratum, dedicare cupiam Archiepiscopo Cantuariensi, viro longè præ omnibus, quos novi, Theologis, uti dignitate, ita etiam meritis eminentissimo, si reverendissimæ illius dignitati meam dedicationem non ingratam fore nôssem. Et scripta et actiones testantur, favere ipsum doctrinæ, quam mihi propugnandum suscepi: quamvis enim historiam solummodo scribam, ipsa illa historia quod intendo luculentius confirmat, quàm si multis ad id probandum uterer argumentis. Utinam tu, qui Rev. illius non es ignotus, captatâ occasione expiscari posses, num dedicationem meam benigne admissura esset. Nescio an mea professio intra Remonstrantes ipsi apud rigidiores zelotas aliquam sit conflatura invidiam aut indignationem. Nolim meâ operâ vel minimam creari molestiam viro quem ex animo colo ac veneror. Tu argumentum et scopum operis mei nôsti: capitum historiæ meæ indicem habes, quem ostendere potes si opportunum duxeris. Nulli rectius opus pro conscientiarum libertate dedicari potest, nisi illi, qui non tantùm libertatis illius est patronus, sed et inter patronos dignitate præ aliis est conspicuus. Si dedicationem non respuat, velim illam ante illius editionem ad te mittere, ut à Rev. suâ videri possit, et si quid incautiùs à me dictum sit, re-

secetur, emendetur, amplietur. Interim titulos quibus compellari decet ut mihi scribas expecto. Hoc quicquid sit tuæ prudentiæ committo, et gratissimum mihi feceris si quamprimùm rescribas, quoniam editio velocissimè procedit, et spatium ad deliberandum non est amplum. Grevium, cui ante quatriduum Trajecti adfui, tuo nomine salutavi: ille pro suâ, quâ me complectitur benevolentiâ, suppeditaturus mihi est, historiam cujusdam ex ordine Francisci, qui adulteratis pontificiis diplomatibus se falsò jactavit Episcopum, et postea Trajecti comprehensus, post degradationem verbalem et actualem ferventi ollæ fuit immissus: postea tamen inde ereptus et capite truncatus. Historiam ipsam habeo ex Raynaldo; sed sententiam, illius pronuntiationem, et executionem, prout extat in archivis capituli S. Salvatoris, cujus ille est canonicus, mihi Grevius est suppeditaturus. Istiusmodi flosculis undique corrasis, historiam meam exornatam dabo. Ipse Grevius plurimam tibi salutem rescribi jussit. Verrinus ruri bene valet: inter homines sibi amicissimos ac familiarissimos qui villas illius villæ vicinas incolunt degit, eorumque quotidianâ consuetudine fruitur. Jam ab aliquot hebdomadibus illum non vidi: recte tamen valere audio. D. Cudworthæ rogo humillima mea officia offeras,

salutemque plurimam à me dicas. Salutat te uxor mea liberique. Vale, vir amplissime, et in amore mei persevera

Tui amantissimus,
PHILIPPUS A LIMBORCH."

"Amstelodamii, 27 Junii, $16\frac{18}{18}$ 92."

Mr. Locke's answer, page 410, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

" AMPLISSIME VIR, AMICE PLURIMUM HONORANDE:

" TANDEM Wetstenius, post diuturnas ac longas cunctationes, exemplaria nautæ, qui hinc in Angliam abit, concredidit. Nudiustertius missa sunt Roterodamum: inde prima occasione nauta solvet, fortasse intra biduum aut triduum; adeo ut jam intra paucos dies, modò ventus faveat, ea habiturus sis. Fasciculus ad te directus est; continet quinque exemplaria; quatuor incompacta, quià Wetstenius rigidas Angliæ leges veritus compacta mittere ausus non est: quod velim saltem apud honoratissimum Comitem Pembrokiensem excuses; indecorum alias foret, ad talem virum incompactum mittere. Exemplar autem reverendissimo Archiepiscopo destinatum compactum est, et capsa inclusum,

eodem tamen fasciculo contentum. Singulis exemplaribus additæ sunt epistolæ, ex quibus cognosces, cui unumquodque exemplar destinatum est. Quintum vero, cui nulla addita est epistola, tibi destinavi. Vides causam, cur et tibi incompactum mittere debuerim. Rogo ut ipse, si sis Londini, aut per amicum si ruri degas, apud bibliopolam Samuelem Smith fasciculum hunc requiras, ut saltem reverendissimo Archiepiscopo suum exhibeatur exemplar, antequam liber venum posset. Nunc candidum tuum ac liberum requiro judicium, et quicquid censurâ dignum judices, pro familiaritate nostra rigide censeas. Attulit mihi nuperrime ex Brabantiâ Wetstenius tractatum de Inquisitione Bifontinâ: ex illo, si ante quinque aut sex menses eum habuissem, aliqua mutuari potuissem: verùm hoc infiniti laboris est; nam et alius posthac quidem mihi ostendetur, qui et alia hoc non contenta, continebit. Ego me hac vice satis defunctum puto. Nunc adhuc sub prelo habeo omnes Episcopii Conciones in unum volumen in folio redactas: additæ sunt septemdecim aut octodecim, hactenus neutiquam editæ. Scribo ego historiam vitæ Episcopii, quæ concionibus præmittetur. Duplici illo labore, Concionum harum, et historiæ Inquisitionis, hac æstate fatigatus sum, nunc aliquam desidero requiem: verùm restat adhuc non contemnenda

pars excudenda, et major longe historiæ vitæ Episcopii pars conficienda: circâ proximum ver laboris illius finem me habiturum spero. Processus contra ministrum qui de Diabolis paradoxam edidit sententiam, hac ratione terminatus est. Synodus Hollandiæ Borealis præscripsit illi formulam palinodiæ, quâ profiteatur se dolere, quòd hoc suo libro recesserit a S. Scripturâ, et formulis Unionis Reformatæ Ecclesiæ; quòd multis Scripturæ locis, et explicationem scandalosam tribuere conatus sit; quòd variis locis nimis irreverenter verbum Dei tractaverit; quòd nimis irreverenter de Servatoris nostri munere prophetico, et doctrina divina scripserit; quòd Ecclesiæ Reformatæ absurdam sententiam de scientiâ, et potentiâ diaboli non tantum præter veritatem affinxerit, sed et exinde valde odiosis consequentiis gravaverit; quòd non tantum indiscrete, sed et contra decretum Ordinum et Synodi nostræ Belgicæ versionis interpretes sæpius contumeliose reprehenderit; et de Reformatis ministris nimis contemtim scripserit, quâ suâ scriptione ministerium ipsorum suspectum et infructuosum reddi possit; et quòd librum suum passim stylo satyrico ac sarcastico scripserit: quæ cùm omnia jam maturiùs expressa ad animum revocet, quòd dolens conspiciat, theses suas, et loquendi formas libro ipso comprehensas, Consistorio Amstelodamensi, Classi, et

Synodo, justas offensionis et toti Ecclesiæ gravis scandali dedisse causas: ac propterea à misericorde Deo, Christiano Synodo, omnibusque, quos libri sui editione contristavit, aut scandalum præbuit, precatur delicti sui veniam: quòd ipsorum de suo libro ac persona judicium approbet, et sincere promittat tanquàm coram facie Dei, quòd inposterum adhæsurus sit immobilibus fundamentis Ecclesiæ Reformatæ, prout illa in omnibus et per omnia in formulis Unionis, videlicet, Catechismo, Confessione, et Canonibus Synodi Dordrachtæ, juxta verbum Dei definita sunt, nec ullum illius dogma in dubium sit revocaturus: et quòd hâc sua subscriptione simul promittat prædictas sententias à se jam retractatas et libro suo contentas, in posterum nec in concionibus, nec catechisationibus, nec scriptis, nec colloquiis, directe nec indirecte docere aut asserere: et quicquid dicturus aut scripturus est, non tantùm visitationi Classis subjicere, sed et contrariâ et saniore doctrinâ, eos quos seduxit, quantùm in se, in rectam viam reducere. Ille hanc palinodiam non tantùm recusavit; sed oblato scripto, contendit causam suam jàm a classe fuisse judicatam ac decisam; ac proinde non posse Synodum denùo sententiam pronunciare. Tandem Synodus, auditis ominum classium suffragiis, hanc in ipsum pronunciavit sententiam: Christiana Synodus

omni mansuetudine et æquitate sua, ut Doctorem Belthasarum Bennetum ad sufficientem retractionem inducat; ipseque Synodum pro judice competente agnoscere, et articulos satisfactionis à Christianâ Synodo conceptos recipere recuset, et in hâc suâ recusatione persistat; auditis Classium sententiis, concordibus suffragiis eundem Doctorem Balthasarum declaravit non posse ut pastorem in Ecclesia Reformata tolerari: ac proinde ipsum à ministerio suo removit, ac hoc suo decreto removet. Ejusque decreti apographum Reverendæ Classi de Consistorio Amstelodamiensi mittetur, ut ipsis actionum erga ipsum norma sit. Habes prolixiùs paulò enarratam hanc sententiam, ut in illâ specimen jurisdictionis Ecclesiasticæ videas. Verùm hæc hactenus. Rogo Reverendam Dominam Cudwortham meis verbis quàm officiosissime salutes. Uxor mea liberique plurimam tibi precantur salutem: imprimis ego

Tui amantissimus,

PHILIPPUS A LIMBORCH."

17

" Amstelodami, 7 Novemb. 16 92

18

" For Mr. John Locke, at Mr. Robert Pawlings,
in Dorset Court, in Chanell Row, Westminster. 8."

Locke's answer, dated Novem. 28, 1692, page 411, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

" VIR AMPLISSIME,

" GRATISSIMAS tuas eodem die quo D. Guenellonus suas, rectè accepi, sed plane laceras, et pluvia madefactas: quæ communis omnium ferunt epistolarum eodem die hîc ex Angliâ allatarum sors fuit. Gratias tibi maximas habeo, pro labore meâ causâ suscepto. Sane non id volui, ut tu amœnissimo, quo rure fueris, contubernio relicto, Londinum te conferres, et negotia mea expedires: sed solummodo, si forte Londini subsisteres, typographum, aliàs fortasse tardiorem, excitares, ne ulla in officinâ suâ exemplaria historiæ meæ venalia habeat, antequàm reverendissimo Archiepiscopo, reliquisque, exemplaria à me ipsis destinata tradidisset: aliàs id negotii amico Londini degenti demandares. Nunc agnosco solitam tuam humanitatem ac sedulitatem, quâ me de novo tibi devinxisti. Gaudeo opus ipsum Archiepiscopo non displicuisse; judicium ipsius benignum admodum facit, ut mihi gratulor quòd patronum historiæ meæ, quæ forte aliorum dentes non evadet, adeo benevolum, tantaque autoritate pollentem, elegerim. Episcopus Salisburiensis benevolum suum erga me affectum declarat. Gratissimum tamen erit, benigna ipsorum judicia, literis expressa, videre: ut contra eos, quibus omnia nostra displicent, si necesse sit, me tueantur. Ab

honoratissimo Comite Pembrokiensi, nullas literas sperare ausus sum: quodcunque tamen scripserit, gratissimum erit. Si viri cordati, præjudiciis non præoccupati, et solam spectantes veritatem, mea non improbent, aliorum judicia non moror. Animo affectibus aut præjudiciis excæcato, ad veritatem aditus minime patet. Gratum omnibus credo fore, Inquisitionem pontificiam genuinis suis coloribus depictam, videre: Multùm vero dubito, an eodem quo pontificiam tyrannidem animo nævos eorum, quos ut patres maxime orthodoxos venerantur, lecturi sint: et tamen si pontificiorum tyrannidem damnamus, illorum recusari minime potest. Vidi quidem multorum me reprehensioni expositum: at veritati sincerè litandum statui: nec tyrannidem illam antichristianam extirpari posse credidi, nisi ipsi radici securis admoveatur. Optas ut hac hyeme vobiscum sim, ut simul habeamus noctes Atticas; et à me sales Atticos expectas. Ego vero nihil tali contubernio prætulerim, ubi Phœbo ac Minervæ Deæ Atticæ assidens oracula Delphicis certiora ex utriusque ore haurirem, et quid in mea historiâ jure reprehendi queat, cognoscerem. Interim quod presenti denegatum est, ab absentibus exspecto. Radios suos Phœbus etiam in longissime dissitos ejaculatur. Errata mea corrigi

unice opto: illa autem acutissimum vestrum judicium minime fugient. Exemplar manuscriptum libri sententiarum ipse tecum loco nitidissimo, ut ab omnibus inspici possit, collocari optem: idque satis in fine præfationis meæ indicavi, si forte aliquos ἐν ὑπεροχῇ constitutos excitare possim. Ex te autem audire velim, quem locum aliis præferendum credas. Episcopii vitam jam ad finem perduxi: quoniam concionibus Belgicis præfigitur, etiam Belgicè conscripta est. Verum poterit illa in Latinum verti sermonem. Wetstenium conveni. Joannes Malela nondum hìc ad ipsum missus est, neque se brevi ulla illius exemplaria nacturum credit, sed citius à te, vel ad ipsum, vel rectà in Galliam ad Toinardum mitti posse. Historiam Gallorum, quæ palinodiæ à me perscriptæ accenseri posset, libenter audiam. Videntur illi locum in historiâ Inquisitionis affectare. Utinam tandem, vel suo malo, sapere discant! In familia tibi amicissima omnia jam pacata sunt. Omnes te salutant peramanter: uti et D. Quina, qui balsamum Capoyvæ tibi, tanquàm astmati sanando aptissimum commendat: ego, ut urbem tibi infestam quantum potes, vites, ac ruri te oblectes docto otio. Clericus literas tuas accepit, mihique quæ de me scripseras quamprimum acceperat indicavit. Vale, vir amplissime, ac cum laudatissima D. Cudworthâ, plu-

rimùm à me, uxore, liberisque salvere. Deus vobis, nobisque omnibus hunc, quem modo inchoamus annum, feliciter transigere benignus concedat."

Tui amantissimus,
PHILIPPUS A LIMBORCH."

14
" Amstelodami, 2 Januar. 16 93
5

" For Mr. John Locke, at Mr. Robert Pawlings,
in Dorset Court, in Chanell Row, Westminster. 8."

Locke's answer, dated Jan. 10, 1693, page 413, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

" AMPLISSIME VIR,

" PERTINAX tuum silentium oppugnare non desinam donec expugnavero. Jam ultra quinque menses elapsi sunt, ex quo Silverius mihi tuas, brevissimas quidem, sed gratissimas, tradidit: promittis mihi prolixiores; sed licet ego mox rescripserim, et postea alteras ad te dederim literas, nihil literarum exinde à te accepi. Tantæ dilationis causam occupationibus tuis, licet gravioribus, imputare nequeo. Rus ex urbe reverso, vel amica hora superfuit, etiam occupatissimo, optanti amico scribendi epistolam. Quid itaque aliud concludam, nisi te adversâ detineri valetudine? Ea cura me plane sollicitum habet: quare si vivas et valeas, hac quæso me sollicitudine libera. D. Clericus mihi

bis urbe à te salutem dixit: verùm et jam à pluribus hebdomadibus ille nullas à te literas habuit, quod non mirabatur: valde autem mirabatur, nullas ad me pervenisse. Aberrâsse tuas literas non credo: non enim quæ ad me ex Angliâ mittuntur aberrâsse solent. Itaque unice de valetudine tua sollicitus sum. 'Res est solliciti plena timoris amor.' Præsertim cum responsum tuum ad duo flagitaverim: de editione Bibliorum Castellionis, quam hic elegantem et plenam meditantur bibliopolæ quidam: et de obitu doctissimi Spenseri, ad quem si vivat mihi necessariò scribendum est: et inofficiosus sim ac cessator, si falsus de morte illius ad nos rumor perlatus est, quòd viro magno hactenus nihil responderim. Expectaveram accuratum ac sincerum tuum de historiâ Inquisitionis, jam proculdubio ad finem a te perlectâ, judicium. Lipsienses in actis suis illius jam mentionem fecerunt: generatim quædam dixere in illius laudem, recensent satis prolixe librum primum, nihil autem (quod miratus fui) carpunt. An tamen placeat ipsis παρρησία mira, ac librum de actionibus quorundam patrum judicium, valde dubito. Mihi satis est quòd reprehendere non audeant. Verùm nec ab illorum judicio pendet causa libertatis; aliorum requirit patrocinium, qui, nullius addicti jurare in verba magistri, absque præjudicio ac

partium studio, omnia æquâ lance ponderant. Quare tuum flagito judicium, quod meritò me flagitare posse credo, utpote qui te hortatore illius historiæ scriptionem aggressus sum. Amici nostri hactenus bene valent. Verrinus rure relicto rursus vitam urbanam amplecti velle videtur. Credo otium viro, hactenus occupatissimo, esse molestum: hinc est, quod in civitate se ad quietem componere nequeat, sed de novo praxim exerceat. Vivit et valet, et post nuptias valetudo ipsi videtur reddita confirmatior. Filia mea jam octiduum febri continuâ, quæ suos habet paroxysmos, laborat: spes tamen blanda nobis affulget, ipsam convaliturum. Aliàs omnes jam bene valemus. Salutant te quàm amicissime omnes mei. Salutem plurimam à me rogo dicas Dnæ Cudworthæ, cui omnia servitia humillime offero. Vale, vir amplissime, ac persevera in amore

Tui amantissimi,

P. A. LIMBORCH."

19
" Amstelodami, 10 Novemb. 16 93.
5

" For Mr. John Locke, at Mr. Robert Pawlings,
in Dorset Court, in Chanell-row, Westminster. 8."

Locke's answer, page 413, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

" VIR AMPLISSIME,

" ULTIMÆ tuæ, quibus te recte valere scribis, non mediocriter me exhilarârunt. Omninò enim sinistra quædam de valetudine tua metuebam. De amicitiâ tuâ certus eram, nec in ea vel minimum suboriri posse frigusculum persuasissimus sum. Verùm cum D. Clericus negaret ad se quicquam de Spenseri obitu scriptum, in ejusque literis te brevi ad me scripturum indicares, jamque plures elabuntur hebdomadæ, nullusque amicorum ne tenuem quidem de te rumorem audiret, quid aliud suspicari potui nisi morbum, ipse ignarus plurimarum quæ te detinerent occupationum? Interim securum te esse volo de literis tuis ad Clericum datis: postremas cum inclusis Comitis Pembrokiensis bene illi esse traditas certò scio; nam ipse statim literas Comitis mihi ostendit. Gratias tibi maximas ago, quòd molestissimum illum laborem, historiam meam Inquisitionis perlegendi, devoraveris. Encomia tua scutum mihi erunt, quo aliorum, si qui exsurgant, criminationes retundam. Mallem tamen ego legere censuras tuas, quas ab erudita et amica manu profecturas scio, et per quas multum proficere possem. Ego quidem defectus aliquot historiæ meæ video: sed quod tollere non potui.

Aliqua quæ inserta cuperem, pauca tamen, post editionem in quibusdam autoribus antea mihi non visis, reperi. Sed illa integritati historiæ nihil obsunt: solummodo circumstantias quasdam exactiùs narrant. Sed aliud est majoris momenti. Tota historia contexta est ex autorum testimoniis: nihil ego ad eam contuli, præter solam methodum. Hæc si placet, est quod mihi gratulor. Potuisset historia esse uberior et concinnior, si uno filo, et eodem stilo conscripta fuisset. Verùm consultiùs duxi ipsa autorum quos consului verba exhibere, licet in majorem historia excresceret molem; quia multa adeo sunt torva et atrocia, ut nisi ipsa doctorum pontificiorum verba adscripta fuissent, fidem vix invenissent. Malui itaque prolixior esse, quàm alicui calumniandi ansam præbere, quam, si meis verbis usus fuissem, fortassis aliqui arripuissent, meque criminandi, quòd quædam minus vera ipsis adscripsissem. Nunc ipsa autorum verba posui, et in margine autores adscripsi, ut unicuique de fide mea constare possit. Interim rem mihi longe gratissimam feceris, si quicquid censurâ judicaveris, mihi perscribas, ut id in exemplari novo emendem. Ego quicquid mihi in autoribus quibusdam à me præteritum occurrit, in eodem exemplari annoto, et

singula suis locis insero, si forte aliquando usui esse possit; et si non aliis, mihi saltem usui est. Penultimas meas per juvenem Hibernum, doctum sane, ingeniique admodùm moderati, ad te misi, quas illum tibi tradidisse nihil dubito, quia maximo te videndi desiderio flagrabat. Nihil tamen post ejus discessum de ipso audivi. Habuit etiam literis à me ad Reverendissimum Archiepiscopum, quibus pro libro mihi misso gratias ago. Judicium tuum de editione nova Bibliorum Castellionis bibliopolæ Stulma indicavi: nunc ipsius est decernere quid è re sua fore crediderit. Vellem ego novam illam editionem videre. Sed nec minus videre cupiam Harmoniam Evangelicam doctissimi Toinardi. Non possùm quin obnixè te orem, ne patiaris tantum thesaurum post obitum tuum negligi, aut interire; sed illum fideli alicui amico commendes, cujus operâ, si non vivo, saltem mortuo autem, lucem adspiciat: autor enim ipse moras sine fine, nectit, et citius elephas pareret, quàm ipse hunc suum fœtum. Filia mea jam multùm convaluit; continua febris deperit; quotidie tamen aliquos sentit paroxysmos, quibus integra sanitatis recuperatio retardatur. Spero et illos brevi cessaturos. Omnes te amici salutant, imprimis uxor mea, liberique. Salu-

tem rogo dicas D. Cudworthæ, cui, uti et tibi, omnia fausta precor.

Tui amantissimus,

P. A LIMBORCH."

"Amstelodami, 4 Decemb. $\frac{16}{14}$ 93.

"For Mr. John Locke, at Mr. Robert Pawling's, in Dorset Court, Chanell Row, Westminster. 8."

Locke's answer, dated 13 Jan. 1694, page 414, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

"VIR AMPLISSIME,

"ULTIMAS tuas 13 Januar. hujus anni scriptas 14 Febr. accepi. Binas aut ternas exinde ad te misi. Nihil hactenus responsi tuli. Statim aliquoties alias addem, ut pertinax tuum expugnarem silentium: verùm, quoniam Theologiæ meæ Christianæ editio altera sub prelo erat, expectandum duxi, donec ea prodiret: quare nec jam scripsissem, quoniam per otium prolixiores, quas tibi destinaveram, jam scribere haud vacat; verùm quoniam Jurisconsultus Grevius has ad me misit, quibus alias D. Professoris Grævii inclusas ait, eas diutius apud me hærere nolui. Intra paucos alias à me expecta

prolixiores, ut sic tædiosâ verbosissimarum literarum lectione nimis diuturni silentii pœnam luas. Intra paucos dies alteram Theologiæ meæ editionem absolutam fore spero. Paucissima quædam emendavi: et pauca addidi: si limatissimum tuum judicium hìc coràm audire licuisset, plura, à te monitus, emendare potuissem. Magnam tamen mutationem in secunda editione extare nolui, ut idem esset liber ubique appareat. Volui jam diu accuratam tibi scribere historiam colloquii mei cum puellâ, quæ de religionis Christianæ veritate dubia ac vacillans ad Judaismum tota inclinabat. Res est per totam nostram patriam vulgatissima. Paucis dicam me in ea deprehendisse tantum ingenii acumen, judicii solertiam, argumentandi dexteritatem, et indefessam variorum librorum tam in Theologia, quàm philosophia, lectionem, ut credi vix possit. Annos nata est viginti duos, sed ea judicii maturitate, ut adultos et in scholis exercitatos longe superet. Cessit illa rationibus meis, et Jesum Christum suum Servatorem ingenue professa est. Jam plura cum ipsâ colloquia instituerant tres ex præcipuis hujus civitatis ministris Ecclesiæ Contraremonstrantium, cujus ipsa membrum est: verùm sine fine; neve mirum, quoniam disputationem in-

choarunt adjunctione dogmatis de SS. Trinitate et quidem locis è Vet. Test. depromptis: quodque magis mirere, Judæis illius credendi necessitatem ex Vet. Test. fuisse impositam urgebant. Illa facile omnia ejusmodi argumenta elusit. Ego ad eam vocatus, longe aliâ methodo sum usus, eâdem nimirùm quâ Don Balthasarum oppugnavi: prius nempe historiæ Novi Testamenti, ac præcipue resurrectionis dominicæ, ac missionis Spiritus S. . . . . adstruxi, iis argumentis, quibus se nihil solidi opponere posse, ac proinde quibus se persuasam ingenue fassa est. Exinde prophetias omnes in Vet. Test. suum in historiâ Novi Testamenti complementum habere probavi: quod, adstructâ prius Evangelii veritate, mihi difficile non fuit. Jam multo quàm antea in religione Christianâ confirmatior, mecum quandoque de . . . . . Verùm finiendum mihi est: aliàs plura et exactiora scribam: nunc de . . . . . plane ignarum nolui. Indignantur mihi, quos maximas mihi gratias . . . . . : quasi in sui ignominiam cedat, puellam, quam ipsi suis ineptis argumentis alieniorem quotidie ab Evangelio reddebant, meis argumentis ac methodo cessisse. Alii tamen inter ipsos meliora de me loquuntur. Verùm finiendum est,

Vale, vir amplissime. Saluta officiosissime meis verbis D. Cudwortham.

Tui amantissimus,
P. A LIMBORCH."

"For Mr. John Locke, at Mr. Robert Pawlings, in Dorset Court in Chanell Row, Westminster."

The omissions in this letter (where the dotted lines occur) are occasioned by damage in the original. Locke's answer, dated Dec. 11, 1694, page 416, quarto edition of Locke's Works.

In the Monthly Repository for 1818, in a note to the correspondence between Locke and Limborch, page 479, it is said that there was a letter of the date of 1694, on an interesting subject, as appears by the following account in Le Clerc's oration for Limborch, a small part of which only has been published, page 418, 8vo edition of Locke.

"In 1694 an accident happened which, in the opinion of all equitable judges, made wonderfully for the honour of Limborch, and of the Remonstrant divinity. I shall relate it the more nakedly, because the person who was principally concerned in it is since dead. She was a young gentlewoman in this city, of

twenty-two years of age, who took a fancy to learn Hebrew of a Jew, and was by this opportunity gradually seduced by him into a resolution of quitting the Christian for the Jewish religion. Her mother, when she came to understand it, employed several divines to dissuade her from that unhappy design, but all in vain, for their arguments had no other influence than to confirm her still more in Judaism; because they went to prove Christianity *à priori*, as philosophers speak, omitting generally the authority of the New Testament; and to the passages which they quoted from the Old, she returned the common answers of the Jews, which she had been taught; nor were they able to make any reply which could give her satisfaction.

"While the young lady, who was otherwise mistress of sense enough, was in the midst of this perplexity, M. Veen, whom I mentioned before, happened to be sent for to visit a sick person, and hearing the mother speak with great concern of the doubts which disturbed her daughter's mind, he mentioned Limborch's dispute with Orobio, which put her upon desiring Limborch might discourse with her daughter, in hope he would be able to remove her scruples and bring her back to the Christian religion, which, she professed, would be the greatest joy

she could receive. Limborch accordingly came to her the second day in Easter week, which was April 12; and, proceeding with her in the same way and method he had used with Orobio, he quickly recovered her to a better judgment. For whereas she insisted he should, in the first place, prove from the Old Testament that God had commanded the Israelites to believe in the Messiah; he informed her, it was proper first to establish the truth of Christianity, and that afterwards he would shew her from the Old Testament that which she desired; as he really did. In the first conference he prevailed so far, that she owned she was not able to answer him; and at several other interviews in the same week he so entirely satisfied her, that she had no doubt remaining. Mr. Limborch sent the sum of their conferences in a letter to our friend and acquaintance Mr. John Locke, from which, if it should ever be published, they who have a curiosity to know Limborch's exquisite method will understand the whole affair more exactly; for the narrow limits of this oration will not suffer me to enlarge upon it. I shall only add, that whatever some may whisper, the mother declared she thought it was the hand of Divine Providence which brought Limborch into her house; and the daughter herself ever after honoured him as a father."

" VIRGINIS nuper Judaizantis, et ad fidem Christianam feliciter retractæ historiam, quam petis, ad minutas usque circumstantias deductam, non possem nisi multis paginis comprehendere: collationi enim ipsi, per quinque dies continuatæ, ultra viginti horas impendi. Sed nec argumenta singula recensere opus est: multa enim paucissimis tantùm verbis indicâsse suffecerit. Quæ te maximè desiderare scio, accurate describam: inde facile dubitationum fontes ipse deteges, et quâ methodo alii cum ipsâ frustra disputaverint intelliges. Hortatu Verini nostri post habitas aliquot à tribus ecclesiæ publicæ concionatoribus irritas collationes, à matre virginis illius, mihi antea nunquam visæ, ad illam vocatus sum. Primo congressu, qui fuit duodevicesimus Aprilis, sed Paschalis secundus dies, dixi, intellexisse me, aliqua ipsi circa veritatem religionis Christianæ dubia esse enata. Fassa est, priusque sibi de lege Mosis probari mandatam fuisse Israeli fidem in Messiam. Respondi ego: Ex lege quidem divinitatem Evangelii probari posse; esse autem alia argumenta quibus illa adstruatur: Dominum Jesum, Johan. cap. v. plura ad probandam doctrinæ suæ veritatem argumenta proferre; videl. testimonium Johannis Baptistæ, miracula sua, et tandem Mosis testimonium. Consentaneum esse ut priùs agamus de miraculis D. Jesu; et historiæ Novi

Testamenti veritas, quæ miraculorum Christi narrationem continet, adstruatur, quâ probatâ accedamus ad examen vaticiniorum de Christo, quæ in Mosi et Prophetis exstant. Mirabatur hoc meum responsum, credebatque me methodo non legitimâ cum ipsâ velle agere. Itaque respondet, Petrum, postquam locutus esset de gloriâ in monte ostensâ, addere, quod habeamus sermonem propheticum quem appellet firmiorem. 2 Epist. i. 19. Regessi ego Petrum utraque conjungere: nos Petrum imitaturos: sed hanc esse legitimam methodum, ut primo inquiramus argumenta quibus divina Christi missio adstruatur: exinde siquid Moses et Prophetæ de ipso prædixerint. Cum illa urgeret, si Israeli olim fides in Messiam venturum mandata sit, oportere ut in lege Mosis id mandatum exstet, quia omnia quæ Israeli mandata sunt lege Mosis continentur: Ego prolixè meum de fide Israelis in Messiam venturum sententiam exposui, perinde uti collatione meâ cum Don Balthasare feci. Illa non sine admiratione hoc meum responsum sibi prorsus inexpectatum audivit: et hac occasione quorundam suorum, qui cum ipsâ consulerant, rigores incusavit, qui omnes, non tantum Gentiles et Judæos sed et discrepantes à se Christianorum cœtus, Orco adjudicent. Ego arreptâ hac occasione prolixiùs

sententiam meam de mutuâ dissentientium Christianorum tollerantiâ exposui: quæ valde placere videbatur. Addidi quid sentirem de Gentilibus cognitione Evangelii nunquam illustratis: tum de Judæis quibus veritatis Evangelicæ lucem affulsisse manifestum est: agnovi tamen discrimen aliquod inter Judæos Apostolorum prædicationem, virtute Spiritùs peractam, et miraculis confirmatam, respuentes; et hodiernos, quibus Evangelium, sæpe ab imperitis et inidoneis predicatur, quibusque multa à Christianis scandala objiciuntur: quæ etiam fusiùs in collatione meâ cum Orobio legi possunt. Tandem, ut sermonem meum ad ipsam converterem, et ex ipsius ore elicerem, hìc æternæ ipsius salutis negotium agi; dixi, esse alios qui postquam jam in Jesum Christum crediderint, rursus ab eo deficiunt; tales non posse Christum rejicere quin simul omnia ipsius beneficia abnegent: sibique nihil cum Christo commune esse aperte profiteantur. Hoc cum legitime sequi agnosceret, dixi: hic est status in quo tu nunc es: tu agnovisti Christum Dominum tuum: non potes ergo ab ipso recedere, nisi abnegatis omnibus ipsius beneficiis: si itaque religio Christiana sit vera, non potes eâ desertâ amplecti Judaismum, nisi amissione Eternæ Salutis. Quod cum legitimè consequi ad-

mitteret, addidi: quoniam nunc agnosceret quantum ipsius intersit scire utrum religio Christiana sit vera, necne, orare me ut quasi chara ipsi esset eterna salus, mecum attentè et in timore Domini expenderet argumenta quibus religionis Christianæ divinitatem essem adstructurus. Illa denuo urgebat initium disputationis esse faciendum ex lege Mosis, vaticiniaque pro Messia ex illâ esse petenda. Hìc diu hæsimus quâ methodo procedendum sit. Ego ut meam methodum probarem, dixi, plerisque prophetiis duplicem inesse sensum, literalem et mysticum: me ultro fateri, literalem olim suum habuisse complementum, verùm in typo: mysticum in Christo esse impletum. Cum autem exinde liqueat, Prophetias olim suum habuisse complementum, licet non secundùm omnem literæ vim et ἐνέργειαν, ipsam facile videri, non potuisse olim mysticum illum sensum distinctè cognoscere, sed illum ex eventu debuisse innotescere: Ita, et nunc sepositâ historiæ Novi Testamenti veritate, non posse me à priore demonstrare quis sensus mysticus sub prophetiis illis lateat, sed necessario præcedere oportere probationem veritatis historiæ Novi Testamenti; quâ adstructâ, me ex eventu probaturum, vaticiniis illis sublatentem inesse sensum mysticum, eumque in Christo secun-

dùm omnem literæ ἐνέργειαν esse impletum. Addebam obiter hac eâdem methodo Apostolos in suis adversus Judæos disputationibus quæ in Actorum libro exstant, esse usos. Cum illa contrariam methodum urgeret, dixi, si evidentibus argumentis constat Jesum Christum à Deo esse missum, an non in ipsum esset credendum, etiamsi nec Moses, nec Prophetæ quidquam de ipso prædixissent. Cum hic aliquatenus hæsitavit, ostendi ut fides alicui habeatur nihil aliud requiri, nisi ut divina ejus missio probetur, etiamsi nulla de ipsius adventu exstent vaticinia. Id probavi exemplo Mosis, cujus adventum nusquam prædictum legimus; non tamen, quoniam missionem suam divinam evidentibus comprobavit miraculis, Judæi in eum gravantur credere. Hìc illa mihi narravit, quid multi suorum concionatorum de hac materiâ futiunt, quæ meæ sententiæ non admodum consentanea videbantur. Rogavi ego, ut non respiceret aliorum hominum, qualescunque sint, dogmata et theses, sed solum verbum Dei, sive libros Veteris et Novi Testamenti: et manum meam sacro, qui aderat, codici imponens, dixi: hoc esse purum verbum Dei: eo continetur confessio mea, extra quam, aliam nullam cui sim adstrictus agnosco: quando tibi probavero, Evangelium perinde esse à

Deo ac legem, nihil ultra à me requirere potes? Sermonemque interruptum repetens, dixi, unicam cur in Mosem credamus esse causam, quòd à Deo sit missus: argumentum autem missionis divinæ unicum esse ipsius miracula. Hìc querebatur, aliquos sibi objecisse, unde his Mosen à Deo esse missum? aliaque plura contra divinam Mosis missionem; addens, sic omnia possint in dubium vocari, et tandem via premeretur ad Atheismum. Hìc ego tam commodam occasionem mihi elabi minime sum passus; et quia ex sermone ipsius deprehenderam, quanto in pretio ipsi esset Moses, prudenter sermonem meum esse temperandum duxi: Respondi ego: si relicto Christo se ad Mosen conferre vellet, non debere ipsam mirari, si Christianus ex ipsa quærat, quibus rationibus de Mosis divina missione persuasa sit? Ego addebam, de Mosis divina missione nullatenus dubitò, neque de Legis Mosaicæ divina autoritate: de eâ verò, etiamsi alia deessent argumenta, satis me persuasum reddit religio Christiana: sed quando tu relicto Christo ad Mosen transis, omnia quæ mihi suppeditat religio Christiana argumenta simul repudias. Possum itaque ut Christianus quærere, quæ tibi pro divinâ Mosis missione argumenta supersint? Non enim, si Christum relinquas, certum est

amplectendum esse Mosen. Quid si enim quæram, cur non amplecteris Mahomedis Alcoranum, cur non ad Gentiles abis?' annon tibi argumenta proferenda sunt, quibus Legis divinitatem adstruas præ Alcorano et Gentilismo? Quid si Gentilis à te petat divinitatem Legis probari, promittens se, eâ probatâ, Judæum futurum, an non officii tui judicares argumentis quibus ille convinci posset eum adstruere? Assensit. Itaque aiebam, ego etiam ut Christianus à te peto, quæ argumenta, si Christum relinquas, tibi restent, quibus Mosis divinitatem probes: egoque in me recipio, me clarè demonstraturum, eadem illa argumenta validiùs pro divina Christi missione, quàm Mosis concludere; ac proinde si illis argumentis de divina Mosis missione te rectè persuasam credas, oportere ut per eadem argumenta Christum à Deo missum agnoscas. Sic tandem eo quo volebam deducta disputatio fuit, quod magno molimine quæsivi, quia sine hac methodo felicem disputationis successum non sperabam. Hìc ego collatione inter argumenta et signa quibus Mosis, et quibus Christi divina missio adstruitur, aliquamdiu hæsimus, in qua quicquid illa pro Mose urgebat, ego certius pro Christo esse argumentum ostendi. Hìc cum diu hæreremus,

ego, ut paucis absolverem, tandem dixi: Hodie est festum Paschalis, quo tota Ecclesia Christiana resurrectionis dominicæ memoriam celebrat. Si solidis argumentis tibi veritatem resurrectionis Jesu de mortuis probavero, annon agnosces ipsum à Deo esse missum? Omnino inquiebat, mortuus enim seipsum excitari nequit. Si ergo revixit, à Deo excitatum esse necesse est. Hìc ego prolixè veritatem resurrectionis dominicæ adstruxi, et ad omnes objectiones et dubia, quæ quandoque objiciebat, respondi. Cum omnia mea argumenta audivisset, respondit, hæc optimè fluere, siquidem historia proût ab Evangelistis conscripta est vera sit. Primò itaque multis historiæ Evangelicæ veritatem adstruxi. Deinde probavi libros sacrorum scriptorum incorruptos ad nos pervenisse, ac tandem majorem multò esse certitudinem traditionis Christianæ, quàm Judaicæ. Cùm prolixi hujus discursûs finem fecissem, respondit: Non possum impræsentiarum argumentis tuis respondere, sed ea attentiùs considerabo. Perrexi ego, Festo Pentecostes celebramus memoriam missionis Spiritûs Sancti in Apostolos: si et illius historiæ veritatem tibi probavero, annon et ea tibi erit alterum argumentum, quo divina Jesu Christi missio evidenter

demonstratur? Concessit. Itaque ego multis probavi, Apostolos certos fuisse, se donum illud Spiritus Sancti accepisse, neque de eo dubitare potuisse: deinde se illud à Domino Jesu in cœlis regnante accepisse: tertiò, ipsos suæ ætatis homines argumentis idoneis de doni hujus à Jesu Christo accepti veritate convicisse: tandem et nos hodie argumentis omni exceptione majoribus de illius veritate esse persuasos. Cum omnia hæc argumenta, quæ tibi satis sunt nota, et à me brevitatis causâ omittuntur, fusiùs deduxissem, iterum respondit: Impræsentiarum nihil argumentis tuis opponere possum, sed ea attentiùs considerabo. Dixi, hoc mihi gratissimum fore; et quando ea ponderaret exactiùs, tanto id mihi fore gratius; sed petebam, ut, quascunque haberet considerationes mihi aperiret, ut et illis respondere possem. Hoc se facturam promisit: addiditque, accusant me pervicaciæ; sed immeritò: non certârunt mecum idoneis argumentis: nunc tu mihi opposuisti argumenta, nunquam mihi antea objecta, quibus me impræsentiarum respondere non posse fateor: attentè ea considerabo: si quid alicujus momenti contra illa reperirem, tibi indicabo: si nihil solidi contra illa reperire queam, me convictam fatebor. Ego commendavi, ut

seriò consideraret statum suum, agi hìc negotium æternæ salutis. Laudavi illius prudentiam, quod non temerè rationibus meis cederet, sed eas accuratè ac maturè meditari cuperet; neque me dubitare, quin quanto exactiùs eas esset consideratura, tanto evidentiùs illarum soliditatem esset agnitura: quibus meditationibus si addat preces ad Deum, felicem hujus collationis successum esse expectandum. Commendavi etiam ut eximium Hugonis Grotii de veritate religionis Christianæ tractatum, quem sibi hactenus visum negabat, et alterum, quem ipse dedi, ex Anglico (cui titulus est, The Gentleman's Religion,) in linguam Belgicam versum, evolveret. Hic fuit primæ meæ collatonis exitus, quam prolixiùs paulò descripsi, quia illis quæ nunc prolata sunt argumentis propriè convicta est. Duravit hæc collatio duabus horis.

" Postridie reversus petii ut considerationes ad argumenta pridie à me allata si quas haberet, mihi aperiret. Illa ingenuè, præsente matre, fassa est, se attentè argumenta mea considerâsse, sed solidi nihil contra ea reperire potuisse: Fateor, inquiebat, te mihi veritatem duorum miraculorum, resurrectionis nimirum Jesu Christi, et missionis Spiritûs Sancti in Apostolos, evidenter demonstrâsse: agnosco Jesum Chris-

tum à Deo esse missum. Ego, gratias me agere Deo, inquiebam, de ingenua hâc confessione: posse nos nunc reliqua collationis nostræ illi confessioni, tanquam fundamento solido superædificare. Itaque ut omnis animo ipsius scrupulus eximatur, nos jam ad prophetarum vaticinia progressuros, meque probaturum, quicquid à prophetis de Messia fuit prædictum, in Domino Jesu Christo suum habere complementum. Verùm antequam novam hanc disquisitionem inchoavimus, repetitio argumentorum prioris diei instituta fuit; et dubiis quibusdam, quæ Judæi contra Evangeliorum scriptores, et traditionem Christianam objicere solent, responsum, multaque prioris diei plenius paulò fuere explicata. Etiam respondi objectioni quod certi non simus, quo tempore singula Evangelia conscripta sint: et quod certiùs Judæi de veritate resurrectionis Dominicæ potuissent convinci, si Dominus Jesus se ipsis redivivum ostendisset. Cum his aliisque ita respondissem ut se meæ responsioni acquiescere fateretur, ad prophetarum vaticinia transivimus. Hìc ego præmonui non esse à me expectandas mathematicas demonstrationes, contra quas homo infidelis nihil quicquam reperire posset: quoniam, non probatâ historiæ Novi Testamenti

veritate, difficile admodum sit è prophetarum vaticiniis ostendere, ita omnia oportuisse evenire, prout in Christo impleta sunt; quia pleraque juxtà sensum literalem olim suum habere complementum: sed quoniam nunc historiæ Novi Testamenti veritatem agnoscebat, me probaturum vaticiniis prophetarum majus quid, præter id quod olim impletum fuit contineri, eorumque complementum secundum omnem literæ ἐνέργειαν esse in Jesu Christo. Respondit illa se demonstrationes mathematicas non requirere, acquieturam verò argumentis quibus nihil solidi opponi posset, quæque veritatis studioso sufficiunt. Hìc illa aperto sacro quem in manibus habebat codice, initium disquirendi facere cupiebat à celebri Genes. iii. 15. loco. Dixi ego: rogo ut mihi permittas mea argumenta ordine quem ipse elegero, proferre. Non sequar ordinem librorum sacri codicis, sed eum ex ipsâ materie desumam. Itaque hoc ordine procedam. Primò ostendam, Deum certum tempus prædefinivisse adventui Messiæ, Dominumque Jesum tempore prædefinito in mundum venisse: deinde prædictum esse locum nativitàtis, genus ipsius, ac tandem de matre Virgine nasciturum. Hæc autem omnia verè in Domino Jesu ita evenisse. Hisce probatis,

evincam munera ipsius, prophetiam, sacerdotium et regnum, ac tandem doctrinæ ipsius per totum terrarum orbem prædicationem, fuisse prædicta, omnesque illas prædictiones in Domino Jesu impletas: singula argumenta mea distinctè proponam, et vaticiniis prophetarum adstruam. Tibi ad singula quæ à me proferentur, liberum erit tuas dicere considerationes: meum erit, omnes tibi eximere scrupulos. Postquam ego argumentandi finem fecero, tu, si quas contra religionem Christianam habes objectiones, eas mihi objicies, neque desines, quamdiu ullum tibi superest dubium: meum enim est tibi per omnia satisfacere. Primo ergo, certum à Deo adventui Messiæ prædefinitum esse tempus, probavi ex celebri loco Genes. xlix. 10. de cujus sensu, et variantibus interpretationibus quando sceptrum Judæ datum, quando à Juda ablatum sit, prolixè actum fuit. Addidi alterum ex Hagg. ii. 7, 8, 9, 10. et de hujus loci sensu multis actum fuit. Hâc occasione quæsivit, quid sentirem de Templo Esechielis. Aperui sententiam meam quam et in collatione meâ cum Orobio expressi, quæ valde ipsi placere videbatur. Tandem addidi locum Dan. xix. 24, 25, 26, 27. cujus sensum cum aperuissem, etiam Judæorum objec-

tiones in contrarium dilui. Et quia hic multus eram in dispersionis præsentis Judæorum causis assignandis, eamque aliam esse non posse ostenderem, nisi Messiæ contemtum, mihi objectum fuit, hanc dispersionem fuisse prædictam, Levit. xxvi. et Deut. xxviii.: ex iisque capitibus liquerè, Judæos in eam propter defectionem à lege Mosis et idolatriam incidisse, et adhuc liberationem ex illâ Judæis esse expectandam. Ego, quia jam hora octava vespertina erat elapsa, paucis respondi, vaticinia hæc captivitatem Babylonicam respicere: quod ipsi primò valde paradoxum erat: paucis meam explicationem confirmabam: sed quoniam jam tempus affluxerat, resque hæc magni erat momenti, unde multorum vaticiniorum explicatio dependet, me id postridie fusè et clarè demonstraturum promisi. Duravit hæc collatio quatuor horis.

"Tertio die sermonis initium feci explicatione cap. Levit. xxvi. et Deut. xxviii. Argumenta mea quibus probavi illis cap. contineri comminationem non captivitatis hujus præsentis, sed Babylonicæ, scripto comprehenderam, excerpta è disputatione mea cum Orobio. Postquam omnia proposuissem, illa se iis planè convictam fassa est. Mox cum attentius ea considerâsset, ait: Hæc est genuina Scripturæ per Scripturam

explicatio: jam clarè multarum prophetiarum, quas adhuc implendas esse hactenùs credidi, sensum percipio, easque jam impletas esse comperio. Lux hinc mihi magna in prophetarum scriptis explicandis exorta est. Tradidi ipsi scriptum meum, ut etiam me absente, omnia loca relegere et expendere posset. Exinde Mich. v. 1. indicato prius literali illius sensu, probavi locum nativitatis Messiæ fore Bethlehemum, Dominumque Jesum in illa civitate speciali directione divina esse natum. Cum in hac probatione nihil desideraret, ad genus Domini Jesu processi. Messiam ex familia Davidis nasciturum ut probarem opus non fuit, ipsis Judæis id habentibus. Solummodo probandum fuit, Dominum Jesum ex Davide ortum suum habere. Hìc multis actum de genealogia Domini Jesu, et de discrepantia inter Matthæum et Lucam, quos ita conciliavi, ut illa conciliationi meæ acquiesceret. Restabat tandem probanda nativitas ejus ex matre virgine, juxta Esa. vii. 14, 15, &c. Hìc prolixiùs paulò sensum literalem vaticinii illius aperui; atque ex verborum Esaiæ ἐνεργείᾳ probavi alium sublimiorem ac mysticum sub eo latere, quem in Domino Jesu complementum suum habere, veritatemque nativitatis Domini

ex virgine, ostendi. Sicque huic colloquio finis fuit impositus. Habita est hæc collatio die Mercurii, duravitque quinque horis.

" Reversus sum die Veneris, quo die probavi ex Deut. xviii. 15 et 18. propheticum Christi munus. Vaticinium hoc Messiam respicere probavi. Hìc multis actum de prophetico Christi munere, de Lege et Evangelio, quo sensu Evangelium Lege perfectius dici potest: de variorum Legis et Evangelii præceptorum sensu: de promissis Evangelii et Legis, et de discrimine inter illa. Exinde ostendi, Dominum Jesum nihil docuisse aut præcepisse Legi contrarium. Hac occasione quædam dicta sunt de dogmatibus quibusdan Christianorum, quæ Judæi Legi repugnare credunt. Ego dixi, ea esse consideranda prout in Scriptura extant, non prout postea ab hominibus sunt definita, et vocibus ac phrasibus non in Scriptura extantibus, sed ab hominibus inventis, enuntiata. Et ad ea solum esse respiciendum, quæ Scriptura tanquam fidei salvificæ objectum passim inculcat. Et quantum ad dogmata, quorum probatio non ex Veteri, sed Novo Testamento peti debet, de iis non esse disputationem cum Judæo inchoandam; sed, ut ego nunc feci, primùm contra ipsum divinam librorum Novi Testamenti autori-

tatem esse adstruendam, ut illâ probatâ ex ipsis Novi Testamenti libris, quid de tali dogmate sentiendum sit, dijudicet: et tum utriusque Testamenti dicta inter se conferat. Hìc illa subridens, ait: Magnam mihi fieri injuriam credidi, quòd meam, quam conceperam, methodum rejiceres: video autem nunc te legitimâ methodo usum: Nostri concionatores longe aliâ methodo sunt usi: nihil attulerunt ad probandam historiæ Novi Testamenti veritatem; sed disputandi initium fecerunt à dogmate SS. Trinitatis, idque adstruere voluerunt argumentis ex Veteri Testamento depromptis: Unus è nomine אלהים pluralis numeri; et è locutione in plurali numero, qua Deus in hominis creatione usus est, Faciamus hominem: (alter vir prius argumentum rejiciebat, sed posterius probabat) ex apparitione trium angelorum Abrahamo factâ; et similibus. Tum æternam Filii præexistentiam ex verbis Dei ad serpentem, Ponam inimicitiam inter te et mulieris semen, Genes. iii. 15: et verbis Evæ post Caini partum, Genes. iv. 1. Accepi virum Jehovam: ita enim interpretabatur textum Hebræum, non, à Jehova: aliisque pluribus. Tantùm abest, inquiebat, ut me argumentis suis retraxissent, ut me in sententiâ meâ obstinatiorem reddidissent. In tuâ autem

methodo legitimè procedi video: probatâ enim divinâ Novi Testamenti autoritate, quid de hoc aliisque Christianæ religionis dogmatibus statuendum sit, ex illo dijudicare, dictaque prophetarum cum Novo Testamento conferre possum. Hac digressione factâ, priorem meum sermonem repetii, ostendique, Dominum Jesum Legem Mosis non abrogâsse, sed perfectionem introduxisse, quæ Legem Mosis divinam esse præsupponit, sed ad cujus præsentiam omnes Mosaicæ legis imperfectiones evanescere debuerunt. Hìc prolixè satis sententiam meam de Christianorum à Lege Mosis libertate aperui. Ostendi etiam quo sensu Lex vocatur æterna; et quomodo Dominus Jesus, perfectiorem annuntiando legem, ad cujus præsentiam lex Mosis evanuit, docuerit consentanea oraculis prophetarum, Deusque hanc Domini Jesu doctrinam ratam habuerit, et destructione templi, et eversione Reip. Judaicæ confirmavit. Quæ omnia fusè contra Don Balthasarum disputavi. Hæc collatio duravit quinque horis, et per illam plurimùm se in veritate Evangelicâ confirmatam aliquoties professa est.

" Redii tandem die Sabbathi, quo die actum fuit de morte Christi. Probavi ex Esa. liii. mortem Messiæ, et quidem tanquam sacrifi-

cium, pro peccato, illo in capite apertè prædici. Postquam de capitis hujus sensu fusè actum esset, petiit ut ipsi sententiam meam de sacerdotio Christi aperirem. Respondi ego: Nos hactenus sollicite vitatis omnibus quæ inter Christianos controversa sunt dogmatibus, solummodo generalem, quæ omnibus Christianis cum Judæis intercedit, controversiam tractâsse: me autem, si ipsi distincte meam de sacerdotio Christi sententiam explicem, à viâ hactenus à nobis tritâ defecturum: non enim id à me posse fieri, quin sententiam Remonstrantium, quatenus à Contraremonstrantibus recedit, ipsi aperiam. Cùm illa instaret, sententiamque meam cognoscere desideraret: ostendi triplicem esse potissimùm de sacerdotio Christi sententiam: Contraremonstrantium, et Socini, quas tanquam duas extremas inter se directè oppositas considerabam; et nostram, quæ inter duas extremas media intercedit. Dixi, quid in utrâque sententiâ extremâ desideremus; quomodo nostra sententia omnia aliarum sententiarum incommoda evitet. Addidi me rationem salvationis non considerare in solo Christi sacerdotio, sed etiam in ipsius prophetiâ et regno. Hisce omnibus diffusè satis explicatis, petii, an jam vellet progredi ad munus Christi regium? Respondit,

Non id esse necesse, de eo enim nullum sibi superesse dubium. Dixi, Quoniam Judæi urgent Messiam promissum fore regem terrenum, placere ut examinemus dicta prophetarum, an illa de terreno regno necessariò accipienda sint? Respondit: Non id necesse est: quoniam per hactenùs monstrata jam omnia quæ de illo habui dubia animo exemisti meo. Quæsivi porro; utrùm sibi ea Prophetis probari cuperet, Messiæ doctrinam per omnem terram annuntiari debuisse; idque in Domino Jesu esse impletum? Respondit: De eo nullum sibi superesse dubium. Tandem rogavi, quoniam mihi nulla jam ex prophetarum vaticiniis restarent argumenta, ut, si quas contra religionem Christianam haberet objectiones, eas proferret, ut et illis respondere possem. Tum illa ita me affata est: Dubitationes, quas de religione Christiana habui, abundè iis quæ à te disputata sunt, omnes mihi sunt sublatæ. Agnosco te mihi probavisse veritatem historiæ Novi Testamenti, et speciatim illorum duorum ingentium miraculorum, resurrectionis Domini Jesu de mortuis, et effusionis Spiritûs Sancti in Apostolos die Pentecostes: quòd mihi probaveris prophetias Vet. Testamenti in Domino Jesu suum habere complementum: quòd mihi

ostenderis connexionem Novi Testamenti cum Vetere. Agnosco Dominum Jesum Christum Servatorem meum: hæcque jam mihi erit immota veritas, de quâ per gratiam divinam nunquam dubitabo. Gratias tibi ago pro fideli tuâ institutione: rogoque ne collationes nostras abrumpas, sed in iis mecum pergas; cupio enim huic fundamento solidiorem religionis meæ cognitionem superstruere. Respondi ego: Deo optati hujus successûs gloriam unicè esse tribuendam; me ad summum tantùm plantâsse aut rigâsse, Deum autem dedisse incrementum. Atque ita consumta in ultimâ hac collatione quatuor horis, sexto à prima nostra collatione die optatum laboris mei, Deo benedicente, vidi eventum. Ex hac autem collatione intima inter nos amicitia coaluit: illa me patris instar veneratur; ego illam filiæ loco diligo.

" Vides hic prolixam collationis hujus historiam, in qua fortasse inutiliora quædam consectatus sum: sed ut morem tibi geram singula annotare volui, ut totius historiæ seriem haberes. Argumenta singula non desideras, nec singula recitare possem, nisi integro conscripto tractatu. Tum quid necesse est repetere, quæ in collatione cum Orobio extant? Quod scirè desiderâsti, abundè hac narratione comprehensum

credo. Rumor hujus collationis, etiam me tacente, mox totam pervasit civitatem, et sicut mihi plurimorum conciliavit benevolentiam, ita et aliorum contra me indignationem provocavit, et emulationem, eorum præcipuè, qui irrito conatu virginem illam oppugnarunt: quorum unus ipsam accedens, cum indignatione rogavit, quibus argumentis et quâ methodo ego in disputando usus essem? Cùm illa responderet, me primò et ante omnia sibi probavisse veritatem historiæ Novi Testamenti: ille maximo cum contemtu dixit, hoc nullius esse pretii, utens his ipsissimis verbis: Quid tum habebas? Nihilum cum magna cauda. Illa respondit, se non intelligere quid sibi velit: credere se, multùm se profecisse, quando de veritate historiæ Novi Testamenti esset persuasa. Ille nihil effectum aiebat, quamdiu à priore è prophetis solidè non esset probatum; ita omnia, prout evenerunt, debuisse impleri: imo alio die eo usque exorbitavit, ut dicere non erubuerit, nisi omnia æque perfectè ex Mose possint à priore probari, atque ex Evangelio, se Evangelium habere pro fabula. Cùm autem illa se argumentis meis acquiescere indicaret, ille indignabundus inquit, jam posteriora tua pejora sunt prioribus: adeo ut ipsa cum matre, ex

sermonibus collegerint, maluisse ipsum, ut ad Judaismum penitùs defecisset, quàm ut meis argumentis revocata ad fidem Christianam redierit. Non etiam sine stomacho rogavit: Tunc dixisti, Cocceianos te decepisse? Nequaquam, respondit: sed Cocceianos esse ineptos qui Judæum convincant. Illo quærente an id potest Limburgius? illa regessit, Exemplum in me habes. Postea mater virginis mihi dixit: Nunquam credideram, tantam in concionatoribus esse æmulationem: Ego nescio quâ occasione ædes meas ingressus sis: nunquam de te cogitaveram: Verrinum longe alia de causa advocavi; nescio quâ occasione tui mentio sit facta: Deum te in ædes meas immisisse credo: à primo enim quo tu filiam meam compellâsti momento ipsam mutatam vidi. Non tamen omnes concionatores hujus hominis stomachum probârunt: Quidam satis benignè de me locuti sunt, ingenueque professi, me præscivisse quod collegæ sui frustra tentârunt. Hæc addo, ut et aliorum ἐπιεικείαν agnoscas. Verùm tempus tandem est prolixam hanc narrationem abrumpendi.

" Reliquis epistolæ tuæ breviter respondebo. Theologiæ meæ Christianæ editionem alteram jam in Angliam appulisse nullus dubito. Dedi in mandatis bibliopolæ Samueli Smith, ut tibi

exemplar illius tradat. Idem tibi aliâ nuper epistolâ, cujus Marcus Tent, juvenis statura corporis exilis, sed ingenio magnus, quemque hic sæpius vidisti, lator est, significavi. Si ergo bibliopola nondum tibi exemplar dedit, posses id ab ipso petere. Quin multa in mea Theologia emendando restent nullus dubito. Vellem te consultore potuisse uti, multa proculdubiò te indicante correxissem, quæ nunc à me non animadversa inemendata prodeunt. Paucula addidi: quæ alicujus sunt momenti potissimùm reperies Lib. II. cap. 1. 3. 6. et 8. cap. xxi. § 23, 25, et 26. Lib. III. cap. iv. § 3 et 11. Lib. v. cap. xxxiii. § 7. Lib. VII. cap. iv. § 7. Sunt et paucis in locis quædam addita, verùm illa sunt breviora. Occasione libri hìc editi paucula dixi de spiritibus malis, ut præcipua libri illius fundamenta everterem: de quibus tuum aveo scire judicium. Quod aliqui Calvinismum restituere moliuntur, minimè miror: Si ita verè sentiunt, reprehendendi non sunt, quod sententiam suo judicio veram aliis persuasam cupiant, sed solidis rationibus confutandi. Si aliud quid lateat, Deus id judicaturus est. Quò hæc tandem evasura sint, dies docebit. Libri tui de intellectu humano versionem Latinam avidissimè expecto: ex illius

compendio Gallico, quod nobis D. Clericus suppeditavit, facilè perspicio, quantùm exinde laus in arduis illis materiis philosophicis hauriri possit. Non dubito quin eruditis, quibus lingua Anglicana ignota est, gravissimum sit futurum, illum linguâ inter omnes eruditos communi, non posse legi. Quantò latiùs dispergetur, tantò illustriorem reddet veritatem à te monstratam. Verùm ubi ipsum videro, distinctius de singulis judicare potero. Ante menses aliquot ad te misi Episcopii conciones aliquot hactenus ineditas, quibus historiam vitæ Episcopii præfixi. Nescio an omnia distincte intelligas. Varia in eâ adversa quibuscum Episcopius luctatus est, leges. Scripsit Reverendissimus Bathoniensis et Wellensis, ad quem exemplar misi, se alicui versionem vitæ Episcopii in linguam Anglicam vertendam mandâsse. Itaque fortasse Anglice eam leges. Unum fere oblitus sum. Scripsi tibi historiam collationis meæ cum virgine nuper judaizante bene longam. Non repugno quin amicis quibusdam prælegatur, apographa autem nulli dentur. Cùm enim post quinque congressus penitus omnes suas dubitationes abjecerit, fundamentaque religionis Christianæ nunc distinctius cognoscat, et fide solidiore amplectatur

quàm antehac, omnino quicquid per ignorantiam, sive incogitantiam aut negligentiam peccatum est, æternæ tradendum est oblivioni. Fieri autem posset, ut quis pia intentione exemplum hoc allegaret ad ostendendum legitima methodo plerumque non cum Judæis disputari, et excerpta ex epistola mea sibi communicata ad majorem dictorum suorum fidem scripto suo insereret: ita rei hujus memoria typis expressa nunquam obliteraretur. Video autem hìc multos non tam ipsius conversione gaudere, quàm dolere quòd meis colloquiis ab errore suo revocata est, magisque materiam quærere errorem ejus exaggerandi, quàm conversionem deprædicandi. Non enim veriti sunt passim eam tanquam præsumtuosam, procacem, pertinacem, et simul, quod mireris, instabilem, cuique nulla religio cordi sit, traducere: quidam eò usque exorbitarunt, ut et atheam vocaverint. Cum ego, quod vere testor, eam expertus sim modestam, neutiquam refractoriam, sed maximè docilem, attentam ac sedulam, Deique reverentem: et quod rarum est, ingenii admodum facilis ac prompti, judiciique peracris ac limati, supra ætatem (est enim viginti duorum tantùm annorum) et sexum, ac incredibili veritatis investigandæ amore incen-

sam, adeo ut proprio Marte sine magistro plurimos libros evolverit, et si quid minus intelligeret indefesso labore illius lectionem aliquatenus reperierit, et assiduè meditata sit, nec conquieverit, donec omnia distincte intellexerit. Vix annos nata quatuordecim (ut mihi aliquoties narravit) solita fuit mane hora quarta insciis parentibus è lecto surgere, et librorum lectioni incumbere: quando autem post iteratam lectionem sensum non perciperet, aliquoties quasi desperabunda cum lachrymis librum è manibus projecit: post horam vero ubi puellari lusu se recreâsset, librum in manus resumsit, lectionem repetiit, meditata est: et hæc omnia crebro iteravit, donec tandem sensum assecuta esset. Quod sane exemplum rarissimum est in puella, quæ in otio et deliciis educata credi posset. Quare hæc ita amicis communicabis, ut nihil ex meis literis depromatur, quod ne à malevolo quidem in illius calumniam rapi possit. Verùm tandem tempus est manum de tabula tollere. Ultus jam sum silentium tuum probe. Mirabor si non aliquoties prolixitatem meam sis incusaturus, epistolamque antequam ad finem perveneris è manibus abjecturus. Salutem à me quàm officiosissime Dominæ Masham. Salutat te Verrinus cum uxore, necnon

uxor et liberi mei, et me, ut facis, amare ne desine,

Tui amantissimum

PHILIPPUM à LIMBORCH."

"Amstelodami, 12 Decemb. 16 94."
4
18.

"Post hasce scriptas tristis me de subita Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis morte nuntius non leviter perculit. Destinaveram ipsi Theologiæ meæ Christianæ exemplar: pridie autem antequam tradi potuerit mortuus est. Ecclesiæ Reformatæ tanto patrono, tam prudente, perito, pacisque amantissimo antistite, orbatæ statum doleo. Utinam Deus qui potens est etiam è lapidibus Abrahæ filios excitare, alium nobis substituat, illi si non parem, quod vix sperare ausim, tamen vestigia ejus, quantum fieri potest, proxime prementem! Ille tibi et Dominæ Masham vitam ad seros usque annos producat! Interim vale.

"Vides hic additamenta in historiam Inquisitionis. Liber unde aliquot loca descripsi, hunc præfert titulum: Speculum Inquisitionis Bifuntinæ ejus Officiariis exhibitum à R. P. F. Joannè des Loix S. T. D. Ord. prædicat. Convent. Audomerensis, per Bifunt. Diversum et

fol. Comitat. Burgund. Inquisitore generali, &c. Dolæ apud Antonium Pinard typographum juratum, 1628 in 8. Continet pagg. 791.

" Si per otium licet, velim quamprimum certior fieri literas has recte ad manus tuas pervenisse; eas enim errâsse nollem, nec diu in incerto hærere: quia multa scripsi, et quæ in aliorum manus incidere nolim. Clericus tuas rectè accepit. Inclusas has mihi Guenellonus dedit, qui familiæ suæ statum ipse scribit."

" For Mr. John Locke, at Mr. Pawlings, over against the Plough, in Little Lincoln's Inn Fields, London."

END OF THE APPENDIX.

NOTES

OF

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

DURING

THE LAST YEARS OF

THE REIGN OF GEORGE I.

AND

THE EARLY PART OF

THE REIGN OF GEORGE II.

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NOTES

OF

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

DURING

THE LAST YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE I.
AND THE EARLY PART OF THE
REIGN OF GEORGE II.

PREFACE.

After the trial of the Earl of Macclesfield, Sir Peter King, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, was made Lord Chancellor, and held the Seals from 1725 to 1733, during which period he noted down in short-hand the principal subjects which occupied the attention of the administration of Sir Robert Walpole. It will be seen, however, that these Memoranda are very much broken and discontinued after 1730, in consequence, probably, of the declining health of the writer.

Abundant proof will be found in the following pages of the disproportionate importance attached to German politics, during the reigns of the two first Princes of the House of Brunswick, who were more interested in the welfare of their Electorate, and in making some petty addition to their German territories, than in that of Great Britain, which they neither va-

lued nor understood. Many of the questions stirred up by the restless activity of the Queen of Spain, and the projects of the Emperor, for establishing a great trading company at Ostend, to the detriment of English commerce in the East and West, perplexing as they may have been to the Ministers of that day, have now lost the interest that formerly belonged to them; but as they may serve to explain some parts of our history, they are printed verbatim from the short-hand memoranda.

There are some curious anecdotes of George II. and Queen Caroline, and a remarkable proof is afforded of their early hatred to their eldest son Frederick, afterwards Prince of Wales, in the plan which they had formed for disinheriting him in England. The project, however, was defeated, by the equally inimical feelings of the reigning King George I. towards his own immediate successor, if not by his sense of right and justice.

Wherever Walpole is mentioned, we may observe the good sense and discretion which distinguished him amongst the Statesmen of his own times. He is, indeed, eminently distinguished above the Statesmen of almost every age, by his love of Peace—the first and greatest of all virtues in a Minister.

NOTES.

1725.—Tuesday, June 1. Monday the 31st May being the last day of the sitting of Parliament, I was introduced into the House of Lords, as Lord King, Baron of Ockham, in the County of Surrey. My introducers were Lord Delaware and Lord Onslow. Baron's robes lent me by Lord Hertford. And this day at noon I went to St. James's, and being called into the King's closet, he delivered the seals to me as Lord Chancellor: and soon after I went to the council-chamber, carrying the seals before him. The first thing that was done was to swear me Lord Chancellor, after which I took my place as such. The King then declared that he was going beyond sea, and had appointed a Regency, whose names were then declared.

2nd.—In the morning I received the visits of several lords and others of my friends, and at noon went to wait on the Prince and Princess, and kissed their hands. This day I surrendered my place of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas.

The King signed a Bill for establishing a Commission in Chancery during my absence; the Commission was as usual, only the deficient Masters in Chancery were left out, and the Commission was sealed at the seal next day.

3rd.—About ten o'clock I waited on the King, to have two Bills signed, the one for Eyre to be Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, the other for Gilbert to be Chief Baron, and as soon as I left him he went on his voyage to Hanover. And inasmuch as several of the nobility were to wait on him to Greenwich, so that they could not attend me, according to custom, to Westminster Hall, I did from thence take an occasion to go privately to Westminster Hall, which I did this day, being a day of motions. I here took again the oath of a Chancellor, which the Clerk of the Crown read, and the Master of the Rolls held the book.

8th.—News being come of the King's safe arrival in Holland, the Regency first met and agreed to meet again on the Tuesday, and that

there should be a Privy Council every fortnight.

9th.—The Duke of Athol was with my secretary, to desire the names of several persons might be put in Justices of the Peace for Perthshire; but on talking with Sir R. Walpole, he advised me not to take them from him, because he knew by letters intercepted that the Duke of Athol was in measures with his elder brother, who is attainted.

12th.—Went to Ockham, and returned Monday morning.

14th.—Returned from Ockham, and sat in the Court of Chancery.

15th.—A Regency, where, amongst other things, was read a Petition of George Lord Murray, setting forth that he was but eighteen years old when he went into the rebellion; that he stands indicted, but was never convicted nor attainted, praying the King's mercy: which being referred by the King to the Regency for their opinions, we were all of opinion that there was nothing in law to stand in the way of the King's pardon, and that if he pleased he might do it. But it was desired that there might be a more explicit opinion, and what we should advise the King to do. I said I wished him pardoned, but I was unacquainted with the

facts, and therefore could only say, that if the King thought fit to pardon him, there was nothing in law to obstruct it, but to advise either one way or other I could not, because I was not sufficiently master of the facts. The Archbishop would not advise any thing in the case of blood. The Duke of Argyle strongly against it, because this man's treason was attended with perfidy, in deserting the King's troops and running away to the rebels; and if this man were pardoned, others would immediately make the the same application. Roxburgh, Walpole, a majority were for it; so a letter ordered to advise the King to pardon him.

At my desire the Regency now ordered that Mr. Paxton, who had been employed by the Council in the affair of the Masters, might lay before the Regency an account of the deficiency of the Masters, showing to this time what the particular effects were that were paid into the Bank; and the Attorney and Solicitor-General were ordered to take care that the suitors might receive satisfaction for their several demands. This I did that care might be taken of the suitors in Chancery, and because it was not proper that I should be both judge and party; that the Attorney and Solicitor-General might bring all things necessary before

the court, and might be the prosecutors in this matter.

The Duke of Argyle and Mr. Walpole spoke to me to expedite the Commissions of the Peace for the several shires of Scotland, which commissions, as they said, had been settled by Lord Townshend before he went away, and sent to the late Commissioners of the Seal. I told them I knew nothing of it—nothing had been said to me about it.

16th.—Mr. Scroop came to me from Mr. Walpole, to let me know that the lists of the Justices of the Peace for Scotland, sent to the Commissioners, were by them sent to the Crown-office; and Mr. Pynsent, Deputy Clerk of the Crown, now brought the several lists for all the counties in Scotland, and the old lists, and said that he had never received any orders from the late Commissioners of the Seal to make out any commissions upon them. Whilst we were talking, the Master of the Rolls came in, and he said that all he knew of it was, that Mr. Bulkley brought these new lists to him from Lord Townshend, without any letter or order, and that being but two or three days before he closed up the seals, he did nothing upon it, but sent them to the Crown-office. I told Mr. Scroop that this was not

the usual way of putting in Justices of the Peace, that I would look over the lists, but if any were to be left out I should first know the reason, and whosoever were to be put in I would have a recommendation in writing from the Lord-Lieutenants, desiring they might be put in, and attesting their fitness, or from some other person of quality and known integrity. He said Mr. Stewart of the House of Commons should wait on me and give me more particular account of these matters, that he himself was unacquainted with them, but there was a necessity for the new commissions, because of levying the Malt tax.

17th.—Mr. Stewart, a Scotch member of the House of Commons, was with me, and acquainted me that all the lists of the Justices of the Peace for the several counties of Scotland had been settled by the direction of Lord Townshend, by Lord Islay, with the Members of the House of Commons, and that the settling these lists had taken up three months time. I spoke this morning with the Marquis of Tweedale, and showed him the lists for Edinburgh, Haddington, Berwick, and Roxburgh; he said that no objection could be made to the men put therein, only in Haddington he thought some more new names might be added, but he would not

add any because he had not been consulted in it, notwithstanding which he sent me three names, which I put into the commission for Haddington.

30th.—An express came from General Wade, of a tumult that had been at Glasgow on the 24th, the day the Malt tax took place, and that among other outrages they had pulled down Daniel Campbell's house and gutted it. The Duke of Newcastle came to the seal where I was then sitting, in the Inner Temple hall, and acquainted me of it; whereupon I told him my opinion, and desired him to get together that evening as many of the Regency as he could, and to have a general meeting the next morning, and to send out notices accordingly.

July 1st.—There was a meeting of the Regency: present, Archbishop of Canterbury, myself, Duke of Devonshire, Duke of Kingston, Duke of Dorset, Earl of Berkley, Earl Godolphin, Duke of Newcastle. At the meeting, a letter, amongst others, from General Wade was read, in which there was a passage, that if the commissions for the justices of peace had been sent down, it might have been of use to them on this occasion: on which I told the Regents, that when I had the seals, I found thirty-one commissions of the peace for thirty-

one of the shires of Scotland, or rather lists of names for those commissions, lying in the Crown-office, and I had been informed that there had been lists likewise for the two other shires now missing, viz. Peebles and Perth. On which, Mr. Pynsent, the Deputy clerk of the Crown, was called in, and said, that the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal had sent these lists for the several counties of Scotland, but had not given any particular directions what to do with them. The Duke of Newcastle informed the Regents, that the Earl of Islay had had orders for a considerable time before the King went away to settle proper and fit lists for the justices of peace in Scotland, it being now proper, both for levying the Malt Tax and disarming the Highlanders, and that such lists had been made and delivered to Lord Townshend, who had desired him to see those lists expedited, and that it was only the hurry of business, just as he went away, that was the occasion it had not been done. The Earl of Islay, who attended at my desire, was called in, and he gave an account, that several months ago he received orders from the King, by Lord Townshend, to go through the lists of all the commissions of the peace in

Scotland, and settle proper lists; that to this end he had consulted with the parliament-men of the several counties; that those who were dead, or had never acted, or had no estates in the county, they had left out; that this was the common method of such proceedings, and had added men of estates and character in the respective counties; that the list took up three months' time in preparing, and was done with great exactness and regard to gentlemen. On this, I told the Regency, that though in England the Great Seal would be a little more consulted in matters of this nature, yet, considering the urgency of affairs, if their Excellencies would order me to pass those commissions of the peace, as now settled, I would do it. Whereupon they ordered me forthwith to pass these thirty-one commissions, and also the two others, if the originals could be recovered again, and, in default thereof, such as the Earl of Islay should, from his papers, or memory, or any other way, recollect. Whereupon, I sent by the express that now went to Scotland commissions of the peace for Edinburgh, Haddington, Lanark, and Berwick, and the others I ordered to be expedited as fast as possible.

24th.—Sir Robert Walpole went with me to

my house at Ockham, and lodged there the night. He entered into a free discourse with me about foreign affairs. That whilst we had plenipotentiaries at Cambray, the King of Spain, being provoked by the French Court sending back his daughter, had entered into a private treaty with the Emperor; that the Queen of Spain, who governs all there, was unmeasurably angry with France, and that she was allured by the Emperor, by a proposal that the Emperor's daughter should be married to her son Don Carlos; that in this point she trusted the Emperor, and, believing that it would be so, inclined Spain to come into the treaty, whereby the hereditary dominions of Austria are preserved in the Emperor's daughters. That the Emperor had invited us to accede to this treaty, and so to guarantee the succession for his daughters; that to encourage us, he had proposed his mediation with Spain to settle all differences between us, and particularly that of Gibraltar and Port Mahon; we declining to enter into that guarantee, Spain had now intimated to the King her hopes that the King would restore those two places.

He likewise informed me of the state of the North: that the Czarina had pressed the King

of Sweden to let her send her fleet to Norkoping, to be ready for her design upon Denmark and Sleswick, and that he had been likely to have granted it, had not we warned him that if this were suffered, the Czarina would by this means turn him out of his kingdom, and put it under the dominion of the Duke of Holstein; and that to encourage him we were forced to give him 10,000*l.* as part of some subsidies that by treaty we are to give him in case of a war; that now all things were like to be quiet on that side.

He told me also another secret: that pending the design in France of sending back the young Queen to Spain, there had been a negotiation between the Princess and Count Broglio, the French Ambassador, by the intervention of the late Lady Darlington, for Princess Ann to be given in marriage to the French King, and that the French Court expected it as a thing sure; and for that reason, at the same time that the Ambassador notified the resolution of sending the young Queen back, he desired of the King his grand-daughter for his master, but that the King absolutely refused it.

Another negotiation had lately been on foot

in relation to the two young Princes, Frederick* and William†. The Prince‡ and his wife§ were for excluding Prince Frederick from the throne of England; but that, after the King and Prince, he should be Elector of Hanover, and Prince William King of Great Britain: but that the King said it was unjust to do it without Prince Frederick's consent, who was now of age to judge for himself; and so this matter now stood. But that Sir Robert Walpole had told the King, that if he did not in his life-time bring over Prince Frederick, he would never set his foot on English ground; so that he did not know whether the King, when he returned from Hanover, would not bring that Prince with him.

26th.—Received by Lord Townshend from the King a warrant to pass a commission under the Great Seal to Lord Townshend to.....

* Afterwards Frederick Prince of Wales.

† Afterwards Duke of Cumberland. This is a very curious proof of the early hatred of George the Second and Queen Caroline to Frederick Prince of Wales. It would have been fortunate if the separation of Hanover from England had taken place then or at any time, by fair means, or by any means.

‡ The then Prince of Wales, afterwards George the Second.

§ The Princess of Wales, afterwards Queen Caroline.

treat and contract with such princes and states as the King should direct, which I accordingly passed under the Great Seal.

29th.—The Duke of Newcastle was with me to explain the meaning of the commission to Lord Townshend, which was, that the Emperor and King of Spain being now in strict amity, there was a necessity to enter into a league with other powers to preserve the peace of Europe; that France and the King of Sardinia were ready, and it was hoped that the Protestant Princes of the Empire and Holland would likewise come into it.

Aug. 11th.—At Sir Robert Walpole's; dined there with Lord Harcourt and Lord Trevor. The end of our dining there was to consider what was fit to be done with Lord Macclesfield's 30,000*l.* We all agreed, that till the deficiency was known, there could not be any distribution; and therefore the safest way would be to lend this 30,000*l.* upon the land-tax, and so it would carry interest, and that interest might go to the credit of the suitors, in aid of the deficiency.

12th.—At a Regency, some of the Regents being then gone, Mr. Scroop bringing a warrant from the Lords Justices to sign for striking 30,000*l.* Land-tax tallies to Holford and

Lovibond, two of the masters, for the use of the suitors, to be disposed of as the Court of Chancery should direct, myself, Lord Dorset, Lord Harcourt, and Sir R. Walpole signed the said warrant to the Treasury for that purpose. But at the Regency the week after, this was altered, because it was said that the first intimation must come from the Court of Chancery; and thereon, on the motion of the Attorney General, an order of Court was made that the Treasury should be desired to issue the 30,000*l.* fine, paid in by the Earl of Macclesfield, to Holford and Thruston, the senior and junior Masters, to be by them lent on the Land-tax, &c. for the benefit of the suitors.

In the month of August, I drew up an order for obliging the Masters in the Court of Chancery to pay their money into the Bank, according to the order of the 26th May 1725, reciting or confirming the said order, with additions and explanations; the Master of the Rolls intimating by the Attorney-General that he was willing to join with me therein. I drew up the order to be made by the advice and assistance of the Master of the Rolls, adding the Usher to the same regulations as the Masters' were, and prescribing his fees. Sent it by the Attorney-General to the Master, then at Belbar. The

Attorney-General brought back the order amended, or agreed to by the Master of the Rolls; but at the same time he told me, that since he came from him, he understood the Usher had been with him, and that he now wrote to him to desire me to suspend the order about the Usher. I told him this was an indefinite suspension. I thought the order was necessary for the Master and the Usher together; but inasmuch as the Usher was of his nomination, if he would give it me under his hand, that he was his officer, and it was his business to look after him, so that he would take it upon him to see that office duly executed, I might suspend it for some time, till farther consideration could be had thereof. This was about the 26th or 27th of August, on one of which days I went to Ockham, and did not return to London till Wednesday night, the 8th of September. Thursday morning, the 9th of September, Mr. Floyd, his Secretary, delivered me a letter from him, dated at Belbar, 1st of September 1725, whereby he declares that he will prevent as much as he can the Usher submitting to any such order.

Sept. 7th.—Tuesday night, a messenger came to me from Mr. Delafaye, with ten instruments from Hanover, with the King's warrant, coun-

tersigned by Lord Townshend, to fix the Great Seal to them; five of the instruments were,—1st, the treaty entered into by the Kings of England, France, and Prussia; 2nd, the first separate article; 3rd, the second separate article; 4th, a third separate article; 5th, a secret article. The other five instruments were duplicates of the same to be executed by the King of France. I returned back word by the messenger, that I was coming to town, and would there do what was necessary.

8th.—Wednesday, at night, I came to town. The Duke of Somerset came to me, and I asked him, when he was in the Regency, and the King abroad, as had happened in King William's time, and the King made a treaty abroad, whether this were communicated to the Regency or Council here? or whether, upon the King's warrant from beyond the sea, the Great Seal was affixed to them here? He said, it was always the custom, on the King's warrant, for the Chancellor to affix the Great Seal. The next day, Mr. Delafaye told me this was always the custom, and that it would be absurd to lay them before the Regency, because the King had agreed and signed them already. I therefore put the Great Seal to them, September 9th, in the evening.

9th.—In the morning, the Duke of Newcastle came to me, and showed me a letter from Lord Townshend, that the King and people there were very apprehensive that the Spaniards were about to strike a blow against us, and that they intended to seize our merchants' effects, and therefore desired that he would speak to me, and such other of the King's ministers as he and Sir Robert Walpole should think fit, to consider how to be ready against such an occasion. He suggested that it would be proper to have fifteen or sixteen men-of-war ready, with bombs, boats, &c. &c., so that if we had our merchants' goods seized, immediately to go and demand, and in case of refusal, to compel restitution; to do as had been done in Wingfield's case in Portugal; and on this he desired me, after the Regency was over, to dine at Sir Robert Walpole's: and accordingly there dined there with Sir Robert Walpole, the Duke of Newcastle, Earl of Berkeley, Earl Godolphin, myself, and Mr. Delafaye. The occasion of this, the apprehension of Lord Townshend, that it appeared plainly that the Emperor was at the bottom of all this management of Spain; that when the Emperor and Spain made their private treaty, the Emperor proposed to us to accede to that treaty, which

the King refused, it being made without his participation; and, in truth, it was so, guaranteeing an unknown succession to the House of Austria. The Emperor, at the same time, offered his mediation to make up all differences between the King and Spain. The King thanked him, but told him he knew of no differences but such as, considering the friendship then between them, might be terminated among themselves, without the intervention of any other Prince. Some short time after, the Queen of Spain let Mr. Stanhope, our envoy there, know that the King of Spain expected that Gibraltar and Minorca should be delivered up; and the like was repeated in another interview between him and the King and the Queen of Spain. He then asked whether, if this were not done, the friendship between them was to be determined? They said, No, but hoped that the King, considering the advantages he had by trade and otherwise from Spain, would make no scruple of it. A little after he was gone from the King and Queen, the Secretary of State, the Marquis de Grimaldi, let him know by letter, that whatever friendship the King and Queen had exhibited to Great Britain, it was still to be taken with the condition that Gibraltar was restored. Some time after, Stanhope went to Court, to

desire an explanation of this letter, and when it was they expected the restoration? The Queen said presto, *bien tôt bien vîte.* Stanhope said that was impossible, it could not be done till the Parliament met, which could not be held during the King's absence. She replied, that the King might go over on purpose to hold the Parliament, that the Parliament would be all for it. He told her, that she would find herself deceived in such information, and that his orders were, to declare positively that the King of England thought those places were secured to him by treaty, and that neither he nor the Parliament would give them up. This, we afterwards found, was set on foot by the Emperor, who had prevailed over the passion of the Queen of Spain, on her disappointment in France, and on promise to marry Don Carlos to one of his daughters. Things running thus so high, occasioned the speculations of Lord Townshend in his letter. But this morning, the Duke of Newcastle received a letter from Mr. Stanhope, wherein the Queen of Spain expressed herself now in another manner, and that she did not mean that the restitution should be done instantly, but hoped the King, in friendship, would find out some way to restore it to the throne of Spain. That he told her it was im-

possible ever to hope England would give up Gibraltar, at least not without some satisfaction: she asked what satisfaction? he said he had no orders to offer any such thing, or any instruction about it; but possibly, if they would offer the free cutting of logwood in the bay of Campeachy, some advantages for the South Sea Company in point of trade, the continuance of the Asscient, it might be considered of. We all now present thought that Mr. Stanhope had gone too far. But, however, it appeared that Spain began now to explain away those demands, which might possibly arise from the apprehension of their inability to go into a war with England and France. However, we all were of opinion, that there should not be any present preparation made of any ships, because that would alarm our own people here at home too much; that it was very probable this would blow over, but that if it did not, and if any seizure should be made of our merchants' ships, the Earl of Berkley said he would engage to have fifteen men-of-war well manned immediately, when there should be occasion: and we were of opinion that on any act of hostility commenced by Spain, we should immediately, without more ado, make reprisals.

The reason of this triple alliance between Great Britain, France, and Prussia was, as I take it, this. The Emperor, without the knowledge of the Kings of France or Great Britain, who were the mediators at Cambray, unknown to them, clapped up a peace with Spain, the general contents of which peace were, to settle the succession of Tuscany, Parma, &c. in Don Carlos, according to the quadruple alliance, to secure the succession of the hereditary countries of the Empire in his daughters. We understood that there were secret articles relating to the Ostend company, to give them a privilege of sending ships to the South Sea, and that the Emperor would take upon him to mediate all differences between the Courts of Spain and Great Britain. By which was understood, the Emperor's interposing to obtain the restitution to Spain, of Gibraltar, and Minorca; and the Queen of Spain was promised by the Emperor, that Don Carlos should marry the eldest daughter of the Emperor, and that he should be sent to Vienna, to be there educated in the German manner. By this method, there was a prospect of bringing the three greatest monarchies of Europe and Italy into one hand. Don Carlos would, by this means, have Italy, and

by his marriage the Austrian hereditary dominions—whosoever had these, would be fair for the Empire. The Prince of Asturias is hectical, and if he should drop, Don Carlos would have Spain. If the present King of France should die without issue, Don Carlos, likewise, then would have title to France; and if all or two of these governments should unite in one person, it would be formidable to Europe.

The Queen of Spain being under great resentment for sending back the Infanta Queen, was worked upon by the Emperor, under the view of this marriage of Don Carlos, to do whatever the Emperor desired. The Emperor, as we understood, put the Spaniards on demanding Gibraltar and Minorca, and promised to manage it so as that they should accomplish the obtaining it.

When Count Staremberg notified this peace to the King, and offered the Emperor's mediation to make up the differences between Great Britain and Spain, the King told him he was very glad that the peace was made between them, especially since the terms for the main were the same as the mediator Kings had proposed at Cambray, but that as for any differences between him and Spain, he knew of none, and so there was no need of any mediation.

In the mean time, Mr. Stanhope, our envoy at Madrid, was given to understand both by the King and Queen, that they expected the King should give up Gibraltar and Minorca, and do it speedily. And when he remonstrated to them that the King could not do it without his Parliament, and a Parliament could not now be called the King being beyond sea, the Queen said that it was worth the King's while to come over on purpose to hold a Parliament, that she was sure, as soon as it was proposed, the Parliament would unanimously give it up, rather than lose the advantages of trade they now enjoyed from Spain. Mr. Stanhope told her she was misinformed, and that the King could not give it up.

The Emperor's ministers were exceedingly elated upon this peace, and could not forbear publicly declaring, that now having established peace with Spain, and made their alliance, they should be able to manage the Protestants in Germany, and get the Empire and other princes to guarantee this succession. This obliged the Kings of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, to enter into this treaty, with liberty to other princes to accede.

Thursday, March 10, 1726. — At the desire of Lord Townshend I was this evening at

the Duke of Devonshire's, with the said Lord and Duke, the Dukes of Argyle and Newcastle, and Sir Robert Walpole, where the Lord Townshend acquainted us, that when he came from Hanover with the King, as he was at Helvoetslues, Major-General Diemar, agent from the Landgrave of Hesse, had made a proposition to him in writing to furnish the King with 8000 foot and 4000 horse, upon certain terms in the said writing contained; but inasmuch as he had not then the express direction of the Landgrave of Hesse, he expressed it so in the writing, and that these terms were subject to the approbation of the Landgrave; that since the King came over, the Landgrave had sent a ratification in form, which was then produced, and that the King thought it reasonable to accept this proposal. None present could declare an opinion to the contrary, but agreed it to be reasonable, because the King being by the treaty at Hanover obliged, in case of an attack on any of the allies, to furnish 8000 foot and 4000 horse, here they would by this means be ready, and would be a satisfaction to the King of Prussia and to Holland, who were both desirous to know where these men would be in case of a rupture. Then the method of the ratification, or acceptance of this

declaration of the Landgrave was proposed to me, because Lord Townshend had brought the draught of a warrant under the sign manual, countersigned by himself, as secretary, purporting the proposition of Diemar, and the ratification by the Landgrave; after which followed the King's approbation and ratification under the Great Seal. This I thought was not the usual and legal form, because there was no minister of the King's to treat with Diemar, and so would be in effect a treaty made by the Great Seal only. Lord Townshend said that this was only a declaration under the Landgrave's seal, and that after he had ratified no minister could set his hand to it, because that would put the minister on an equality with a Sovereign Prince; and therefore the other Prince only must ratify: and that this was not properly a treaty, but only a declaration by the Landgrave, on what terms he would furnish the King with so many soldiers, and that there was nothing more to do than for the King to show his approbation, by a ratification under the Great Seal. I thought that the form of this instrument made no alteration in the substance, and that this was really nothing else than a treaty, and that there was no instance wherever the Great Seal made a treaty by it-

self, or ratified a treaty which was not first agreed to by some minister or commissioner. And thereupon it was agreed that inquiry should be made in the Secretary's office, whether there had been any thing of this nature before; and on inquiry the next day, it being found there was none such, it was agreed that Diemar and Lord Townshend should both mutually sign the agreement by way of treaty, and that after such signing, the ratification should pass according to the usual forms. And I having hinted to Lord Townshend, that when I was to be concerned in the conclusion of an affair, it was but reasonable that I should know the beginning and the progress, he did the 12th of March send to me inclosed the copy of this matter, drawn up in form of a treaty between him and Diemar.

Thursday in Easter week, 14th April, I was at Ockham, where the Duke of Newcastle sent me by a messenger the copies of Admiral Hosier's instructions for the West Indies, and of Sir Charles Wager's for the Baltic. Hosier was at this time sailed, and Wager sailed a little after, but before this time I never saw the instructions, nor was acquainted with them.

June 20th.—The Duke of Newcastle com-

municated to me the information given by Mr. Keene, the 15th instant, to the Duke, of the discoveries made to Mr. Stanhope in Spain by the Duke of Ripperda. After the Duke of Ripperda's disgrace he sheltered himself in Mr. Stanhope's house, and, whilst there, made such discoveries to Mr. Stanhope, that he did not think fit to send in writing, lest they should fall into the hands of those who might make an ill use of them, therefore sent Mr. Keene to acquaint the Duke of Newcastle with them by word of mouth, that so he might lay them before the King.

The account that Mr. Keene gave was, that Mr. Stanhope having pressed the Duke of Ripperda to inform him of the schemes that had been projected or agreed to by the Emperor and King of Spain, either with regard to the state of Europe in general, or to His Majesty's affairs in particular, the Duke began with the secret treaty of Vienna,* consisting of five articles, and three separate ones, the sub-

* The particulars of this secret treaty of Vienna, related by Ripperda, are curious, and almost incredible; they rest on the veracity of Ripperda. Ripperda was an adventurer; born a Dutchman, he became a Spanish minister, and at last retired to Morocco, where he died, having attempted to establish a new religion.

stance of which he dictated to Mr. Stanhope, who took them down in writing with his own hand, and are as follows.

ART. 1. confirms and ratifies all preceding treaties made between their Imperial and Catholic Majesties.

2. The Emperor gives the eldest Archduchess in marriage to the Infant Don Carlos.

3. The second Archduchess is given to the Infant Don Philip.

4. The Emperor and King of Spain enter into reciprocal engagements to begin a war for reconquering the Duchy of Burgundy, Franche Comté, Alsace, and all the French conquests in Flanders and encroachments on Lorraine, Navarre, Roussillon, Petite Sardaigne, which are to be divided after the following manner. Burgundy, Franche Comté, Alsace, and all that formerly belonged to the House of Austria, is to be settled upon Don Carlos, and looked upon as the Austrian patrimony: Lorraine is to be restored to its Duke: and Navarre, Roussillon, and La Petite Sardaigne, to be reunited to the Spanish Monarchy.

5. The Emperor and King of Spain do mutually oblige themselves and posterity, never to give an Archduchess or Infanta in marriage to the House of Bourbon in France.

1. Separate article—That in case the present King of France should die without issue to inherit that Crown, the Infant Don Philip is to be King of France.

2. The Emperor and King of Spain do solemnly engage to assist the Pretender with their forces, in order to the putting him in possession of the throne of Great Britain.

3. Is a reciprocal engagement between the Emperor and King of Spain, utterly to extirpate the Protestant religion, and not to lay down their arms till this design be fully and effectually executed.

None of the King of Spain's Ministers besides himself knew this treaty, and that it had not been communicated to any person whatsoever, except the Emperor, the King and Queen of Spain, and the Ministers who signed it.

His Catholic Majesty was so earnest for the extirpation of the Protestant religion, that in the several letters that had passed directly between the King of Spain and the Emperor upon this subject, the King proposed, in case of necessity, to see the domains of his throne put up *grandezas* to the highest bidder, and dispose of all the employments for life in the Indias to the best purchaser, for promoting this scheme; and in one of his own letters, he

makes use of these extraordinary expressions, "Je vendrai même ma chemise."

July 28.—Received the King's orders by the Duke of Newcastle, to make Ric. Edgecombe, Esq. *custos rotulorum* of the County of Cornwall.

Received also a sign manual to put the Great Seal to the power to Lord Glenorchy, envoy in Denmark, to treat with foreign princes.

Wednesday, June 14th, 1727.—About five in the evening, I had a letter from Sir R. Walpole, informing me that the King was dead, and desiring me to meet him immediately at the Duke of Devonshire's.

I went there immediately, and found that Sir R. Walpole, on receipt of the news from Lord Townshend, had instantly gone to Richmond, and acquainted the Prince with it, and that thereupon the Prince had resolved to be in town as fast as he could that evening. In the mean time we prepared, by the Attorney and Solicitor-General, the draft for proclaiming the King, and settled the other things necessary to be done. The King, in the mean time, came to town, and sent us word that he was ready, whenever we were ready to wait on him. Accordingly, we who were at the Duke

of Devonshire's, except the Duke himself, who had the gout, went to Leicester-House, and there being joined by several others of the nobility, we sent in to the King to desire an audience: and although the Archbishop was present, yet I made a short speech to the King, according to agreement, setting out the great sorrow we were under by the unexpected death of the late King, and that nothing could relieve or mitigate it, but the certain prospect of happiness under his future administration; and that being now become our liege lord, we desired leave to withdraw into the Council-chamber, to draw up a form of a proclamation for proclaiming him, and to sign it as usual; which being granted, we retired into the Council-chamber, and there the form, which we had before agreed upon, was produced, engrossed, and thereon all the Lords of the Council then present first signed it. Then the doors were opened, and the peers in the outer room were desired to walk in and sign it, which they did; then it was delivered to the gentlemen in the outer room to sign as many as they pleased. And after it had been some time out, the Lords of the Council sent for the parchment, which being returned, secret intimation was given to the King that the Council were ready

to receive him. Whereon he immediately came in, and seating himself in the royal chair, he there read the declaration, that was printed at the desire of the Lords of the Council: it had been prepared at the Duke of Devonshire's, by Sir R. Walpole and the Speaker. After that, orders were given for the proclaiming of the King the next morning at ten o'clock, and several other orders of course were made, which are to be seen in the Council-book, particularly one for proroguing the Parliament, being now, by reason of the King's demise, immediately to meet.

Thursday, 15th.—A little after ten, I came to Leicester-House, and the Heralds and all being ready, about eleven, the Archbishop of Canterbury, myself, and other Lords, went into the yard before Leicester-House, and there the Heralds proclaimed the King, we being there on foot uncovered. As soon as that was done, we went into our respective coaches, and in the street before Leicester-House the King was again proclaimed. From thence we went and proclaimed him at Charing-Cross, Temple-Bar, the corner of Wood-street, and the Royal Exchange.

After that I came home, and about four o'clock got to the House of Lords, where the

Parliament met, and all the Lords present taking the oaths, I then informed the House, that I had a commission from the King to prorogue the Parliament to the 27th instant, which was the day it stood prorogued to in the late King's time. And thereon the Lords Commissioners seated themselves as usual in such cases, and on message by the Usher of the Black Rod, the Speaker and Commons, coming to the bar, the commission was read, and I declared the Parliament prorogued to the 27th inst.

From hence I went to Leicester-House, a Council being appointed this evening, and there several other orders were made, which had been omitted the evening before, and particularly the same proclamation, which had been issued out upon the death of Queen Anne, on the foundation of the act *Sexto Annæ*, for continuing persons in their offices, and requiring them to take the oaths, according to the said act.

Friday, 16th.—A Council in the evening, wherein I delivered up the Seals to the King, who re-delivered them to me as Chancellor, and thereon I was sworn Chancellor in Council.

Saturday, 17th. — I was sworn Chancellor in the Chancery Court in Westminster-Hall, and this day I swore all the Judges *de novo*, and the King's Council, and some of the

Welsh Judges, pursuant to the Act of Parliament, *Sexto Annæ.*

Sunday, 18th.—Received the Sacrament at Ockham, to qualify myself.

Tuesday, 20th.—Took the oaths in the King's Bench; went to Kensington, and presented the Judges, both English and Welsh, Masters in Chancery, and the King's Council, who all kissed the King's and Queen's hands.

Saturday, 24th.—At a Cabinet Council at Lord Townshend's office, the King's speech settled. There then arose a question, whether the King was to take the test on his first coming to Parliament next Tuesday, and the Lords desired me to look into that matter, and I promised them to do it by Monday morning, and lay what I could find before them, for their determination.

Monday, 26th.—At Lord Townshend's in the morning, where were present Harcourt, Trevor, Walpole, Newcastle, the Speaker, Townshend, Godolphin, and myself, and I stated the matter to them.

"That by the first Gul. et Mar. c. ii. an Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the Crown, it is enacted, That every King and Queen of this realm shall, on *the first day of the meeting of*

the first Parliament next after his or her coming to the Crown, sitting in his or her throne, in the House of Peers, in the presence of the Lords and Commons therein assembled, or at his or her coronation, which shall first happen, make and subscribe the declaration, &c.

As this act stood, there could be no doubt when this declaration was to be made, viz. at the coronation, or on the first day of the meeting of the first Parliament, which should first happen; that at this time the Parliament determined by the demise of the King, and therefore the first Parliament could not be meant, but of the first Parliament called by him, and the first day of the meeting is the day when the King comes to the House of Lords and opens the Parliament, and declares the causes of the meeting, 4 Inst. 7.

That afterwards, by the 7 et 8 Gul. c. 15, it was enacted, That that Parliament, or any other Parliament which should be summoned by King William, his heirs or successors, should not *determine or be dissolved* by the death or demise of the said King his heirs or successors, but *such Parliament should continue*, and was thereby impowered and required immediately to meet, convene, and sit, and to act, notwithstanding such death or demise, for six months and no

longer, unless the same should be sooner prorogued or dissolved by the next heir to the crown in succession, according to the first Gul. et Mar. c. 2. Though the enacting part of the said act be general, extending to the death or demises of all future Kings, yet the restriction of determining the continuance within the six months being appropriated only to those who were within the limitation of the Crown, by the first Gul. et Mar. c. 2. shows that the intention of the legislature was, this act should extend no farther than to the persons inheriting the Crown under the limitation of the said act.

12 et 13 Gul. c. 2.; an Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, &c. thereby enacts that whosoever should inherit the Crown by virtue of the limitations in the said act, should make, take, subscribe, and repeat the declaration in the first Gul. et. Mar. c. 2. in the manner and form thereby prescribed.

Anno 1701, 8th March, King William died, the Parliament then sitting; they met the same day, and continued on to do business. Nothing was discontinued by his death, but they went on just as if he had been living, and the 7 and 8 Gul. c. 15. not requiring the oaths to be again taken, they did not take the oaths *de novo* only before the 25th March 1702; they

took the oath of abjuration, according to the prescription of the 13 et 14 Gul. c. 6. which passed into a law but the night before the King's death, whereby all members of Parliament, as well peers as commoners, were to take the said abjuration before the 25th March 1702.

1701, 11th March, the Queen came to the House the first time, made a speech, but did not subscribe the declaration.

The session in King William's time, and the session in Queen Anne's time, did not make two different sessions, but one session under two different sovereigns. If they had been different sessions, then on Queen Anne's coming to the Crown, the Houses of Parliament must separately have begun all things *de novo*, which they did not; the consequence of which was, that without a particular provision to the contrary, the acts passed in Queen Anne's time must in law have commenced the beginning of the session in King William's time, because all acts commence in law the first day of the session, unless a special time of commencement be limited and appointed. Therefore an act was made the same Parliament, 1 Anne c. 8. that that act and all other acts to which the royal assent should be given after the 8th March

1701, and *before the end of the present session of Parliament*, shall commence and begin, and be taken in law, to commence and begin the said 8th day of March 1701, unless in such acts some other time for commencement thereof be specially limited and appointed. This was the case of the King's dying when the Parliament was sitting, and it seems that they did not take this Parliament to be the first Parliament after the King's demise, but the first Parliament that should be by him called, and therefore the Queen did not take the declaration, nor at the beginning of the next, because the coronation intervened, when she took it.

The 4 Anne, c. 8. which was made the year before the Union, was after the union re-enacted by 6 Anne, c. 7. 6 Anne, c. 7. is entitled an Act for Security of her Majesty's person and government, and of the Succession to the Crown in the Protestant line; and enacts that that Parliament, or any other Parliament which should be thereafter summoned by the Queen, her heirs or successors, should *not be determined or dissolved* by the death or demise of the Queen, her heirs or successors, but such Parliament shall and is hereby enacted to continue. —§ 5. And if there be a Parliament in being at the time of such demise, but the same happen

to be separated by adjournment or prorogation, such Parliament shall immediately after such demise, meet, convene, and sit, &c.

§ 11. Takes notice, that it might happen that the next Protestant successor might, at the time of the Queen's demise, be out of the realm of Great Britain, in parts beyond the seas, and therefore makes provision for the administration of the Government, and particularly for holding the Parliament during his absence. And particularly § 17. that the Lords Justices shall not dissolve the Parliament *continued and ordered to assemble and sit as aforesaid,* without express direction from such succeeding King or Queen.

§ 18. That all the members of both Houses of Parliament, who are or shall be continued by this *act as aforesaid, shall take the oath,* &c.

1714, July 9th, the Parliament was prorogued to the 10th of August.

Aug. 1st, Queen Anne died: and the same day the Parliament met, and in the House of Lords they took the oaths, according to the 6th Anne; and so likewise did the Commons, as soon as the Speaker and they could make a House.

25th, the Parliament prorogued to the 23d of September.

Sept. 20th, the King came to St. James's.

23rd, the Parliament prorogued by Commissioners, under the Great Seal, to the 21st of October.

Oct. 21st, farther prorogued by Commissioners under the Great Seal to the 13th of January following; but, in the mean time, viz. the 5th of January, the Parliament was dissolved by proclamation.

King George did not take the tests at the meeting of this Parliament. He was not in England at that time; neither did he take them on the 23rd of September, which was after he came into England, and was a meeting of Parliament, because Lords and Commons were both there when the Commissioners prorogued them. This happened in case where the Parliament was separated by prorogation; and on the death of the Queen they assembled, according to the Act of Parliament, and made several laws.

As on the death of King William, the Parliament being then meeting, it was taken to be the same Parliament and the same session, so now the opinion was that it was the same Parliament but a different session, the former session having been determined by the prorogation.

Thus, in the act that passed this session for the civil list, c. 1. there is a recital of the Soap Act, which passed in the same Parliament, just before the last prorogation by the Queen, and it is said to be an Act made in the last session of this present Parliament; the nature of the thing shows it to be another session, just as in the common case of a prorogation; and in the session 1 George, c. 2. in the Act to rectify Mistakes in the Names of the Commissioners of the Land-tax, &c. § 8. the laws which would have expired at the end of that session of Parliament, are enacted to continue in force till the end of the next session of Parliament.

So that this was a different session of the same Parliament, as the present case is, and the King did not come to the House and take the tests; so that the apprehension then must be, that the first Parliament in the 1 Gul. et Mar. must be, what certainly was the meaning of the Act when made, a new Parliament called by the authority of the successor."

On these reasons the Lords all present agreed, that there was no need for the King now to take the test; but he might do it at his coronation, if that intervened before a new Parliament should be chosen.

On the King's coming to the throne, he ordered Sir R. Walpole and Sir S. Compton to confer together about his affairs, and let him know what they thought fit to be done for his service from time to time. Sir R. Walpole seemed so sensible that he should be laid aside, that he was very irresolute what to do, whether to retire into the House of Lords and give up all business, or whether to continue.

But the King and the Speaker persuading him to continue, he went on, and undertook what the King expected from him, as to the Civil List and the Queen's jointure, which he forwarded in Parliament.

During which time, by his constant application to the King by himself in the mornings, when the Speaker, by reason of the sitting of the House of Commons, was absent, he so worked upon the King, that he not only established himself in favour with him, but prevented the cashiering of many others, who otherwise would have been put out.

The Speaker for some time came constantly to the King every afternoon, and had secret conferences with him; but in about three weeks' time, he saw his credit diminish, and so left off the constancy of his attendance. The Tories and others, who expected great changes and

alterations, finding things not to answer their expectations, began to retire about the end of the short session of Parliament that was held for settling the Civil List.

The King, when he came to the throne, had formed a system both of men and things, and to make alterations in several offices, as to their power, and particularly as to mine. About July 8th he told me that he expected to nominate to all benefices and prebendaries that the Chancellor usually nominated to. I told him, with great submission, that this was a right belonging to the office, annexed to it by Act of Parliament and immemorial usage, and I hoped he would not put things out of their ancient course. He told me my Lord Cowper* told him, that in the latter part of his Chan-

* Lord Cowper's Diary, found amongst Lord King's papers at Ockham, confirms George the Second's account of the conversation.

EXTRACT FROM LORD COWPER'S DIARY.

"November 13th, 1705.—I had the Queen's leave to bestow my livings of 40*l.* and under without consulting her.

"June 25th, 1706.—At cabinet. Before it begun, I had discourse with the Archbishop about disposing of the livings in my gift, and my having promised the Queen to present, as she directed, in all the valuable ones; he said he feared it would be under a worse management than under the late Keeper's servants, by the importunity of the women and

cellorship, in the Queen's time, he laid before the Queen a list of all persons whom he recommended to benefices, that she might be satisfied they were good Churchmen. I did not give up this point, but directly desired him to consider it; and afterwards, at another time, he told me that I should go on as usual.

Sunday, July 16th.—I then saw him again: he seemed now very pleasant, and I gave him a list of all the Judges, both in England and Wales, King's Serjeants, and Council, and other subordinate officers in the law, in his invariable nomination, and told him, that as to those which were not Judges in England, they were many of them Parliament men, and some now stood again. So he ordered me to make out *fiats* for such of them as were like to be Parliament men.

He also told me, now that he had heard that I had acted prudently in his father's time, as to the commissions of the peace, that his pleasure

other hangers-on at court, and promised to endeavour to get that matter into a proper method."

These importunate women and other hangers-on at court, were probably the first and loudest to cry the Church is in danger, on every occasion that suited their interest or secured their patronage; and they thought the best security of the Church was to be found in the worst distribution of the richest benefices in that Church.

was, that I should put into the commission of the peace all gentlemen of rank and quality in the several counties, unless they were in direct opposition to his Government; but still keep a majority of those who were known to be most firmly in his interest, and he would have me declare the former part as his sentiment.

I did declare this to very few, but I did to Sir T. Hanmer among others, which afterwards occasioned me a great deal of trouble; for he gave me the names of Sir R. Kemp, Sir C. Blois, and three others, to put into the commission of the peace for Suffolk, which I promised him to do, and intended so to have done in the November following, when the commission of the peace was renewed. I showed these names to the Duke of Grafton, the Lord-Lieutenant, but he would not hear of them. I told him what the King had told me, and what I had said to Sir Thomas Hanmer; whereon he went to the King, and complained to the King, who told me of it, and that the Duke of Grafton assured him these men were Jesuits, and that he did not intend that such should be put in. I told him I never intended to put in any such; but these were certainly gentlemen of quality, and recommended to me by Sir T. Hanmer, whom his Majesty knew to be well affected to

his Government. But I was not so fond of them; but if his Majesty did not think fit they should be put in, I should not put them in. He told me that I must in this be guided by the Duke of Grafton, the Lord Lieutenant; so I did not put them in.

November 24th, Friday. — Sir R. Walpole came to my house, and informed me that there was a treaty on foot between the King and the Duke of Wolfenbuttel, whose resident, Count Dehn, was here; that it was as good as adjusted, and that Lord Townshend being sick, he could not attend to it; and that the King would not let it be communicated to the whole Cabinet, but would take the three first of the lay Lords, viz. the Chancellor, President of the Council, Privy Seal, the two Secretaries, and Sir R. Walpole, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I told him I had heard nothing of it, but that whatever the King commanded must be submitted to. He left with me a draft of the intended treaty in English. I desired to see the French, because that must be the original.

At this time, he took occasion to tell me of the great credit he had with the King, and that it was principally by the means of the Queen, who was the most able woman to govern in the world.

However, he wished now he had left off when the King came to the throne, for he looked upon himself to be in the worst situation of any man in England; that that which engaged him to go on, was seeing every one willing to settle a large Civil List on the King. He went with the others, and that the Civil List now given exceeded the Civil List given to his father, and all the additions made to it; so that this Civil List, which was given with unanimity, was more than the late King ever had, and so was a justification of his conduct as to that matter in the late reign: that he was now struck at by a great number of people. All those who had hopes on the King's coming to the throne, seeing themselves disappointed, looked upon him as the cause. All the discontented Whigs, and Carteret, Roxburgh, Berkeley, Bolingbroke, the Speaker, Compton, and Pulteney, were entered into a formal confederacy against him; and if he could once retire, he never would meddle by way of opposition, but would comply with the Government in every thing.

25th.—Lord Townshend sent me the French draught of the intended treaty.

Sunday 26th.—At Court. Sir R. Walpole desired me to be at home the next evening, for

he would come and talk with me about the treaty. The King spoke to me that he was entering into a treaty with the Duke of Wolfenbuttel; that it was personal to him, and that he had appointed me a Commissioner. I told him it was usual to appoint the whole Cabinet. He said he did not like it. I told him I must submit to his pleasure.

27th.—I was at home all the evening to expect Sir R. Walpole; but he sent me word at eight that evening that he could not come.

28th.—Sir R. Walpole came to me in the evening, and talked to me about the treaty, and that he was against having the Cabinet; no good ever came from them.

29th.—This being the day in term when I had resolved to go to Ockham, just before I went out, there came a Bill to me by a messenger, signed by the King, for passing the Commission under the Great Seal, to treat and sign with the Ministers of the Duke of Wolfenbuttel. The said Bill or Warrant was dated the 28th of November. I immediately put the seal to the Commission, delivered it to the messenger, and forthwith went to Ockham.

30th.—Received at Ockham a letter from the Duke of Newcastle, dated November 29th, wherein he acquainted me that the treaty with

the Duke of Wolfenbuttel had been adjusted with Count Dehn; and he being very pressing to have it signed forthwith, the Duke desired me to be in town this day, that so we might meet, and sign with Count Dehn on Friday. He likewise took notice, that when I came, the Commission must be re-sealed, the reason whereof he would tell me when he saw me. To this I returned answer, that my constant and continued application to the business of the Court of Chancery had brought upon me rheumatical and sciatical pains; and if I had any regard to myself or family, I must for remedy stay three or four days in the country. And therefore, I hoped he would excuse my coming this day, especially when there was no necessity, because two are sufficient to sign.

Dec. 1st.—Received a letter from the Duke of Newcastle, dated 30th November, letting me know that there was a mistake in the date of the full power, and that which made it material was, that Count Dehn had writ to his master, on Saturday the 25th, that the treaty was then signed; and therefore the treaty must be antedated, and the King's warrant, and so sent me a new warrant, dated the 25th, to which I put the seal and returned it. And he told me by the same letter, that on the return

of this full power new sealed, they could sign the treaty without giving me any farther trouble. I received at the same time a letter from Sir R. Walpole, much to the same purpose.

January 2nd, 1728.—In the evening at the Duke of Devonshire's, there being present the said Duke, the Duke of Newcastle, Sir R. Walpole, Lord Trevor, and myself. The Duke of Newcastle and Sir R. Walpole communicated to us that the King of France had sent orders to Count Rottemburg, with *memoires* or instructions very little different from what had been desired of them; and producing a copy of these *memoires*, Sir R. Walpole asked whether any thing was to be objected to these *memoires*, or to our assenting to them. I asked him whether they were not already gone from the Court of France to Rottemburg at the Court of Spain. He told me they were. I then said that our assent was not now of any great importance. On that he went on to read them, and asked particularly whether in that part of the memoires or orders which related to the ship Prince Frederick, that it should be determined at the Congress whether it was contraband or not, *et en cette discussion* all the pretensions of Spain should be considered, and the affair of Gibraltar, or any thing relating

thereto, was included. We all thought, both from what went before and after, that it was not included. This *ultimatum* on our side was sent from the Court of France to Rottemburg, to Madrid, with orders that if it were not complied with he should come away in two days after. But before these orders came, Rottemburg prevailed on the King of Spain to propose a new ultimatum on his side, which was rather more for our advantage than that which we sent. And in the evening of January 19th, a courier brought from France this ultimatum on the Spanish side. Whereon a cabinet was held at Lord Townshend's by the King's orders on Saturday evening, 20th January, whereat were present King, Trevor, Devonshire, Argyle, Bolton, Grafton, Dorset, Wilmington, Sir R. Walpole, Townshend, Newcastle, Scarborough, and Horace Walpole, and all agreed to advise the King to comply with it. The principal matter in debate was in the article wherein the pretences about the Prince Frederick were to be left to the Congress.

There is a general clause, that all reciprocal pretensions shall be left to the Congress generally. Whether the pretension to Gibraltar was included in the general words. The 8th article of the preliminaries hath the same

word, that all pretensions shall be open at the Congress. But it is plain that that excludes any pretension about Gibraltar, because one of the preliminaries is, that all things shall continue as they were by treaties before 1725, and therefore the pretensions to be discussed, must be of such things as are consistent with the preliminaries; and though the words here be general, yet they cannot be construed to design any thing agreed to before the preliminaries: and the whole transaction of the affair and of this article, shows that it can only be meant of pretensions for prizes, indemnification for damages and the like, and so is understood by France, the Cardinal having given assurance more than once that the Court of France will support us with respect to Gibraltar. This was afterwards, with an amendment of mutually laying all pretensions before the Congress, returned to France, and from thence to Spain, who agreed to it and signed it.

After this Horace Walpole pressed the Cardinal that the powers of the Hanover alliance might settle between themselves their several pretensions, and to stick to them at the Congress. The Cardinal, upon the proposal, agreed that the preliminary article must be the groundwork of all our proceedings at the Congress,

and that the union of the Treaty of Hanover must still subsist; but he did not seem disposed to have any particular points reduced into writing, by way of agreement or instruction to the respective ministers, saying that as it was impossible to have the secret kept considering the nature of the Dutch government, so it would give an occasion to our adversaries to upbraid us with having previously settled among ourselves all points, without having heard the reasons and pretensions of others.

By Horace Walpole's letter to the Duke of Newcastle of the 23rd March, 1728, N. S. he gives an account, that that day he had been at the Cardinal's at Versailles, where he found the Dutch Ministers with him, and as they had desired that he would be present, they being then to communicate the points they had received in confidence from the Pensionary, he joined them, and the said points were then examined.

These were points proposed on the part of the States to the Ministers of France and Great Britain, as well for the form as the matter of the future Congress. The first three points were as to the form of the Congress, the last four as to the matter. They proposed that the matter should be principally to regulate and

settle among the allies of Hanover the points which created the misunderstanding and differences in Europe; as, with respect to the Dutch, the abolition of the Ostend trade, and the not granting any farther licences to the Imperial ships. And the sixth point was, that the treaties anterior to the year 1725, being to serve as a basis in the negotiations in the Congress, and the States having stipulated by the barrier treaty, 15th November, 1715, for the extension of those limits, which were regulated by the posterior convention, 22nd December 1718, and that that stipulation not having yet taken effect, as this is an important point, they proposed whether this should not be carried to the Congress. Mr. Walpole declared, that England being a party and guarantee to the barrier treaty, was ready to do what might be thought proper. The Cardinal said it was to be considered, whether it would not be more advisable for the States to renew first their application to the Imperial Court, for the execution of these treaties.

The seventh point was about Embden; that the Dutch having been in possession for more than an hundred years, to put a garrison in the town of Embden, and in the fort of Lierwort,

in East Friesland; that if in virtue of any decrees given or to be given by the Aulic Chamber at Vienna, in the differences between the prince and the States of East Friesland, or otherwise they should endeavour to oblige the Dutch troops to withdraw out of these places, and put others in their room, in prejudice of so long and just a possession, which is absolutely necessary for their safety on that side, that they cannot neglect to maintain their garrisons there, in persuasion and expectation that the allies will, in case of necessity, assist them, and therefore they desired to know their sentiments thereon. If it would be proper to bring this point to the Congress, or if it be sufficient that the States be assured of the assistance of France and Great Britain in the cases before mentioned?

As to this, the Cardinal in this conference seemed desirous to be more particularly informed of the titles and facts relating to the States' rights for having a garrison in that place. Mr. Walpole was of opinion that the possession of a hundred years, and the States immediate security, was strong indication of having right and reason on their side, and motives which, on account of the strict union between them

Great Britain and France, might induce them to consider what will be necessary for the security and satisfaction of the States in it.

To this letter of the 23rd March, 1728 N. S. the Duke of Newcastle sent two letters to Horace Walpole, by Sharp the messenger, the one private, the other very private, both dated 21st March, 1727-8, O. S. In the private letter he signifies that it was the King's sentiment that the Hanover allies should immediately come to a resolution, not to agree to any thing at the Congress but what is conformable to the preliminary articles, and to the several engagements they are under to each other as to any other power, and that he thought that something of this nature should be put into writing; and that he thought the Cardinal's objection against reducing the principal points into writing might be obviated, and that the thing might be kept a secret, it being in effect no more than settling what particular instructions shall be given to the ministers of the several powers; that the rejecting any proposal inconsistent with the engagement that the Hanover allies are under to each other, or to any other power, would greatly shorten the business, as indeed comprehending most, if not all, the points that came properly in debate. But as it

may be thought necessary to insert, particularly in the instructions, such points as relate to each power, Mr. Walpole is directed to take care to have those in which his Majesty and his subjects are more immediately concerned, explained and settled, the chief of which are already secured by the Hanover treaty and the preliminary articles, and therefore the Duke doth not enter into particulars, but only in general observes that it should be inserted in the instructions, that any proposal against His Majesty's possessions, and particularly that of Gibraltar, should be rejected; and that effectual care should be taken to put the trade of England, France, and Holland upon the foot it was before the year 1725. That as some points are referred to the decision of the Congress, relating to the contraband trade carried on by the ship the Prince Frederick, and to the restitution of prizes taken at sea, justice should be done to the King and his subjects, and to all others of that nature that might be carried to the Congress.

As to the paper given in by the Dutch Ministers containing these points, he suggests to him, that his Majesty is willing to do whatever the Dutch think necessary for their security; and then answers point by point, and particu-

larly as to the barrier, that his Majesty is ready to give all the assurances imaginable to the Dutch for the execution of the barrier treaty. And as to the affair of Embden, that the King is willing to give them all possible assurance of his assistance and support.

In the very private letter of the same date, sent by the same messenger, the Duke writes, that though in the paper of points delivered to the Dutch Ministers, there are two points which cannot well be said to have been any cause of the present misunderstanding between the Powers now at variance, and consequently cannot be looked upon as an object of the preliminary articles; viz. what relates to the barrier treaty, and to the affair of Embden; yet the King, out of his great desire to preserve in every thing the most perfect unanimity with the States, has given into it, and hopes that this great facility he has shown in what concerns them, will procure a suitable return from them in whatsoever may assist his Majesty's interest; and that they will stand by him in regard to any little dispute which the King may have to settle with the Emperor and the Congress. The points that occur to his Majesty at present are, the investiture of Bremen and Verden, and what relates to the country of Ha-

delen. It is certain that his Majesty is very hardly dealt with in both these cases; and it is not natural that there should be a perfect reconciliation with the Emperor till he has done the King justice on these heads.

Your Excellency will in great confidence mention these points to Mr. Pesters, and show him the justice thereof; that as his Majesty makes no difficulty in what concerns the States, they should show the King the same regard in what touches his particular interest. You will ask Mr. Pesters whether he thinks the States will come into it, and whether he can take upon him to answer for it; and if he cannot, you will beg of him to write to the Pensionary upon it, and in the mean time not to mention it to Mr. Van Hoes. But if Mr. Pesters himself is willing to engage for it, you will then speak of it to the Cardinal, or otherwise not say any thing of it to him till you have the Pensionary's answers; and if our friends in Holland do agree to it, as it is hardly possible to imagine they should not, you will then take care to have it inserted in the instructions to the several plenipotentiaries at the Congress.

In the said very private letter, the Duke tells Mr. Walpole that he was sufficiently apprised of the matter of Bremen and Verden; but as

to the country of Hadelen, he inclosed in his letter a paper containing a particular statement of that matter, which was drawn by Mr. St. Saphorin, the contents of which paper was this. The country of Hadelen, which was part of the estates of the late Duke of Saxe Lawenburg, was taken into sequestration by the Emperor; whilst the Princes of the House of Brunswick put themselves in possession of the rest of the Duchy of Saxe Lawenburg, in virtue of the right of reversion which they had. The Electoral House of Saxony pretended, that both the Duchy and the country of Hadelen ought to come to him, in consequence *des expectatives* which the Emperor had given him. But afterwards, the Electoral House of Saxony yielded their right to his late Majesty. On the other side, the Princess of Baden, daughter of the late Duke of Lawenburg, pretended also to the succession; yet neither she, nor the Princess Palatine her sister, could hinder the present Emperor from giving, in the year 1716, the investitures of the possessor of Lawenburg to his late Majesty. But as to the country of Hadelen being taken once into sequestration, it there remains, under pretence that it could not be given to the King before the Aulic Council had decided this dispute by way of law.

It was to no purpose that it was shown on the part of his Majesty, that this country was always a part of Lawenburg, and by consequence ought to follow its fate; and it was in vain to remember the Court of Vienna of the promises which the Emperor had made to the King in the year 1713, whilst he had a great body of troops at the disposition of the Emperor, that this country should be remitted to him. They persisted still at Vienna to say that they would not invest the King without a previous judgment. The Imperial Court was thereon strongly pressed to examine this affair before the Aulic Council.

At length, after many delays, this Council examined the pretensions of the Princesses of Saxe Lawenburg, and those of Sweden, which made some also; and both were found to be without any right, and rejected. And then, when every one expected that in consequence thereof the investiture of this country would be given to the late King, the Count de Wurmbrand maintained in the Aulic Council, that the fief did not belong to the late King, but was escheated, and by consequence devolved to the Emperor. This notion caused great debates in the Aulic Council. But the proposition of the Count de Wurmbrand, in all pro-

bability underhand supported by the Court, carried it by the plurality of votes, referring it nevertheless to the Emperor, and laying before him the reasons of both opinions. Since which nothing publicly had been done thereon, so that it is in the power of the Emperor to do justice to the present King, and to give him possession of this country of Hadelen.

In a letter from Mr. Walpole and Lord Waldgrave from Paris to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 30th of March, N. S. 1728, they tell him, that in order to execute his Majesty's commands contained in his Grace's and Lord Townshend's letters of the 11th inst. O. S. to each of them respectively, they waited on the Cardinal that morning at Versailles; and having thoroughly considered the point upon which they were to endeavour to learn his Eminence's sentiments, and the manner of doing it, they thought it most prudent, instead of communicating to him a French translation of Lord Townshend's letter, to make use of Lord Waldgrave's taking leave of him, on account of his setting out the Monday following for Vienna, to desire to know his thoughts upon some matters about which it was reasonable to expect that the Court of Vienna would sound him upon his arrival there. One of the points was

about guaranteeing the Emperor's succession; another was the Emperor's design of uniting the Duchies of Milan and Mantua, and making them a feminine fief to be annexed to the Empire.

The next point was, whether such interests and pretensions as were only collateral, particularly those of the North and the Germanic body, should or should not be considered at the Congress. The Cardinal seemed to be of opinion that these matters should be postponed, and considered or not as circumstances might require, after things of more immediate concern should have been debated and settled; though he thinks that the affair of the North, and particularly that of Sleswick, is an object of the preliminaries by virtue of an article in them Lastly, they mentioned to his Eminence the injustice done to his Majesty by the sequestration of the country of Hadelen, and the refusal of the investiture of Bremen and Verden, letting his Eminence know that his Majesty would never make any separate addresses to the Imperial Court for his undoubted rights in these points, being persuaded that France would be equally steady in their engagement to him. His Eminence said that he was convinced that the Emperor detained these things without

doing his Majesty justice, in the hope of obtaining some particular advantage from it, and therefore he was very sensible of this mark of his Majesty's steadiness and union, and that he might depend at all times upon a suitable return from their Court.

May 19th.—At Lord Townshend's; met himself, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Trevor, Duke of Newcastle and Sir R. Walpole; about renewing the treaties with Holland; the Dutch usually renewing all their treaties with us on the accession of a new King; this was only a renewing of the old treaties with an explanation about rehearing of causes of no great significancy; and the 27th following, these treaties were signed by us six on the part of England, and by the Count Welderen and Sylvius on the part of Holland. 28th May, the Parliament was prorogued to the 8th of August following.

Monday, November.—A letter came from Fontainbleau, dated 8th, N. S. from Messrs. Stanhope and Walpole, informing us that Count Zinzendorf, on the arrival of a courier from Vienna, was much altered as to his countenance and disposition, and that it appeared to be his orders not to sign without the concurrence of Spain, and that it appeared that he had many personal enemies at Vienna, and he

intended to return to Vienna as soon as he had a courier from Madrid, to know how the Duke of Bournonville was there received; and that he would go to Vienna before the Duke of Bournonville returned to Soissons, and hoped by his presence to set things right again.

This seems to put a stop to the affairs of the peace; thereupon the Duke of Newcastle sent a letter, dated November 6th, O. S. to Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Walpole, that in case nothing should come of the Duke of Bournonville's journey to Madrid, from which little good could be expected, they should forthwith communicate to the Cardinal his Majesty's sentiments thereon, in order to be prepared for the worst, and to be determined amongst ourselves what to do in such an emergency which is likely to fall out.

As the notion of a provisional treaty arose from the Court of Vienna, the reason of it was apprehended to be, that if the Congress went on, the several grievances of the empire, the affair of the marriages and many other points would be brought before them, contrary to the Emperor's inclination, and therefore his Majesty thought that one way of terrifying the Imperial Court would be, to let them see that if the Congress should be resumed, these points would infallibly come into debate, and the

Allies must have justice done on them. But the chief point that the King thinks is to be pressed is, that the Allies of Hanover should, upon the refusal of the Emperor and Spain, take a resolution generally, which should be communicated both to the Imperial Court and to that of Spain, whereby the Allies should declare, that in case the Emperor and Spain will not come into the provisional treaty, as last adjusted by Count Zinzendorf with the English, French, and Spanish Ministers, and promised to be generally supported by them all, that then within a time certain, for example, two months, the Allies will then break off all negotiations, and take the proper measures to obtain such satisfaction and redress upon their several grievances, and to procure for themselves that justice which they could not obtain by the way of treaty and negotiation: this his Majesty looking upon to be the only means left for bringing these two powers to a compliance. As the declaration, in the King's opinion, would be a right measure with regard to the Emperor and Spain, his Majesty does also look upon it to be what his Allies cannot refuse to come into. The Cardinal will consider that the King is just upon opening the session of Parliament, and had the greatest reason to hope

that the negotiation would by this time have been finished to his own and his Allies, satisfaction; while, on the contrary, matters seem now to be farther from a settlement than ever, the Emperor gone back from what his own Minister proposed, and Spain more intractable than it had ever been; and if his Majesty cannot have the satisfaction to show his Parliament that his Allies are still firm and steady to him, and that if an end of our present difficulties cannot be brought about one way, it will another; which will be one good effect of the proposed declaration. The Cardinal will much reflect what will then be the notion here of France, and of the manner of that Crown's supporting its engagements, especially when it cannot be denied that if the French Court had showed the vigour they ought to have done, all this must have been over several months ago, and his Majesty doth not conceive that the Cardinal in justice or friendship can refuse this, or that in act or policy he should be inclined to do so.

March 19th, 1728-9.—Lord Townshend sent me some letters from Lord Chesterfield, Ambassador in Holland, to Lord Townshend, and his answers; the first was a private letter from the Hague, from Lord Chesterfield to Lord

Townshend, dated 15th March, 1729; wherein he wrote that he had been yesterday with the Pensionary, to know if he had any positive answer to give upon the subject of a very private letter of the 20th of February, O. S. of Lord Townshend's, and that the answer he gave was, that he had consulted with the Greffier, and with some few others of his friends, upon the proposition of concerting a plan with England, to oblige the Emperor and Spain to come into measures, and to excite and press France to join in that design, but that he found it was impossible for him to propose it here; that they were so sensible of their own weakness, so persuaded of the inactivity of France, and so apprehensive of engaging in measures that may by any accident bring on a war, that he was sure such a proposal would be instantly rejected, and with a good share of indignation upon himself for having done it. That the only possible way of bringing it about, was for England and France to join in pressing the Republic to come into such measures, in which case, he believed, they neither could or would refuse, but to act separately with England alone he was sure they would never do it.

The Earl of Chesterfield proceeds farther in his letter to give an account of the arguments

that he made use of with the Pensionary to induce him to enter into the concerting of the said plan with England, but it was all without success. For the Pensionary told him that he was as much convinced of the truth of those reasonings as Lord Chesterfield could be himself, and as desirous to bring the Republic into vigorous measures if possible; but that the weakness of the government, the private interest of some, and the reasonable fears of others, made it impossible to carry it through, and consequently imprudent to attempt it. That besides, the stay that the Prince of Orange had made at the Hague, though but short, had given so great an alarm, and caused so much uneasiness amongst the anti-Stadholder party, that they could think of nothing else, and they would apprehend that a war would facilitate the designs of that Prince.

The Earl of Chesterfield says farther in that letter, that it is impossible to describe the miserable situation of the Republic. The disputes between province and province engross both the thoughts and the time of the States General, as the disputes between town and town wholly employ the states of each particular province. Private interest or resentment is to be gratified at the expense of the whole. Present and im-

minent dangers are neglected for the fear of those remote and chimerical; and I may venture to say with justice of this government, that the utter ignorance of some, the notorious depravity of many, and the private view of all, render this Republic at present a most contemptible enemy, and a most insignificant ally.

Of the same date with the former letter, the Earl of Chesterfield sent another very secret letter to Lord Townshend, that having mentioned in his private letter something the Pensionary said to him concerning the Prince of Orange, he would in this give him a more particular account of what passed between him and the Pensionary on that subject, viz.—that the Pensionary having recapitulated every thing that had happened during that Prince's stay at the Hague, said, that every body looked upon his coming there as a forerunner of his match with the Princess Royal, and upon that match as a sure forerunner of the Stadhouderat; that this persuasion gave the utmost uneasiness there, and unless removed, might be attended at the time with very ill consequences, and that he wished some declaration could be made, or something done on the part of England to quiet their fears. That he was informed the Prince of Orange was to return here in

May at the time of the Kermes, and when the troops were to be exercised, and the militia under arms. That this would give a general alarm, and might have a very ill effect with regard to England at the time, and therefore desired that his return might be prevented. The Pensionary, in farther talking about the affairs of the Stadtholder, said, that when he was made Pensionary, he was asked whether he would be for preserving the present form of government? That he had promised he would, and though he plainly said now, that sooner or later a Stadtholder would come, that yet he would not betray his trust as a minister, but when that should happen, "*il quitteroit la partie*," and retire.

The Earl of Chesterfield afterwards goes on in the said letter, and writes that the Prince of Orange's presence at the Hague had had a much better effect than either his friends could have expected, or his enemies apprehended. The people followed him wherever he went, crying out Long live our Stadtholder! and uttering bitter invectives against the present government; so that with a very little trouble a tumult might have been raised equal to that in 1672. His levee was crowded with officers of all ranks, who openly declared themselves for

him; and even those who talked the loudest against him before his arrival, and declared they would not go near him, seeing the fury of the people in his favour, thought it prudent at last to wait upon him, though with an ill grace. The great point then to be considered, and by which that Prince, I think, is to direct his conduct, is, whether his Majesty intends to bestow the Princess Royal on him or not; and when? If his Majesty should think fit to make that match this summer, I think it is absolutely necessary he should return to this place at the time I mentioned before, viz. May next at the Kermes, both upon account of the main view of the Stadhouderat, and upon account of his admission into the council of state in September, which is a very important point, and a leading card to the other.[o] For as I am persuaded the Pensionary and the Greffier can never be brought to approve that match, whenever it shall be made, the scabbard is thrown away, and the main object must be pushed with vigour, and I doubt not with success. On the other hand it is certain that the match, the return of the Prince, and his admission to the council of state, will cause very great disorders here, both parties being now animated in the highest degree, so that it is to be considered how far

the present situation of public affairs makes it advisable or not to venture those disorders that will inevitably happen. Upon the whole, I am persuaded the Prince is not likely to be Stadtholder by fair means, the power and profit of that employment being so much taken away from the most considerable people of the province, who will always oppose it. But I am convinced too, that whenever it shall be thought proper to push that affair, a general insurrection of the people may with very little difficulty and expense be procured, and a Stadtholder imposed upon the province.

10th March, 1728-9, O. S. Lord Townshend wrote to Lord Chesterfield, that the King was sorry to see by his letter of the 15th inst. N. S. that it would be in vain to propose to the Republic the concerting of a plan with his Majesty, in order to press France to join in it, and by that means effectually oblige the Emperor and Spain to come to a speedy determination. But his Majesty hopes and expects that the States may be induced to join with his Majesty (should the provisional treaty be rejected by the Courts of Vienna and Madrid) in preventing our being carried back to the Congress again; and therefore your Excellency may in confidence assure the Pensionary and

Greffier that his Majesty is at all events determined not to submit to this. But this is certainly the aim of the Court of Madrid, and we have reason to think that the Court of Vienna has likewise the same view. The term prescribed by the 8th article of the preliminary treaty for the duration of the Congress, is but four months. Now, not only that number, but above as many more have been spent since the opening of the Congress, and that purely by the fault of Spain, which has not hitherto vouchsafed to give the allies of Hanover an answer upon the provisional treaty. His Majesty might in justice insist upon the execution of the preliminaries in this point, which limits the duration of the Congress to the term before mentioned, and in consequence not permit his plenipotentiaries to return thither, unless it be to sign the provisional treaty; but rather chooses to abide by the preliminaries for the remainder of the seven years prescribed by them as the term for the cessation of hostilities, than begin the Congress again. Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Walpole will be going to France the latter end of this week or the beginning of the next, and will be instructed to acquaint the Cardinal with his Majesty's resolution not to go back to the Congress unless to sign. His Majesty

must, for the reason before mentioned, insist to know the Pensionary's opinion as to the probability of obtaining from the State the same orders to their Ministers at Paris, to join with those of England in the particular.

The same 10th March, O. S. Lord Townshend wrote a very secret letter to the Earl of Chesterfield, in answer to the Earl's said very secret letter of the 19th March, 1729, N.S. wherein he writes, " Your Excellency knows that the King, as well as his royal father, always looked upon the States as the only ally upon whose friendship they could rely upon all occasions; and in consequence of this principally, his Majesty, as well as the late King, has never suffered any other consideration, but the real good and prosperity of the public, to have any share in his sentiments, or in the part he was acting towards them; and for this reason, it always has been his intention, that his ministers residing in Holland, should avoid entering into any factions or cabals. It is no secret to the Pensionary, that his Majesty, out of regard to the House of Nassau, and foreseeing from the confused and disunited state of the Commonwealth under its present form, that the Prince might one day arrive at being Stadtholder, has given him reason to hope that, at some time or other, he

may have one of his Majesty's daughters in marriage. And in this the King thinks he has acted the part of a true friend, not only to the Prince, but to the Republic; there being no alliance so desirable for them as that of a Princess of England: farther than this the King has not gone. In order to give the Pensionary the most signal proof of the confidence reposed in him, his Majesty is resolved to break through the rule he has hitherto prescribed to himself, in not interposing in what relates to the government of the Republic, and to comply with what the Pensionary desires of him, by using his good offices with the Prince, to induce him not to return to the Hague at the time of the Kermes; your Excellency will therefore find some way of acquainting, in the utmost secrecy, either the Prince or somebody in his confidence, that his Majesty doth earnestly entreat his Highness to consider most maturely how far it may be advisable for him to return to the Hague at the time of the fair."

25th March, 1729. N. S.—The Earl of Chesterfield writes from the Hague to Lord Townshend, that he had received his letter of the 10th instant, O. S. and that he had communicated his private letter to the Pensionary and Greffier; and after they had considered of it,

waited separately on the Pensionary and Greffier, to know their determination upon it. The Pensionary told him that he was persuaded the Republic could never be brought to send orders to their plenipotentiaries not to return to the Congress, unless to sign the provisional treaty, without knowing first what part France would take in that affair; that the provisional treaty had never been much relished in Holland, and therefore it was very improbable that they would agree to break up the Congress for the sake of it; that he was convinced, should he make the proposal to the States, they would look upon the breaking up of the Congress as the beginning of hostilities, the thing they dread here. That they would certainly take the proposal *ad referendum*, and consult their principals upon it; by which means the affair would become public, and if not agreed to at last, as he was persuaded it would not, the attempt proving unsuccessful, he thought would be attended with many very ill consequences, both with regard to his Majesty and the alliance. That he thought the most probable way to get this proposition agreed to by the Republic, was for his Majesty's plenipotentiaries to communicate with the plenipotentiaries of those States their orders not to return to the Congress unless to

sign, and to press them, *id est*, the Dutch ministers, strongly to join with them; that of course they would write this to the States, and desire instructions upon it, and that he thought it more likely to obtain such instructions that way than any other, especially if France seemed to come into it, or even did not oppose it. That he was persuaded France would do nothing till they saw what became of the effects of the galleons, and that even afterwards, he very much questioned if they could ever be brought to aid: which persuasion he said was so universal here, that it was one of the great causes of the unwillingness and apprehensions of their Republic. The sentiments of the Greffier, on my conversation, were much the same, that till he had his Majesty's farther orders, he should not show him the letter about the Prince of Orange. That the affairs of the Prince of Orange in Zealand seemed to take a favourable turn, and I think it not impossible, that he may be declared Stadtholder of that province very unexpectedly; the whole thing depends upon three people, two of whom are corruptible. I must therefore beg to know whether, if a sum not exceeding ten thousand should absolutely secure that affair, I might, upon a proper occasion, be empowered to promise it?

18th March, 1728, O. S.—Lord Townshend wrote to Lord Chesterfield, to make his Majesty's compliments to the Pensionary, for so freely declaring his opinion, and for suggesting the expedient which he thought the most probable, in order to get his Majesty's proposal agreed to by the States; in pursuance of which opinion, Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Walpole will have his Majesty's instructions, upon their return to Paris, to press the Dutch Plenipotentiaries to join with them in declaring the resolution of their masters not to return to the Congress unless to sign; and as the Pensionary thinks this the best method of bringing that matter before the States, his Majesty depends, when it does actually come thither, that he will apply his whole credit and influence towards procuring a favourable resolution upon it. That the King approved his not communicating his letter about the Prince of Orange, before he had transmitted an account of his conference with the Pensionary and Greffier. That a new one was now sent him much to the same effect with the first. That as to the proposal that the King should advance a sum of money towards procuring the Stadtholderate of the province of Zealand for the Prince of Orange, his Majesty did not think it at all ex-

pedient for him to take a step of that nature at present, when the consequences may be throwing things into disorder, and without any immediate real advantage to the Prince. Lord Townshend told me, after I had read these letters, that there were two material things in them: the refusing to go to the Congress unless to sign, and the King's interfering so far as he doth in these letters, and no farther; I told him I had no objection against either of them.

Monday, March 24th.—Lord Townshend desired me to come to his house in the evening, to consider about the instructions to be given to Horace Walpole and Mr. Stanhope on their return to France. I went accordingly about six o'clock, and there met with Lord Townshend, Duke of Devonshire, Lord Trevor, Duke of Newcastle, and Sir Robert Walpole, Mr. Stanhope, and Horace Walpole. The latter produced and read a long paper, which he called the state of the case since the passing the preliminaries. The scope of it was to make a narration of the fact, and that though the matters in dispute between us and Spain were by the preliminary articles and the act of the Pardo to be determined in four months, yet Spain had done nothing; and seeing they did nothing, an expedient of a provisional treaty had been found

out, which the Emperor's Minister went into and encouraged, and the answer that Spain gave was, that the preliminary articles should serve for a basis of a future treaty. But Bournonville was to return to the Court to give an account of what had been done, and then they would give their answers; that Bournonville returned to Madrid the 5th November last, but no answer had ever yet been given; and therefore it was proposed that the instructions to our Ambassadors now going, should be, not to return to the Congress unless it were to sign the provisional treaty; and that this should be in confidence told the Cardinal upon their coming over privately, by which means we should put an end to this long negotiation. Some debate arising hereon, and the Duke of Grafton, and the Earl of Scarborough coming in towards the conclusion, it was agreed that Horace Walpole should against Wednesday night draw up these instructions in form, or at least reduce them into writing, and then they would be the better considered. Friday night the same company met at the same place, where the instructions were brought prepared, and read over, much to the same purpose.

Friday, May 16th.—In the evening at the Duke of Devonshire's: there were present the

Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of Newcastle, Duke of Grafton, Lord Trevor, Lord Privy Seal, myself, Earl of Scarborough, Earl Godolphin, and Sir Robert Walpole. The Duke of Newcastle told us that the King being to go tomorrow, and having appointed the Queen Regent, he desired that we would meet, as there should be occasion, and that we would not tell any one either of the message or of this, or of any other meeting that we should have, because there were some others that might expect, to whom it was not fit that every thing should be known; and the present occasion of our meetting was to deliberate upon letters come in from Mr. Keene, importing that the Spaniards had refused to return any answer to his memorial, which they said they had prepared an answer to. But the Marquis del Paz being asked whether this was to break off all intercourse with us and to commence hostilities, he said that the reason of it was this, he had sent a letter in the King's name to the Cardinal, and that the Cardinal had sent back an haughty answer without communicating the letter to his King; and that their Ambassadors had advised them that Chauvelin had said, "*qu'on avait déjà pris partie*," so that they took it for granted, that the Hanover Allies were already engaged to begin hostilities,

and therefore it was as good for them to break off now as a month hence. And that therefore it lay upon us, before we would have any answer from them, to procure an *éclaircissement* of the Cardinal's letter. Upon this, it was considered that there was already gone from Paris our ultimatum in effect, that this before was a sufficient explanation of how far he would go with respect to Don Carlos. And this seemed to be only a method of Spain to bring us to open ourselves more thoroughly on that point, which Mr. Keene receiving by way of Paris, would set all this matter clear and plain. On a conference that Patino had with Brancas, he declared that he was not in the interest of the Emperor: that the methods he had brought them into were prejudicial to this country, but they were forced to follow them; that they were getting out as fast as they could, and therefore conjured Brancas to treat their King with respect, otherwise he could be forced back again into the Emperor's power.

Thursday, June 6th.—About eleven in the forenoon was at Lord Godolphin's, where were present besides him, Duke of Newcastle, Earl of Scarborough, Lord Trevor, myself, Lord Torrington, and Sir Charles Wager. Where I was informed that the Saturday before, at a

meeting at Sir R. Walpole's, it had been agreed to advise the King to send away the fleet immediately from Portsmouth; but that more letters were since come from Spain, which though not a direct answer to the memorials presented by Mr. Keene and Mr. Brancas, yet they contained hopes and expectations that Spain would in three or four days give a direct answer to our satisfaction; and therefore it was thought advisable that the fleet should stay a few days, till we had a more direct answer from Spain.

Wednesday 11th, and Friday 13th,—were meetings of the Select Lords at Sir Robert Walpole's, but I could not be there. It was there agreed that the fleet should not yet sail, the occasion whereof was this. There were letters from the plenipotentiaries in France, that they had considered with the French Ministers that too much time might be lost at this season of the year, now perhaps a favourable occasion, should they forbear any longer to let the Court of Spain know the ultimate resolution of England and France relating to the succession of Tuscany and Parma. And being thoroughly convinced by the advice from all quarters, that the union and intimacy between Spain and the Emperor, if not broken, was become very weak

and cold; and that the Queen of Spain was at present sincerely disposed to be reconciled with the Hanover Allies, if they did not lose the opportunity of gratifying her in that darling point, of securing the succession of Tuscany and Parma to her son Don Carlos; and therefore they had thought proper to send the English and French Ministers in Spain new instructions, which were sent away the 3rd of June, O. S. a copy of which instructions was sent over, and were instructions to Mr. Keene and Mr. Brancas, that in case their Catholic Majesties would not be satisfied with Swiss garrisons, either neutral or in the pay of Spain, to declare the consent of their masters to Spanish garrisons, on condition that the preliminaries be fully and immediately executed, and all our demands satisfied. And if in fifteen days' time after this proposal they should find there was nothing more to hope for, whether by refusal to give an answer, or the answer did not tend to a speedy conclusion, they should present a memorial, and thereby declare that the Kings of Great Britain and France should think themselves obliged immediately to take measures the most convenient to procure themselves reparation for those grievances suffered by the inexecution of the preliminaries.

It was thought that on this new method taken, seeing there could not possibly be an answer till the beginning of July, the fleet should stay till that time, and that if a satisfactory answer did not then come, that part of the fleet should sail to Gibraltar, and another part to the West Indies.

Tuesday, 17th. — At Lord Godolphin's about eleven o'clock in the morning; there were present, Lord Godolphin, myself, Lord Trevor, Duke of Newcastle, Earl of Scarborough, Duke of Grafton, and Sir Robert Walpole. We were informed that at Hanover, the opinion there was against the present sailing of the fleet; and there was a letter read, that came that morning from Lord Townshend, to acquaint us from the King, that the last time that the English and Dutch fleet were formed, all our orders to our fleet were sent to the Dutch for their concurrence, and they joined with us in every thing, and that the same must be done now. I found, by Sir Robert Walpole, that he was very uneasy at the junction of the Dutch fleet with ours at Portsmouth, wondered how they came there, and that it would not facilitate but retard our operations. This made me think that this, in some measure, sprung from a misunderstanding between

him and Lord Townshend, which to me was visible; and that Townshend, whilst he was in Holland, on his way to Hanover, procured the Dutch fleet to come, who were originally designed for the Baltic; and it seemed odd to me that they should come in this manner, without any concert with us, or any determination what to do.

On the whole, seeing the fleet could not sail till an answer came from Spain, which could not be till about the middle of July, we agreed that the Duke of Newcastle should write to Lord Townshend with names of us present; that we were entirely of opinion that a good correspondence should be kept with the States General, but desired that the King would forthwith order Lord Chesterfield to agree with the Dutch upon the orders proper to be given to the fleet, in case of a dissatisfactory answer from Spain; that so no time may then be spent in concerting measures about our actions, but they may be speedily executed.

After this there was read a draught of a letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Hunter, Governor of Jamaica, to take off an embargo that he had hastily laid upon the ships there, and to let all the trade ships come away.

When this was done, I came away to go to Westminster Hall—What was done afterwards I know not, and if any thing afterwards done was writ in my name as well as others, it was because I was there the beginning, but went away before any thing else was done but that which is above written.

The aforesaid letter that came from Lord Townshend was dated at Hanover $\frac{10}{21}$ June 1729, to the Duke of Newcastle, wherein he writes him, that his Majesty had ordered him to acquaint his Grace, that since the States have resolved to join their squadron to his Majesty's fleet at Portsmouth, and it is probable that Admiral Somelsdyke may be already there with the ships under his command, in order to preserve the great harmony and concert that subsists between the King and the States, it will be necessary for the future, when any orders are to be sent to Sir Charles Wager, that they should be transmitted to Lord Chesterfield, to be by his Lordship previously communicated to the Pensionary and Greffier; that having been the constant practice during the last war, whenever the fleets of the two nations were united.

I afterwards saw the copy of what the Duke of Newcastle sent to the Lord Townshend, in

a letter dated June 17th, 1729, as the said resolutions and advice of the said Lords here. The Duke writes, that their Lordships came to the resolution mentioned in the enclosed minute, which was taken in their presence, and is, by the Queen's command, as well as their Lordships' request, transmitted to Lord Townshend to be laid before the King.—The minute enclosed was this.

"At the Earl of Godolphin's, June 17th, 1729, Present—Lord Chancellor, Duke of Grafton, Earl of Scarborough, Lord Privy Seal, Earl of Godolphin, Sir R. Walpole, Duke of Newcastle.

"My Lord Townshend's letter of the $\frac{10}{21}$ June, having by the Queen's command been laid before the Lords, their Lordships are humbly of opinion that Lord Townshend should be wrote to, acquainting his Lordship that the Lords here were always of opinion that a good correspondence should be kept up with the States General, and upon that principle did humbly offer it to his Majesty's consideration in the last letter to my Lord Townshend (I was not present when this letter was agreed on or wrote, and never saw it) that the orders to be sent to the united fleets should be in concert with them: and in consequence of the same

opinion, their Lordships do now humbly offer it to his Majesty as their advice, that immediate orders should be sent to Lord Chesterfield to prevail with the States without loss of time to send orders to their Admiral to sail and act in conjunction with his Majesty's fleet, upon the first notice of an unsatisfactory answer from the Court of Spain, that the time of action and execution may not be lost in farther concerting measures for it. But their Lordships beg leave still to give it as their humble advice, that whatsoever is to be done in the West Indies, should be singly done by his Majesty's fleet, for the reasons mentioned in the letter, in which case their Lordships think a previous concerting the less necessary, which might possibly disappoint the success of it. In a letter afterwards received from Lord Townshend, directed to the Duke of Newcastle from Hanover $\frac{20\text{th June,}}{1\text{st July,}}$ he writes, that his Majesty had agreed to the introduction of Spanish garrisons into the places of Tuscany and Parma, and that the States had also agreed to enter into this engagement with Spain, which, considering the conduct throughout the whole negotiation with respect to the quadruple alliance and for some years since, the King had little reason to expect they would have obliged

themselves. However, it was of great importance to his Majesty, because it engages them jointly with us in all the consequences that our guarantee of the above-mentioned garrisons to Spain may draw upon us, and may likewise be a great inducement to Spain to accept of our last proposal. He writes, moreover, that the King agrees entirely with the Lords of the Council in their opinion, that if the Court of Spain should endeavour by their answer still to amuse and avoid coming to a conclusion with us, and nothing of consequence should be attempted against the Spaniards this Summer, it will not be hard to foresee what ill effect it may have, not only throughout the whole kingdom, but in the next session of Parliament. And therefore his Majesty is of the same sentiment with your Grace and their Lordships, that a certain day should be fixed for the united squadrons to sail after the expiration of the term prescribed to the Ministers at Madrid, to give in a second memorial, in case the Court of Spain should not comply with what had been proposed. And accordingly he writes by his Majesty's command to his Ministers in France and Holland, to press the Cardinal and the Pensionary upon that subject, and to endeavour to bring France and the

States to consent to the fixing of a day, as their Lordships have proposed.

As to the operations of the English and Dutch squadrons, proposed to be undertaken at the same time, both upon the coast of Spain and in the West Indies, the two squadrons being now joined, nothing can be determined as to his Majesty's squadron sailing alone to the West Indies, till the sentiments of the States are known upon that head, and my Lord Chesterfield is directed to sound the Pensionary as to the share the Republic will like most to take in the projected operations both in Europe and America. At the same time the King is apprehensive that the Dutch will not care to let their whole squadron lie without detachments before Cadiz, to hinder the flota or the galleons from sailing from thence to the West Indies, and leave the trade of their subjects in America to be protected only by the King's fleet in those parts. Especially considering the exceeding great losses they have suffered from the Spaniards there, and the interest they have themselves to defend their trade, to take and destroy the Spanish men of war and *guarda costas*, their bitter enemies, and to avenge and repair their own immense sufferings in that part of the world. Wherefore as

it appears probable to his Majesty that the Dutch will be inclined to join some of their ships to those of the King's that shall be ordered to the West Indies, which cannot be refused them if they desire it; his Majesty is of opinion that this part of their Lordships' scheme, which relates to the operation of his fleet alone in those seas, should be kept secret, since the States would most certainly oppose it, and the proposing it to them would most certainly break the union which subsists between them and his Majesty, which would be fatal at this juncture. Besides, the sailing of the joint squadron thither upon some general concert, in common for annoying the Spaniards and protecting the trade of both nations, will not hinder his Majesty from sending some more ships in a reasonable time after, with four Irish battalions on board, under pretence of strengthening our garrisons in those parts, in order to put in execution any attempt on Porto Rico, or any other place of the Spanish dominions there. Such particular expeditions have been several times undertaken in the last war without any communication with our allies, and cannot reasonably be excepted against in case a war should be actually begun with Spain—and this may be done without putting the nation

to any greater expense, by finding some pretence to keep back so many of Sir Charles Wager's squadron as may be thought necessary to convey the troops that shall be sent to the West Indies. As to the two thousand men which his Majesty offered to put on board his fleet going to the coast of Spain, in my letter of $\frac{31st\ May,}{11th\ June,}$ it was in answer to their address of the 1st of June, N. S. wherein they desired his Majesty's thoughts as to the operations which they should suggest to the Cardinal for acting jointly against Spain, in case the conduct of that Court should oblige the allies to come to an immediate rupture with them; and as his Majesty thinks it of the greatest consequence to engage France to come to open hostilities with Spain, if the Cardinal likes the proposal of embarking troops on board our fleet, to be sent to the Spanish coast to assist the French in any operations on that side, his Majesty, besides the four Irish battalions designed to execute the scheme in the West Indies, would have two English battalions ordered on board Sir Charles Wager's fleet, which will suffice for that purpose, and may engage the French, according to his Majesty's intentions, to act generally with us in the war against Spain.

1729, August 7th, Thursday.—On a letter

from Sir Robert Walpole, desiring me to dine with him this day, and other Lords whom the King principally intrusts with his affairs to advise the Queen during his absence, I went there, and dined with him, Lord Trevor, Duke of Newcastle, and Lord Torrington. After dinner he imparted to us two letters from Lord Townshend, intimating the King's pleasure, that as to the affairs of Spain and the fleet, the orders should be given here immediately, without transmitting them to Hanover, and that the King had given orders to the Plenipotentiaries at Paris to receive their orders from hence without expecting them from Hanover. Then he informed us, that Tuesday night, the 5th of August, the Duke of Newcastle had received from Mr. Keene the proposals of Spain, delivered by the Marquis del Paz and Mr. Patino, which we were desired to consider. These proposals were very plain and express in what Spain desired, but very dark and unintelligible as to what we were to have. Too much was desired on their side, and it did not plainly appear what would be granted by them to us. But considering the circumstances of the times, and that it appeared plainly by Spain delivering the effects of the galleons, and promising to deliver the *cedulas*, and from other facts, that Spain

was in a disposition to conclude a treaty with us, though the Ministers of Spain would not speak out plainly what they would do for us, but would rather that it should come from us; therefore we were of opinion that the Queen should write to our Plenipotentiaries at Paris, that the project delivered by the Marquis del Paz to Mr. Keene was crude, obscure, and unsatisfactory. But that, however, with proper alterations and amendments, it might be made sufficient for obtaining a general pacification; and therefore to direct the Plenipotentiaries to draw up in form such articles as to them should seem proper, and to do it in concert with the French and Dutch. It was likewise thought by us, that until farther news from Spain, meaning as to the delivery of the effects of the galleons and the *cedulas*, the fleet should stay in the place where they now are.

It was by a letter from Lord Townshend, dated $\frac{18}{29}$th of August, to the Duke of Newcastle, that it was first intimated that the King being at a distance, had determined, in regard to the uneasiness which he heard the people of England were under, to leave the management of the negotiation with Spain to the Queen, with the advice of those Lords of the Council who

are usually consulted upon foreign affairs, and who, being upon the spot, are better judges of the present temper and disposition of the nation; and the same he repeated again in a letter dated from Rodenkirk $\frac{\text{July 21}}{\text{Aug. 1.}}$

Some time in the month of July, Lord Townshend sent over, by the order of the King, a project of a treaty between the King of France, Holland, and the four Electors, framed by Count Albert, the Duke of Bavaria's Minister at Paris, and considered at Hanover by Lord Townshend and M. Plattenburgh, the Elector of Cologne's Minister (by whom some marginal notes were made on the project). This project with these marginal notes had been sent by Lord Townshend to the Duke of Newcastle, with orders from the King to communicate them to those Lords with whom the Queen usually advised in foreign affairs, and to have their opinion. This was some time in July; I was not at that meeting, but the Lords there, viz. Lord Trevor, Newcastle, Torrington, and Sir R. Walpole, returned for answer, that they thought a treaty on proper terms with the four Electors might be advisable; but the project and the notes being contradictory to one another, and not knowing what was agreed on, they could not tell how to give an opinion upon it.

Upon this, Lord Townshend wrote another letter to the Duke of Newcastle, wherein he says, that the King hoped to have had the opinion of the Lords, as well upon the marginal notes as upon the treaty itself. That no part either of the project or the articles were agreed to; but these were only proposals that might or might not be agreed to, and therefore the King desired to have the opinion of the Lords upon the project and the notes both, that so having their opinion, he might be at liberty to act upon the whole as he should think fit.

Not having time to take this into consideration at this meeting, the 7th August 1729, we agreed to meet again on the Monday following, viz. 11th August, at Sir Robert Walpole's; and accordingly there then met there the Chancellor, the Privy Seal, Dukes of Grafton and Newcastle, Lord Torrington, and Sir R. Walpole. We all took this letter to be a reprimand for not directly answering the first letter, which we did not care to do, not liking the particulars of the treaty. But, however, finding the King had an inclination to this treaty, and that something must be done, we did agree to send now for answer to this effect:—That, considering the present circumstances, we were in a likelihood to agree with Spain, which might provoke the Emperor, it would be advisable to have a body

of troops ready in the Empire for our assistance; but that as to the particulars of this project, we first represented as to the preamble, that it was fit the Elector of Mentz should be a party, because otherwise we have not four Electors, and he was party as Elector of Triers to the treaty of 1724 between the four Electors, which is referred to in the preamble, as to which part of the preamble we could not say any thing, because we had never seen that treaty; but that the preamble of this project related only to the Empire, which would not be acceptable here, whilst the foundation of it was for something of advantage to all the contracting parties, and that in the preamble the King is to covenant for himself as King and Elector, whereas we thought it should only be a general covenant for his Majesty's Britannic dominions generally.

The First article, which was of a general friendship, we had no objection to.

Second article, we objected that the view of the treaty therein recited was too narrow, confining it to the Roman empire, whereas it should be for the benefit of all the contracting parties. The amendment in the marginal notes we thought proper.

Third and Fourth articles agreed to with the amendment in the margin.

So the Fifth and Sixth.

Fifth and Sixth articles—According to my remembrance we did agree thereto.

Article Seven.—We represented the beginning of the article to be engaging too much, even in the general terms, but the particulars, not to make any convention, alliance, or agreement but in concert and with the approbation of the contracting parties, we thought not to be entered into, nor the addition in the marginal notes, that they will not give any guarantee to any one out of this alliance, because this is, in other words, to say that we will never guarantee the Emperor's succession, which, though it be not proper now to do, may be proper under other circumstances, and however proper it may be at another time, we cannot by this article do it, and also because the Electors whose interest is never to do it, will never permit us to do it.

The Eighth article agreed, leaving out as in the margin.

The Ninth article, we thought too narrow, and confined to the Empire too much.

The like our decision as to the Tenth.

The Eleventh article.—We agreed to the amendment made in the margin by the Elector of Cologne's Minister, that this treaty should

continue only for two years, which we thought long enough.

The Twelfth, for keeping the treaty concealed, we agreed to.

First secret article as to the succession of Juliers of Berg, we thought not reasonable nor proper, but agreed to it as amended in the margin, that the King would not take any engagement with the King of Prussia contrary to the Palatine.

Second secret article as to Mecklenburg, which was what the King desired, we agreed to.

Third secret article, containing the demands of the Elector of Cologne, we agreed to the amendment in the margin for the King to pay his quota, and that the King would do nothing as to the Session of Liege without the consent of the States, and would employ all good offices with them — and agreed to what was in the margin.

Fourth secret article relating to Bavaria— disagreed as to what relates to the King. The rest related only to the King of France.

The Duke of Newcastle was desired to draw this into writing, which he did against the next day, and read it to me, Trevor, and the Duke of Grafton the next day at his house in Ken-

sington, Sir R. Walpole and Lord Torrington not being there. He added something by way of amplification and enforcement, which had not been mentioned the day before, which, excepting one, being of no great consequence I did not contradict; but there was one which I could not agree to, and which he struck out, as not being our thought; which was, in that part relating to the guarantee of the Emperor's succession, he unnecessarily mentioned a fact, that though Count Kinski offered on the part of the Emperor to give up the Ostend trade if the King would guarantee the succession, yet the King had refused it. I said that it was a fact I did not know, and if it were so, there was no reason to insert it here. On which it was struck out of the paper, and therefore, if it should be afterwards put in, it is without my consent or knowledge.

Sunday, 17th.—I went in the evening from Ockham to visit the Duke of Newcastle at Claremont, who told me that my company was desired in town the next morning to consult upon a letter come from Hanover, which letter he had not there, but told me the contents of it were, that Lord Townshend wrote, the King did not like the articles proposed by Spain, but looking upon them as

a project or foundation to work upon, and that the Spaniards would expect present performance as to Don Carlos, therefore it was fit to add this article, that in case the King should be molested by the Emperor, or by any other, for this assistance to Don Carlos, that the King of Spain would join with our King against such aggressor. I told him freely my opinion, that I thought our business was to make a definitive treaty at once, not to assist Don Carlos unless the King of Spain granted us our points; and if he granted our points, then to assist him, and care might then be taken according to this additional article proposed by the King;—but to enter into an execution of what was projected with relation to Don Carlos before the whole was concluded, I thought that was what could not be right. I told him, moreover, that if there was nothing else but this to be considered of the next morning, I thought I might well enough stay at Ockham, and not come up to town; which he agreed to, and I did not go to London the next morning.

Sunday 24th.—At the Duke of Newcastle's, present the Duke, myself, Earl Godolphin, Sir R. Walpole, and Mr. Pelham, Secretary of War.

The end of our meeting was to consider of

letters of Lord Townshend's from Hanover, whereby we were informed that the King of Prussia had ordered his forces to begin their march on such a day, and to rendezvous at Magdeburg, and this was with an intention either to fall into Mecklenburg or the King's immediate territories; that the King had ordered all his forces in Hanover to be ready, which were about 22,000; had sent to the Landgrave of Hesse for the 12,000 men in his pay, had also sent to France, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, and that if this matter went on, the King designed to have the same number of men from England as was upon a like occasion intended to have been had over under the conduct of the Earl of Orkney, and therefore ordered us to give an account what that number of men was, where the soldiers lay in the kingdom, and how soon a body of like number of men might be able to be sent over to Hanover. We agreed to send over to the King the last lists returned according to order into the War Office, by which his Majesty would see the number of the whole, and where quartered; that the number of men intended in the late King's time to have been sent over under Lord Orkney, was 10,000; viz. 7,000 foot and 3,000 horse, but what or how

many of this force, or how many dragoons, was never settled; that the King would consider the troops were now dispersed, the horses at grass, and it was uncertain by what time vessels for embarkation might be got ready. But whenever his Majesty pleased to give his orders, we should take care to comply with them in the best manner we could.

This was the substance of what was agreed to, and the Duke of Newcastle was to write it in form. The Lord Townshend, as I think, sent a copy of an intercepted letter from Chauvelin, the *garde des sceaux*, to Chamorel, the French Secretary here, wherein he writes him, that the affairs with Spain were not yet determined, but might be if the English would show a little more facility. This I understood to be their yielding in general words to let the affair of Gibraltar be still open.

Monday, 2nd September, 1729, went to town.—The next day saw the Queen at Court; from thence went to Sir R. Walpole's in his chariot, and dined with him and his lady only. He told me, that since the last time I saw him, they had received the draught of articles for a definitive peace concerted between our Plenipotentiaries and the Cardinal and the *garde des sceaux;* that they were so plain and good, that

they did not think it worth the while to send for me to come to town to see and agree to them, or to give any farther instruction; that they were as good as we could desire, he was afraid too good—but, however, the Cardinal said that he was sure Spain would come into it; that, for expedition, as soon as they were agreed on in France, they were immediately sent to Spain, and were there by this time. In talking with him about the King's orders, that orders for the fleet and the negotiations with Spain should be all from hence without first sending to Hanover, he told me that Lord Townshend was very much displeased at it; that he in concert with the Queen gained it by a stratagem; that the Queen wrote a letter to the King intimating that some people thought the orders for the fleet were too long coming from Hanover, but that she would not for the world desire the King to send a power to her or to any one—here to give immediate orders; that would be to execute a power which belonged only to him, and should be only executed by him. Whereon he wrote her a letter, that he would trust his throne and kingdom entirely with her, and thereupon ordered, that not only the fleet, but also the Plenipotentiaries at Paris

should receive their immediate orders from hence, and not stay for his.

On this occasion he let me into several secrets relating to the King and Queen—that the King constantly wrote to her by every opportunity long letters of two or three sheets, being generally of all his actions—what he did every day, even to minute things, and particularly of his amours, what women he admired and used; and that the Queen, to continue him in a disposition to do what she desired, returned as long letters, and approved even of his amours, and of the women he used; not scrupling to say, that she was but one woman, and an old woman, and that he might love more and younger women, and she was very willing he should have the best of them. By which means, and a perfect subserviency to his will, she effected whatsoever she desired, without which it was impossible to keep him within any bounds.

Tuesday, 3rd.—News came from the King, that he desired to return as soon as possible, whereon the yachts and ships were immediately ordered.

Sunday, 7th.—At noon, the Duke of Newcastle sent a letter to me from Claremont, desiring me to meet him and the rest of

the Lords in town the Monday at dinner at Sir R. Walpole's, to consider of the project and articles of peace drawn up by our Plenipotentiaries, and transmitted from them. This looked to me very strange, because last Monday, the 2nd September, when I was in town, Sir R. Walpole told me of these articles, and that they had already been sent to Spain for their concurrence. Whereupon I went to the Duke's in the evening, and not finding him at Claremont, I followed him to his . . . . . where I found him, and told him that I had determined to go a journey into Hampshire to-morrow morning, viz. to Lord Delaware's; that Sir R. Walpole knew of my going a journey, and that he who had told me all this matter when I was in town, knew that now my coming back again upon this matter would be no significancy. The Duke would not own that there was this early news in town of these articles, and stood to it that he received them not till Thursday last. There was some evasion in this. He was out of town, it may be, and might not have them till Thursday. But certainly Sir Robert Walpole told me of them the Monday before. And when I desired to know of the Duke, what we were to do at this meeting, seeing they were already

gone to Spain, he told me that this meeting was at his desire. That though nothing could now be altered therein, they being gone to Spain, yet the King having left the management of this affair to Lords here, he thought it requisite that on the King's coming, now expected, the Lords should be ready to lay before the King what had been done, and their opinion thereon. I told him, that if this was all, it was not sufficient reason to divert me from my journey, which I could not possibly take at any other time, and therefore desired him to get me excused, which in some few words he promised to do, and that he would excuse me both to the Lords and to the Queen, and also take care of the prorogation of the Parliament, for which there was to be an order of Council next Tuesday, and that on the Clerk of the Crown waiting on him with the Bill for the prorogation, he would procure the Queen to sign it, that so it may be ready for me to see when I came to town, which I intended to do Monday, 15th October.

November 5th, 1730.—On a summons of the Cabinet Council, there met at Lord Harrington's office, himself, Lord Wilmington, Lord Torrington, and myself: when Lord Harrington told us that the King had news that a Spa-

nish man-of-war, coming from Carthagena to Spain with a great quantity of money and effects, had been cast away at St. Pedro's Shoals, about ten leagues from Jamaica; and that they had help from Jamaica to save what could be saved out of the ship, and that an officer had been ashore at Jamaica to desire help for that purpose, and that the King desired us to advise him whether he should not on some pretext or other detain the silver and effects, to be disposed of as hereafter should seem reasonable. By the treaty of Seville, the Spaniards were to restore the money and effects they had seized of ours during the rupture; among which was 200,000*l.* in silver belonging to the South Sea. The King of Spain had given orders to his officers in the West Indies to restore it, but they said they had contrary orders from Patino, to send it home to Europe, which they had done. So that as yet we had no restitution, and if there were the same sums to be met with in this shipwrecked ship, by this means we might obtain restitution. On the whole, we were of opinion that a frigate should be sent forthwith to Jamaica under pretext of carrying orders to the Governor, to provide place and conveniencies for the two regiments of soldiers that were to go thither from Gibraltar; but that a letter

should be writ to him to take care and help the Spaniards in securing all the silver and effects, that he should take an exact account in their presence, and by their concurrence, of all the silver and effects that were saved, put them in safe custody, and then tell them that he would give an account thereof to England, and have orders from thence about the delivery.

November 8, 1730.—At Lord Harrington's, present myself, Duke of Newcastle, Lord Wilmington, Lord Harrington, Lord Torrington, and Horace Walpole. The Duke of Newcastle informed the company that the King had promised the French King to permit him to list 750 men in Ireland, to fill up the Irish regiments in France, and that French officers were gone over, and at Dublin. But this had made so great a noise there, that the Primate and other justices did not care to meddle therein but by positive and direct orders from hence; that therefore it was thought reasonable that we should endeavour to get a discharge of this promise from France, and it was proposed to consider in what manner to write to France to this purpose. The Duke said that it had been thought a proper way to let France know the disturbance the putting it in execution would do at this present, and there-

fore desire them to waive it; but if, notwithstanding, they insisted upon it, the King would certainly do it. I gave my opinion that at the first view I did not think it proper to enter into any new engagement, but what to do I could not tell till I was first satisfied of the legality of it, and when I was satisfied as to that, I would give the best opinion I could. It was then agreed that the Attorney General, who had given his opinion for the legality, should wait upon me to show me his opinion, and the reason of it, and when I had considered, this matter should be resumed. When the Duke of Newcastle proposed this, he introduced it with telling me that I had been acquainted with and well knew the several steps that had been taken in this matter. I said he was mistaken, for I never heard of it till last Thursday from Lord Harrington.

Wednesday, Nov. 11th.—The same persons as before were at Lord Harrington's, and the Duke of Newcastle desired the company to advise what was best to be done with relation to the permitting the filling up the Irish regiments in the French King's service. As to the legality, this depending upon an Act of Parliament in Ireland, it might be taken for granted, that, following the direction of that law, it was legal.

As to the prudential part of it, all wished no such promise had been made. But it was affirmed by the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Harrington, that such promise had been frequently made, and therefore it was the thought of all that proper application should be made to the Court of France to obtain a discharge of it; and the Duke of Newcastle took out a copy of an intended letter to the Cardinal, the purport whereof was to lay before him the great alarm this made in Ireland, and the great impediment there would be to the King's affairs if it were insisted on, which it was hoped the French King would take into consideration, withal assuring him that if he should not like to comply with this reasonable request of our King, upon the return of the courier the King's promise should be performed. I objected against this last clause, and gave it as my opinion that the King should not put himself under any new engagement. What was passed could not be helped, but he should not anew tie himself down. But except Lord Torrington, every one present was against this, alleging that the best way to procure this act of amity from France was to show the King's adherence to his promises. I thought this had no solid argument in it, therefore still declared my opinion

that it should not be done. But at the instance of Lord Torrington, they softened the assurance of doing it the next courier, by saying that if the King of France insists on it, it should be done *d'abord*.

Friday, Nov. 13th.—In the evening at Lord Harrington's; present the same company. The *Memoire* of the Marquis de Castelar delivered at Paris was read, and several things said about it, but no resolution taken, the matter only talked over.

Monday, Nov. 16th.—At Lord Harrington's; present myself, Lord Wilmington, Duke of Newcastle, Lord Harrington, Sir R. Walpole, and Horace Walpole. The *Memoire* of Castelar was proposed to be considered, and what answer to give to it; or rather what instructions should be given to Lord Waldegrave about it. Lord Harrington and Horace Walpole said there was a necessity to instruct Lord Waldegrave that the King was ready to enter into a war to execute the treaty of Seville, as soon as a plan of the operations should be settled. Myself and the Duke of Newcastle thought that too much, to say we would enter into a war before the plan of the operations was settled. Sir R. Walpole proposed some other words to the same purpose as the former, against

which there was no opposition. As for the plan of operations, Lord Waldegrave was instructed to hint that he believed we would come into those which were settled in 1727, which I knew nothing of, and so declared, but hoped they had then been well settled.

Wednesday 25th. The Duke of Newcastle sent me a copy of the letter wrote by him to Lord Waldegrave, November 19th, 1730, wherein he writ in these words to him. "I am now to send you his Majesty's commands, as well upon the answer to be given to the Marquis de Castelar's memorial, as upon the measures to be taken in consequence of it.

"His Majesty being persuaded that a perfect union among the Allies is what must have the greatest effect not only upon the Court of Spain, but also upon that of Vienna, looks upon it to be absolutely necessary that the answer should be made jointly by you all; and would therefore have your Excellency press the French and Dutch Ministers, that you may all join in a general answer, which in his Majesty's opinion ought to be such as may give entire satisfaction and security to his Catholic Majesty for the execution of the treaty of Seville. In order to which his Majesty thinks that you should by the said answer jointly declare that the Allies

are ready, without loss of time, to enter upon the measures prescribed by the sixth, separate and secret article of that treaty for overcoming the opposition on the part of the Emperor to the introduction of Spanish garrisons, by concerting and fixing a plan of operations, by joining their forces and beginning the war as soon as the season of the year will permit. And that there may no doubt remain of the sincerity of his Majesty's intentions upon this head, your Excellency is to acquaint M. Castelar and the other Ministers, that you are fully informed of the King's sentiments as to the measures that his Majesty thinks proper to be taken for that purpose, and the share his Majesty is willing to bear towards them. His Majesty is of opinion, that as the object and sole end of the war has at last been assigned and declared by all the Allies to be the introduction of the Spanish garrisons, and that this being once effected, the said treaty is fully executed, the Generals and other military officers of the Allies, now at Paris, should forthwith assemble and consider upon, and form a plan of measures and operations of the war, to be undertaken for the end above mentioned; that the stress of the war should be in Italy where the object of it lies, and consequently an of-

fensive one should be carried there;—that in Flanders we should remain upon the defensive, and in Germany such a disposition should be made of the troops of the Allies as may not only be sufficient for their own security, but also to deter the Emperor from pouring his whole force into Italy, and to be in a condition to act as the circumstances of affairs may require. That for carrying on the war in Italy with success, your Excellency should propose the renewing forthwith the negotiations with the King of Sardinia, and that in order to gain him, a considerable subsidy should be offered him in all events and an assurance of acquisitions in case of a war. That his Majesty is willing to engage to give the same subsidy as England furnished to the Duke of Saxony during the last war, which was about £150,000 per annum, provided the other Allies will contribute in proportion, either in subsidies or troops, which will enable his Sardinian Majesty to provide for his own security, and also to bring a considerable number of troops into the field for the service of the Allies. That your Excellency is to consent to any reasonable plan that may be proposed for attacking the Emperor in Italy, either by sea or land, or both; and if with and above the

subsidies above mentioned to the King of Sardinia, which are to be reckoned as part of the contingents, any thing more should be required of his Majesty towards the war in Italy, the King is willing to furnish it in ships, but not in land forces, considering the danger and expense that would attend the sending of national troops so far.

"As to the forces to be employed by the Allies in Germany and Flanders, the same numbers may fully suffice as were settled for that purpose by the plan formed in the year 1727, and his Majesty is willing to furnish what was thereby allotted to him. But before any plan is put in execution on that side, it will be absolutely necessary to demand of the King of Prussia to explain himself as to the part he intends to take, which was always proposed to be done before any operations were to be begun. As his Catholic Majesty must be convinced by this of the sincerity of the Allies towards him, M. Castelar should be given to understand that when the Allies are taking these vigorous measures for the service of Spain, they cannot but expect an exact performance of the treaty of Seville by his Catholic Majesty towards them and their subjects, which depends singly upon the pleasure

of the King of Spain, and can neither be attended with expense or *hazard* to him."

The Duke of Newcastle by the same post, and of the same date, wrote another private letter to the Earl of Waldegrave, in which he writes him, that having by his other letter been fully informed of his Majesty's intention, he was persuaded he would make such use of it to satisfy Monsieur de Castelar, of the sincerity with which the King acts towards Spain; and as his (*i. e.* Waldegrave's) chief view should be to hinder Castelar, if possible, from making the extravagant declaration he has so often threatened, and returning abruptly to Spain, which might be attended with very ill consequences, his Majesty left it to him to execute his orders in such manner as should be most proper for that purpose.

The Duke likewise directs him to explain to M. Castelar, his Majesty's conduct ever since the signing of the treaty of Seville, and to show that the non-execution of it could not be attributed to the King.

The only project that was brought to any kind of consistency last summer, was the attempt upon Sicily, which had the approbation of all the Allies; and the King's quota, both of ships and troops, was actually in the Mediter-

ranean time enough to have executed it if the other Allies had thought it proper.

That it will be easy to show M. Castelar, that the method the King has now suggested is the only practical one of procuring the introduction of the Spanish garrisons by force; for the confining the war chiefly to Italy, where that introduction is to be made, is not only the most natural but what all the Allies can without difficulty agree in. Whereas the proposing general and extensive plans, if not done purely to avoid doing any thing, must create questions which will necessarily take up a great deal of time, and may possibly be attended with insurmountable difficulties. And M. Castelar must himself see, that the flinging out, as M. Chauvelin did, the proposal of attacking Flanders, so far from being a sign of their intention to do any thing, is a plain indication of the contrary. For if England and Holland would consent, which they never can, to have any operations there, how would the introduction of Spanish garrisons be forwarded by it? especially when, in all probability, the Emperor would not give himself much trouble about what should be done in those parts, thinking the interest of the maritime powers more concerned in that question than his own.

The proposing of an extravagant contingent to be furnished by his Majesty, may possibly be done with the same view, and therefore M. Castelar should see that the insisting upon any thing unreasonable, is a sure way to have nothing done. His Majesty proposes to give the King of Sardinia a subsidy of 150,000*l.* per annum, which, according to the usual computation in treaties, is equivalent to above 13,000 foot; and besides this, to have a squadron of men-of-war in the Mediterranean to act for the carrying on the war in Italy; and when and above all this, by the plan of 1727, his Majesty was to furnish 12,000 English, 12,000 Hessians, and 20,000 Hanoverians, which ought to be reckoned as part of his Majesty's contingent; so that without reckoning the King's own Hanoverian troops, England will furnish to the value of 37,000 men besides a squadron of men-of-war.

By the same post, the Duke wrote a very private letter, of the same date, to Lord Waldegrave, wherein he writes, that after what the Cardinal had told him, that he had absolutely refused M. Castelar to write to England for obtaining such orders to Lord Waldegrave as he desired, his Majesty was surprised to find that M. Chauvelin had done it, as he would

see by Mr. Broglio's letter to him, of which he enclosed a copy, as also of his short answer to it. The Duke writes, that no doubt Chauvelin did this at Castelar's instigation, and communicated to him the very letter before he sent it away, thinking by that management to persuade the Court of Spain of their readiness to fulfill their engagements, when probably they are only shifting off the blame from themselves by proposing to others what they think will not be consented to. That his Majesty has no other way to disappoint them, but by pursuing the same steady and uniform conduct he has always done, showing his readiness to execute instantly the treaty of Seville, and to enter into the proper measures for that purpose.

The letter of Broglio referred to, was dated at London $\frac{17}{28}$ November, 1730, from Broglio to the Duke of Newcastle, wherein he writes, that *Monsieur Le Garde des Sceaux* had informed him, that he had had a conference with my Lord Waldegrave, M. Hungrogene, and M. Castelar, which last very warmly pressed for a positive answer upon the means to execute the sixth, separate and secret article of the treaty of Seville, and that he had intimated to that Minister, that the King his Master was ready to employ in this expedition all his

troops proportionably to what the allies of Spain would do.

Broglio goes on to write that France could not be suspected of preferring war to peace, but that their partial endeavour jointly with the Allies having had but small success, the common honour of all the Allies engaged them not to defer any longer to take all necessary measures to make the Court of Vienna know that the engagements of the treaty of Seville neither are nor will be illusory; that it is too long time that people have nourished themselves in the error that the Allies are not of accord among themselves, and that being animated by different interests, it will be easy to divide them, or that being united only in appearance, they will but weakly concur in the operations of the war; that this prejudice is the principal motive which hath engaged hitherto the Ministers of the Emperor to be inflexible on the head of the introduction of Spanish garrisons; that one cannot oppose the reasons of M. Castelar, especially when, without abandoning himself to uncertain and general propositions, he demands only the effectuation of Spanish garrisons. That it is no more a question to restrain it to the only war in Italy, which will be impossible to undertake

with hope of success, considering the number of the Emperor's troops in Italy, and that he is master of all the posts and places by which an entrance might be made. That it is necessary generally to unite all our forces, to force the Emperor to divide his—by attacking him on other sides, and to endeavour to enlist the King of Sardinia in our interest, being the two only means to arrive at the introduction of Spanish garrisons, which engages the King, my master, to desire his Britannic Majesty to labour to form this plan, by furnishing, in proportion with us, a number of sufficient troops to execute it. That when our forces are thus united and directed in concert, they are so superior, that there is no fear of a long continuance of a war; that the King his master hopes, that upon all these considerations, the King of Great Britain will not refuse to determine himself upon the number of national troops which he will employ for an offensive war generally with those of his master, and also upon the kind of operations. That every moment being precious, it will be too long to expect to deliberate at the meeting of the Parliament. That the King, his master, waits only for this determination to give his last orders, and to

make speedy dispositions for the opening of the next Campaign.

This letter was writ for an ostensible letter, and to throw the blame of any delay upon us.

The Duke of Newcastle returned to Broglio a short answer, dated November 19, that the King was always so inclined to the execution of the treaty of Seville that he sees with pleasure the Court of France to be in the same sentiments, who must too well know the conduct of his Majesty not to do him justice to the Court of Spain on this head. As we are agreed upon the *fond de l'affaire*, it now remains only likewise to agree upon the means to come to the end proposed: a plan upon which the Allies may equally concur will be the only way to fulfil our engagements with Spain, and showing to the Court of Vienna that they neither are nor will be illusory. It is upon this principle that his Majesty hath sent orders to Lord Waldegrave to concert with the ministers of the Allies an unanimous answer to the memorial of the Marquis de Castelar, and the measures to take in consequence.

1732.—In the beginning of October, 1732, in an evening I was at the Duke of Newcastle's in Kensington, where were present

most of the Cabinet Council, Sir Charles Wager and Commodore Stewart, to consider of a letter from Mr. Petuchio to Mr. Keene, complaining of an unjust capture of a rich Spanish register ship in the bay of Campechy, and leaving it to the King's discretion to do therein what he should think just. The fact was this. The 1st of September, 1730, on account of the clamours about the Spaniards taking our ships in the West Indies, orders were sent to Commodore Stewart, that if any English ships were for the future taken by the Spaniards, to go and demand a restitution, and in case of denial to make reprisals. But Stewart, when these orders were sent to him, by the advice of the South Sea Company's factors and others, suspended the execution of them. In June 1731, the Spaniards took an English ship called the Woolball; but Stewart did not then attempt to make any reprisals, because he had taken upon him to suspend the orders for so doing. In October 1731, there being fresh hostilities committed, the orders to make reprisals were renewed to him. Soon after this matters were accommodated between Spain and England, and the Schedule to the South Sea was sent, dated October 18. January 1731-2, the Schedule for putting an end to all hostilities was

signed at Seville, 1731-2. Capt. Stewart received the Schedule the 28th of April, 1732, but before that time, viz. 6th of April 1732, he sent Capt. Aubin to Campechy to demand the Woolball, and in case of refusal to make reprisals. Accordingly he made the demand at Campechy the 6th of April 1731-2, and they refusing to restore the Woolball, he took a Spanish register rich ship then in the bay of Campechy, and carried it away to Jamaica, where it now is.

This Petucchio insists upon to be an unjust capture, and was like to be of ill consequences in the West Indies. This being the fact, the Duke of Newcastle said that the King had ordered this meeting to advise him what to do: and after debating the matter *pro et con*, it was agreed that the Spanish Ambassador being hourly expected, we would suspend the coming to any conclusion till the Duke of Newcastle should first send him word about it, which he accordingly did; and about a week after this first meeting, there was a second meeting of the cabinet, when the Duke of Newcastle reported that he had spoke with the Conde de Montejo, who declared that he had no orders about it, but that he had private letters informing him of such a fact, that he believed in his

own private judgment nothing could make Spain easy but a restitution of the ship, which had been taken contrary to all engagements. We thought that it was not fit to make a rupture about this matter, and, rather than that should be, to restore the ship.

THE END.

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